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The research question that motivates this dissertation is: How do firms build 
new-to-the-world kinds of businesses that serve markets that do not yet exist? 
To answer it, I begin by drawing on theories of inductive entrepreneurial 
processes such as improvisation, bricolage, effectuation, interpretive 
processes, and reflective practice to develop an integrative framework for 
examining how opportunities are constructed. The framework‟s components – 
flexible goals, network transformation, leveraging of contingencies, and 
resource reenactment – help distinguish when entrepreneurs act to construct 
opportunities rather than discover and exploit them. 
Using this synthetic framework as a lens, and contrasting it to an opportunity 
discovery mindset, I then examine the cases of the two western firms that 
deployed field teams to create and launch novel businesses in undeveloped 
markets – the base of the economic pyramid (BOP). These businesses were 
intended to provide innovative products and services for which no there were 
no extant markets; they were also intended to produce social and 
environmental benefits while creating value for their shareholders. 
I term the grounded theory that emerges from these ethnographic studies: 
entrepreneurial sensemaking. In this process, the enactment of an opportunity 
 discovery mindset in the firms‟ upper echelons contrasts with the opportunity 
construction logic used by the field team. The interaction of these distinct 
outlooks leads to the development of a hybrid logic that meshes some of the 
firms‟ initial goals with the artifacts and opportunities that are constructed non-
linearly in the field and embeds them in the new venture. 
The dissertation contributes to our understanding of: firms‟ innovation 
strategies for serving the BOP, the conditions that induce opportunity 
construction, entrepreneurship as a social process that stretches beyond the 
single entrepreneur or entrepreneurial team, a category of bottom-up meets 
top-down strategy making process, and how innovation processes that require 
isolation from existing networks can be combined with those that call for the 
leveraging of established relationships. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In their quest for growth and survival, firms often enter new geographies to 
achieve synergies and economies of scope (Teece, 1980). When choosing 
new markets to expand to, a “related diversification” logic often rules (Rumelt, 
1974); firms look to markets where they can leverage their existing strengths 
and capabilities to attain a competitive edge (Klepper & Simons, 2000; Helfat 
& Lieberman, 2002; King & Tucci, 2002). The basic logic behind expansion to 
new geographical markets is that these are opportunities for growth that can 
be captured without having to drastically renew competencies and reconfigure 
resources1. So as firms move to sell products and services in new 
geographies, they usually remain within the same narrow industry (Hennart, 
2009). 
The larger the firm, the more certainty and greater likelihood of profits it 
requires in order to pursue an opportunity for expansion (Bhidé, 2004). Thus, 
most multinational expansion occurs horizontally, between countries that have 
mirroring market structures or similar economic potential; it occurs across 
correspondingly munificent environments in which firm-specific resources 
retain their value (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1998; Hennart, 2009). 
Established firms tend to enter less munificent (i.e. poorer) geographies when 
one of two opportunities for expansion present themselves: (1) cheaper 
versions of the firms products – usually achieved by reducing functionality or 
 
                                                                                                                                            
1
 I refer to expansion related to sales; firms also expand internationally to secure inputs (for 
example, by integrating vertically or producing in countries with low labor costs). 
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quality – are perceived to be attractive to the market, or (2) the segment of the 
foreign market with equivalent purchasing power to their home market has 
become large enough to become a market in its own right for the firm‟s 
existing products (Ghemawat, 2001). Although firms still face difficulties when 
they expand into less developed countries (Wells, 1998; Cuervo-Cazurra & 
Un, 2004), this has been the most prevalent model of sales-driven, North-to-
South, corporate expansion in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Wilkins 
(2005) calls it the “American model” even though most multinational 
enterprises are western European (Roach, 2005). Following in the footsteps of 
Prahalad and Doz (1987, 1991) – who characterize diversified multinational 
corporations as multidimensional and heterogeneous organizations that mesh 
global and local functions – Immelt, Govindarajan & Trimble (2009) call this 
phenomenon glocalization: manufacturers in rich countries develop products 
at home and then distribute them worldwide with some adaptations to local 
conditions, “skimming the top of the emerging markets.” 
Some western firms, such as the Coca Cola Company, have products and 
services that have a broad appeal, and have thus been able to take the exact 
same product across the world. Other firms start with their existing product 
offerings and use them to make inroads into developing markets, usually 
serving the small high-income brackets of the population which can afford 
higher-priced goods. Once they‟ve established a foothold and begin to 
produce locally, these firms often enable their subsidiaries to begin 
experimenting with product development and alternate distribution channels in 
an attempt to increase sales – sometimes by targeting slightly poorer 
segments of the population. Fast moving consumer packaged goods firms 
such as Unilever, Nestle, and P&G are classic examples of this mode of entry 
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and subsequent expansion (Prahalad & Doz, 1987; Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1998; 
Wilkins, 2005). 
 
FIRMS AND THE BOP 
Over the last fifteen years there‟s been a surge in efforts – by both small and 
large firms – to establish a different pattern of entry into developing country 
markets. Instead of moving laterally to serve the top of the local income 
pyramid with their existing products, they are attempting to directly serve the 
base of the economic pyramid – the poor (Prahalad & Lieberthal, 1998; 
Prahalad & Hammond, 2002; Prahalad & Hart, 2002; London & Hart, 2004). 
This approach contradicts the expansion logic described above. The poor 
sectors of developing country societies – known as the base of the economic 
pyramid, or BOP – are usually so different, non-munificent, and foreign to 
established firms serving richer markets, that attempts to use incumbent 
capabilities (e.g. stripped down products, existing distribution channels, etc.) to 
serve them generally flounder and fail. Very few products and services as 
designed for developed markets are attractive to the BOP at sustainable price 
points. As they realize this, firms are finding they have to develop entirely new 
businesses to reach the BOP (Immelt, Govindarajan & Trimble, 2009). 
So why are firms now attempting to serve the BOP? From a conventional point 
of view, it does not make sense; the market space is not munificent, expected 
pay-offs are very uncertain, and firms‟ current capabilities and assets provide 
no immediate leverage or differential advantage. Despite this, increasing 
numbers of firms from the global North are targeting the BOP, in the last 
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fifteen years, hundreds – if not thousands – of corporate initiatives at the BOP 
have been undertaken2. 
To be clear, western firms and corporations have been selling to the poor for 
centuries (Wilkins, 1970; Hertner & Jones, 1986; Wilkins, 2005). But this has 
been in cases where the traditional expansion logic holds – the firms happen 
to have a product or service they believe is appealing to the segment and 
profitable for the company. What distinguishes this newer mode of corporate 
involvement with the BOP is its double motivation. Most new initiatives 
targeting the BOP strive to both "do well and do good" (Margolis & Walsh, 
2001). While some initiatives are driven from a pure corporate social 
responsibility orientation – meaning that they are seen mostly as cost-center 
activities that provide corporate-level benefits in terms of public goodwill, 
enhanced corporate reputation, or more lenient regulation – others are driven 
by the emerging social movement captured in the motto "applying business 
thinking to solving the world's problems". This broad movement is embodied in 
terms such as: social entrepreneurship, BOP strategies, social business, 
sustainable enterprise, market-based approaches to poverty alleviation, 
inclusive marketing, and private sector-led development. 
Although the movement is still emergent and somewhat inchoate, it has 
proven very powerful in some sectors and induced the mobilization of 
significant resources. For example, the Inter-American Development Bank 
created its Opportunities for the Majority Initiative to engage the private sector 
in developing businesses for the BOP, and funded it with more than $100 
 
                                                                                                                                            
2
 Just to give one example, the Opportunities for the Majority Index (developed by the Inter-
American Bank and Innovest) includes seventy five publicly traded national and multinational 
firms operating in the Latin American region that are engaged in BOP-targeted activity. 
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million dollars; the World Bank‟s International Finance Corporation 2009 
portfolio dedicated $1.4 billion dollars in investment and advisory service 
projects to support commercial BOP initiatives; independent investment funds 
such as IGNIA, Good Capital, and Elevar Equity have amassed hundreds of 
millions of dollars to invest in this area. 
One of the movement‟s earliest and most visible proponents has been 
Muhammad Yunus, the micro-credit pioneer. The microfinance movement, 
which traces its origins to the 1970‟s, can be seen as one branch of the larger 
“business thinking to solve social problems” movement. Its focus and nature is 
embodied in the motto “business by the BOP” since its intent is to stimulate 
the poor to create and run businesses themselves. Its key underlying 
argument is that the poor are trapped in their situation by a set of structural 
elements (e.g. lack of capital, oppressive governance systems, or 
unproductive lands), and that “business thinking” or a “market orientation” is 
the mechanism that can remove or alter these constraints. Once these 
constraints are removed, then the poor can bootstrap themselves out of 
poverty; one only has to remove the barriers that restrict their creativity and 
industriousness. Thus, de Soto (2000) argues for restructuring property and 
business rights in developing countries so that the poor may “unleash” the 
power of their capital, and Sen (2000) advocates eliminating the “unfreedoms” 
that limit the poor‟s self-directed development. 
The other main branch of the movement, which originated in developed 
countries, can be termed "business for the BOP", and is characterized by 
Prahalad and Hart‟s (2002) exhortation to large western firms to pursue “the 
fortune at the bottom of the pyramid”. As the title of Prahalad and Hart‟s article 
insinuates, this perspective is unconventional in that it envisions substantial 
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profit potential at the BOP. Instead of bottom-up development driven by people 
at the BOP lifting themselves out of poverty, the "business for the BOP" 
movement envisions western private-sector actors building businesses 
designed specifically to serve the BOP. These businesses are to be both 
profitable and solve some social or environmental problem. This stream of the 
movement is often criticized for “infantilizing” the BOP, promoting a new form 
of “corporate” imperialism, and striving to homogenize the world for the benefit 
of corporations (Prahalad & Lieberthal, 1998; Chandler & Mazlish, 2005; 
Simanis, Hart, & Duke, 2008; Hart, 2010). These critiques emanate from the 
belief that pursuing profits and social good simultaneously is almost 
oxymoronic; at best, these goals are incompatible, at worst, they are 
contradictory. 
But it is this double motive which provides the movement with its potency, 
benefiting oneself while benefiting others is a powerful vision; it also poses 
some very interesting practical and theoretical challenges. As mentioned, 
historically, business expansion to the BOP has been unhindered by this split 
rationale. If profits or growth is the single driver, then a firm decides to enter 
the BOP only when it thinks it has an advantage. But if in addition to profits, a 
firm also wants to have significant social impact, its problem space and logic of 
action changes drastically. First of all, entering the BOP is a given – the firm 
has to enter the BOP in order to have a beneficial impact, regardless of 
whether it has any relevant competency or product suited for the BOP. 
Secondly, even if the firm has a product that may be attractive to BOP 
markets, it is extremely unlikely that the product will naturally produce the 
poverty reduction or environmental benefits the firm desires. Quite the 
opposite, the western products with broad BOP appeal have traditionally had 
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deleterious effects (e.g. soda, refined flour, alcohol, cigarettes, fatty and 
sugary snacks, arms, etc.). So by definition, the firm usually has to create a 
new business, a new offering, and a new delivery system that could potentially 
provide the profits and social benefits envisioned. 
This situation motivates the central research question of my dissertation: 
How do firms create novel businesses in new market space? 
 
DOING BUSINESS WITH THE BOP 
Most of the early documented attempts of firms creating novel businesses to 
serve the BOP, such as Nike‟s World Shoe (McDonald, London & Hart, 2002), 
and Hindustan Lever‟s Wheel soap (Ellison & Rodríguez, 2003), applied 
western corporations‟ traditional methods for new product development to the 
task. The firms essentially followed Kotler‟s (1988) dictums – they used market 
surveys to identify and delineate their target market, conducted "willingness to 
pay" studies to determine prices and configure their cost structures, and in 
some cases even deployed professional ethnographers to observe how locals 
lived and design their products to "fit" local lifestyles. They negotiated terms 
with their existing or new distribution channel partners, set up regional supply 
chains, created marketing campaigns, etc. Once everything was in place, they 
launched the businesses. 
This approach to launching businesses is not only applied by foreign or 
multinational firms. Yunus describes the same process for launching 
Grameen-Danone's joint venture to produce and sell yoghurt in Bangladesh 
(Yunus, 2007). By his own account, it took Yunus six months to get from an 
initial meeting to a memorandum of understanding with Danone that stated the 
business objectives – with poverty alleviation being a central goal – and an 
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agreement to invest $1.1 million dollars. It then took the venture a year to set 
things up, even though it relied extensively on Grameen's well-established 
business networks in the Bangladeshi BOP and Danone's global production, 
product engineering, and marketing capabilities. Amongst other things, 
Grameen and Danone spent two hundred thousand dollars to buy a rural plot 
of land, designed and then built a new-generation mid-scale yoghurt plant, 
found a Chinese provider of edible yogurt cups, organized local smallholder 
farmers to serve as raw material suppliers, and worked with GAIN (a Swiss 
nutrition organization) to develop, test, and validate a program to ensure that 
the product would deliver the expected and meaningful benefits to the poor 
(Yunus, 2007). After more than a year of preparations and more than a million 
dollars spent up front, the business was finally launched. 
As exemplified by the Grameen-Danone joint venture, most firms targeting the 
BOP develop their new products and businesses as they would for a low-risk, 
developed market expansion (Bhidé, 2004) – they invest significant resources 
to set things up before launching. After some very public and expensive 
failures, such as P&G‟s PuR initiative (Hanson & Powell, 2006), some firms 
have realized that this way of creating new businesses is actually very risky. 
Product launches are hit-or-miss affairs in developed markets, but these 
markets at least have a base level of coherence and expectations since 
potential customers are accustomed to pay for a wide array of products and 
services, and are generally willing to try new ones if they conform to broad 
existent categories. At the BOP, these efforts are even more likely to fail 
because there are no extant markets for the kinds of products and services 
that generate social or environmental benefits, there usually aren't even any 
markets for similar or substitute products. 
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In reaction to these failures, yet sometimes inadvertently, a number of firms 
have launched businesses at the BOP in a different, more iterative way. 
Realizing that prediction counts for little in this "turbulent" environment, they 
have followed an "innovate with the BOP" approach (Simanis, Hart & Duke, 
2008). 
Again, Yunus (1999) provides an early example of this more iterative 
approach. His initial micro-credit venture was developed in an experimental 
fashion that explored many options over several years. He arrived in 
Bangladesh in 1972, but was really driven to action by the 1974 famine, which 
turned his attention towards farming and searching for ways to produce more 
food. At one point, he personally began to teach farmers how to farm, "the 
local newspaper published photos of us, knee-deep in mud, showing local 
farmers how to use a string to plant rice in a straight line" (Yunus, 1999). In 
late 1975, he turned to the "problem of irrigation" to raise a winter crop and 
created Nabajug Three Share Farm. It was through this organization that he 
began his first experiments with providing credit – to the relatively richer 
farmers of the community he was working in. In 1976, he began visiting the 
poorest farmers, searching for ways to help them, rather than their richer 
brethren. He generated his first micro-loan ($27 USD to enable 42 people to 
work) in an off-the-cuff reaction to his interview with a female stool maker. He 
financed the first loan himself, requesting no interest or repayment schedule. It 
then took him six months of negotiation with a local bank to line up a follow-up 
$300 loan to the poor. In his own words: 
"I did not know anything about how to run a bank for the poor, so I had 
to learn from scratch… Slowly my colleagues and I developed our own 
delivery-recovery mechanism and, of course, we made many mistakes 
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along the way. We adapted our ideas and changed our procedures as 
we grew. For example, when we discovered that support groups were 
crucial to the success of our operations, we required that each 
applicant join a group of like-minded people living in similar economic 
and social conditions." (Yunus, 1999) 
Peer group lending – the mechanism Yunus virtually stumbled upon – is now a 
central tenet of micro-finance the world over. Grameen Bank is now officially 
recognized as having started in January of 1977, but more than a year later it 
was still considered Yunus's "Jobra experiment". It took the firm more than 
twenty years to reach the milestone of $100 million in loans (Yunus, 1999). 
To be fair, while the origin of Grameen Bank nicely depicts how iterative 
business development at the BOP can occur, it does not represent the case of 
a western firm starting a business in a foreign country – Yunus didn't represent 
anyone but himself at the start, was a native to the area, and was primarily 
focused on providing social benefits. To this day, Yunus eschews the pursuit 
of profits when serving the poor (Baron, 2008), Danone clashed with him when 
it specified that its joint venture with Grameen be established as a for-profit 
enterprise (Yunus, 1999). Yunus apparently uses certain "business methods" 
and "business thinking" almost by accident, partly because he was trained as 
an economist and therefore naturally gravitated towards thinking in terms of 
capital and funds; and partly because his initial partners were banks. 
Cemex's Patrimonio Hoy (PH) illustrates a modern-day multinational 
corporation with a very strong rent-seeking culture adopting an iterative and 
experimental approach to innovating at the BOP. In the director of PH, Hector 
Ureta's words: 
"…my boss told us to forget everything we knew about cement, and 
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see the market with a clean slate, leaving out any prejudices that we 
may have had from previous experience" (Segel, Chu, & Herrero, 
2006). 
Ureta was named head of PH in 1998, and set out to create an immersion 
team designed to understand the BOP cement market in Mexico. He formed 
an eleven person team and rented an old butcher shop in a low income 
community on the outskirts of Guadalajara. The team spent eight months in 
the community, conducting surveys and speaking informally to hundreds of 
local residents. 
In Ureta's words: 
"Perhaps our most significant discovery was the realization that we 
stood a chance to have a real impact on people's lives. We viewed 
people not just as consumers, but as human beings, with a more 
holistic perspective, and we realized that selling them more cement 
would not fix their lives" (Segel, Chu, & Herrero, 2006). 
The team eventually designed and implemented an entirely new and 
innovative business model aimed both at driving cement sales and providing 
meaningful social benefits. Ureta argued that PH‟s business model was an 
efficient and sustainable solution to the living conditions of Mexico's poverty-
stricken population and that it also instilled attractive social values such as 
goal-setting and saving habits. In 2004, six years after its launch, PH reached 
breakeven at a yearly operation of about $4 million USD, and was projecting 
profits of $2 million in 2005 (Segel, Chu, and Herrero, 2006). Ureta described 
the experience as follows: 
"It has been an interesting ride to this point... We were good at 
experimenting and changing when we felt we weren't getting it right. 
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We started by realizing that we were not selling cement, and that we 
needed to customize our proposal in each deal, something that was 
quite alien to Cemex's culture" (Segel, Chu, and Herrero, 2006). 
And it's not only firms looking to build businesses or learn about the BOP that 
decide to deploy field teams to explore a potential market and iteratively build 
a new business. Honda's expansion to the US in the late 1950s and its 
eventual catalysis of the small motorcycle market illustrates this in an 
expansion to a developed country (Mintzberg, 1987a). 
In 1958, Honda sent two executives, led by Kichahiro Kawashima to the US to 
assess the market potential for Japanese motorcycles. The team returned to 
Japan after visiting motorcycle dealerships across the US and reported that "it 
didn't seem unreasonable to shoot for 10% of the import market" (Pascale & 
Christiansen, 1989). But Kawashima also states: 
"In truth, we had no strategy other than seeing if we could sell 
something in the United States… we did not discuss profits or 
deadlines for breakevens… Fujisawa (Kawashima‟s boss) told me if 
anyone could succeed, I could, and authorized $1 million for the 
venture" (Pascale & Christiansen, 1989). 
After haggling with bureaucrats, Kawashima was deployed to the US with only 
$110 thousand dollars in cash and $140 thousand in inventory and parts. The 
small team that relocated to LA to crack the US market was so strapped for 
cash that its three members shared a single apartment, two of them sleeping 
on the floor. It took the team seven years to grow to five Japanese executives 
(Pascale & Christiansen, 1989). 
The main point of the Cemex and Honda examples is that many corporate 
initiatives to create new businesses in foreign locations are ultimately driven 
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by the adventures and experiences of a small field team deployed to the 
location; even when in hindsight they may be portrayed as rational, top-down 
decisions led by executive managers to exploit pre-identified opportunities 
(Mintzberg, 1987a). 
In my dissertation, I examine in detail the processes that occurred when two 
western firms deployed field teams to immerse themselves in BOP settings 
with the task of creating new and innovative businesses that were to be 
profitable and provide social or environmental benefits. From these in-depth 
cases I inductively develop a theoretical framework called entrepreneurial 
sensemaking that helps us understand how the interplay between a field 
team‟s evolving appreciation of the business it is developing and senior 
management‟s intentions shape the firm‟s strategic understanding of what the 
new business is really about, and its ultimate substantiation. 
 
DISSERTATION OVERVIEW 
The rest of the dissertation is structured as follows: 
 
Chapter 2 – Theory review 
Recognizing that many of the challenges field teams face when trying to 
create new businesses at the BOP are analogous to those that individual 
entrepreneurs and start-up teams must overcome when founding their 
enterprises, in Chapter Two I review the literature and existing theories of 
entrepreneurship that speak to the open-ended processes that underlie the 
emergence of novel businesses. I first look at the different conceptualizations 
of what it means to be an entrepreneur, and then examine the implications 
these perspectives have for the actual on-the-ground innovation processes. I 
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analyze the differences between “opportunity discovery” and “opportunity 
construction” logics and then identify and describe seven broad theoretical 
approaches to opportunity construction processes: entrepreneurial bricolage, 
improvisation, effectuation, reflective practice, interpretive processes, 
muddling through or disjointed incrementalism, and organizational knowledge 
creation. 
 
Chapter 3 – Theory development 
Based on the theory review, in the second chapter I compare and contrast the 
theories reviewed in the previous chapter to extend the theory on opportunity 
construction processes by proposing a synthetic framework that builds upon 
the theories‟ common elements and identifies boundary conditions based on 
the factors they disagree upon. I use a vignette to demonstrate how the 
constructs of the synthetic framework – goal flexibility, reenacting resources, 
network transformation, and leveraging contingencies – interact, and how the 
framework can be used to examine opportunity construction processes. I 
conclude the section by exploring the implications for the synthetic framework 
for the discordant elements of the opportunity construction theories. 
 
Chapter 4 – Research Strategy 
In this chapter I explain how I collected and analyzed the data that supports 
my theorizing. I explain why being a participant observer in two sequential, in-
depth ethnographic studies is the most appropriate mechanism for generating 
theory about this emergent phenomenon. I use ethnographic, participant 
observation, and extensive archival data from a three year study of two 
independent cases to generate dense theory which captures the complexity of 
 15 
the dynamics that occur within firms that deploy field teams to create novel 
businesses in new market space. 
 
Chapters 5 & 6 –SCJ Johnson Kenya Case and ACB Case 
These chapters are a “thick description” and a condensed depiction of the 
efforts of two unrelated firms that deployed field teams to BOP settings with 
the specific task of creating novel businesses that would provide “triple bottom 
line” benefits to the firm and to the local communities. Each case study 
describes at least a year‟s activities of each firm, including the efforts of the 
teams in the field and the actions of their supervisory managers. The 
descriptions are primarily focused on the social processes and interactions 
amongst actors; concrete details of the actual businesses and settings have 
been minimized as much as possible. 
 
Chapters 7 – Discussion 
In this chapter I dissect and analyze the case studies in light of the synthetic 
framework for opportunity construction processes to develop a theory called 
entrepreneurial sensemaking. First I identify the factors that drive the 
emergence of an opportunity construction logic and the factors that foment an 
opportunity discovery logic, examining how they occurred in each case. In 
general, field teams tended to enact an opportunity construction logic while 
senior managers tended towards opportunity discovery. Entrepreneurial 
sensemaking is the process that unfolds as these two parties interact and 
labor to bridge their two perspectives. Although not guaranteed to produce a 
favorable outcome, when the interaction is maintained – and conflicts are 
managed in order not to derail the process – the iterative and collective 
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sensemaking process can lead to the development of a novel business and a 
deep, tacit understanding of its implications and potentialities. 
 
Chapter 8 – Conclusions 
I conclude by exploring the four main contributions of this dissertation to the 
theoretical domains of: BOP strategies, entrepreneurship, strategy process, 
and innovation. I then, outline some avenues for future research, and describe 
some applications for real-life practice. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORY REVIEW 
 
Corporate teams deployed to remote locations and tasked with creating 
entirely new businesses face many of the challenges and obstacles that a lone 
entrepreneur or a start-up entrepreneurial firm do. 
In this chapter I survey the literature on entrepreneurial processes, with a 
particular focus on what people actually do when they are attempting to create 
new businesses. I begin with a broad review of scholars‟ thinking on 
entrepreneurship, from the search for specific personality traits that could 
distinguish an entrepreneur to the view of the entrepreneur not as an 
individual, but as an economic function – that of disrupting markets and 
creating innovations. 
Next, I explore the differences between two theoretical approaches to 
opportunities. The one labeled “opportunity discovery” assumes that 
opportunities are objective features of the environment, and that an 
entrepreneur‟s job is to find them and then exploit them. I term the opposing 
view “opportunity construction”; this perspective sees entrepreneurs as people 
committed to action, and who use their creative imagination to explore ways to 
produce new services and products. 
I then briefly review seven theories that examine opportunity construction 
processes from different viewpoints. Some of them, such as effectuation and 
entrepreneurial bricolage, look specifically at opportunity construction within 
entrepreneurial settings – as individuals strive to found firms. Others, such as 
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reflective practice, focus more on how individuals create opportunities within 
their everyday practices. Finally, another set of theories – interpretive process 
and organizational knowledge creation – look at opportunity construction 
within organizations or collectives. I analyze, compare, and contrast these 
theories in Chapter Three, Theory Development. 
 
ENTREPRENEURIAL PROCESSES 
Aldrich (1999) coined the term “nascent entrepreneur” to describe the 
individual taking action to create an organization. The term refers to “those 
persons thinking about starting a new firm and involved in activities that could 
result in a new organization, distinguishing them from „entrepreneurs‟ who 
actually have created an operating entity” (Aldrich & Ruef, 2006). 
In one of the first empirical studies of nascent entrepreneurs, Reynolds & 
White (1997) surveyed people randomly selected from the general population 
to determine the proportion of nascent entrepreneurs. Reynolds and White 
classified individuals as nascent entrepreneurs if they conducted at least two 
of a list of activities that Reynolds and White assumed should precede the 
launching of a business. Examples of these activities include “seriously 
thinking about starting a new business”, “writing a business plan” or 
“organizing a start-up team”. Reynolds and White admit that these indicators 
don‟t tell us much about the entrepreneurs themselves, or how businesses get 
started. In their own words: 
“…even though there has been progress in predicting new firm 
birthrates on the basis of contextual features, these do not start new 
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firms, people do. Despite the importance of this activity, how 
individuals create new firms is one of the least-understood features of 
modern societies.” (Reynolds & White, 1997) 
 
Personality traits and the entrepreneurial function 
Early work on entrepreneurship focused on the identification of personality 
traits as determinants of entrepreneurial success. A variety of traits, ranging 
from need for achievement (McClelland, 1967) and locus of control (Chen, 
Greene & Crick, 1998) to overconfidence bias (Busenitz & Barney, 1997) have 
been posited as important factors determining entrepreneurial performance, 
but the current consensus is that personality traits at best explain only a very 
small proportion of entrepreneurial success (Gartner, 1989; Stevenson & 
Jarillo, 1990). 
A research stream that emerged from the Austrian School of economics 
(Schumpeter, 1934; von Hayek, 1948; von Mises, 1949), developed by Kirzner 
(1973, 1983), Casson (2003), and others has examined the entrepreneurial 
function, rather the entrepreneurs themselves (Danhoff, 1949; Gartner, 1985; 
Gartner, 1989). In Schumpeter‟s view, an entrepreneur (or “wild spirit”) is a 
source of disequilibrium within markets. Entrepreneurs recombine existing 
conceptual and physical resources to produce innovations that render existing 
firms or ways of doing things obsolete. Schumpeter assumed inventions were 
“trivially and abundantly available and known to all sorts of people” (Witt, 
1992), what defined an entrepreneur was the willingness and ability seize this 
opportunities and bear the attendant uncertainty (Knight, 1921). Once 
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opportunities had been discovered and acted upon, the market would return to 
equilibrium. (Chiles, Bluedorn & Gupta, 2007). Kirzner provides an opposing 
(or complementary) perspective; he models entrepreneurs as agents that 
exploit information asymmetries, coordinate the combination of scarce 
resources, and engage in profitable arbitrage, helping to bring a market back 
to equilibrium (Harper 1996, Chiles et al. 2007). Schumpeterian entrepreneurs 
create disequilibrium; Kirznerian entrepreneurs resolve disequilibrium. Kirzner 
assumes entrepreneurs are rational (knowing what they want to achieve) and 
possessing of unique information that lets them identify existing opportunities 
created by exogenous shocks to the environment. Kirzner‟s alert 
entrepreneurs discover profit opportunities by “opening their eyes” and 
noticing facts staring at them in the face (Harper, 1996). Casson (2003) 
suggests that entrepreneurs create “market-making” firms by developing 
specific information-gathering and processing skills which feed their good 
judgment and help them identify opportunities existent in the environment. 
Shane & Venkataraman (2000) argue that the views on entrepreneurial 
function and individual characteristics need to be united in order to better 
understand entrepreneurship. They define entrepreneurship research as “the 
scholarly examination of how, by whom, and with what effects opportunities to 
create future goods and services are discovered and evaluated” and 
encourage researchers to study the nexus of enterprising individuals and 
valuable opportunities in the environment, since the outcome of 
entrepreneurial efforts is determined by the confluence of individuals with 
unique traits, skills, and mindsets, and extant opportunities with particular 
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attributes (Shane, 2003). Different people will identify different opportunities 
from the same discovery (Venkataraman, 1997) as prior knowledge, 
experiences, and perspectives influence how a new discovery is viewed and 
exploited (von Hayek, 1945; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). For example, 
Shane (2000) studied eight people who recognized eight distinct uses for a 
single manufacturing technology licensed by MIT. 
Research in this vein is focused on elucidating the contextual variables that 
generate opportunities and has given a renewed impetus to the search for 
more nuanced individual traits that help explain how some entrepreneurs are 
better at identifying and subsequently exploiting opportunities. Thus, for 
example, Baum and Bird (2010) look at how “successful intelligence” and 
“entrepreneurial self-efficacy” predict entrepreneurial venture growth. 
As regards the process of entrepreneurship, this view naturally stresses the 
search for opportunities. So Gruber, MacMillan and Thompson (2010) 
describe how serial entrepreneurs identify opportunities in emerging 
technology fields by constructing opportunity “choice sets”, and Bhardwaj, 
Camillus and Hounshell (2006) examine how established firms continuously 
look for entrepreneurial opportunities through a “moving, anchored search” 
process. Alvarez and Barney (2007) label the logic that underlies this line of 
theorizing “opportunity discovery”. 
 
Opportunity construction processes 
A fundamental critique of the “opportunity discovery” perspective on 
entrepreneurial action attacks its conceptualization of opportunities as pre-
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existent, objective, environmental attributes that are there to be discovered (or 
not) (Vaughn 1994; Sarasvathy, Dew, Velamuri & Venkataraman, 2003; 
Chiles, Bluedorn & Gupta, 2007). Critics assert that this view is overly 
deterministic (de Rond & Thietart, 2007) and disregards human choice and 
inventiveness in the creation of the future (Buchanan & Vanberg, 1994). 
Furthermore, they note that the “opportunity discovery” perspective minimizes 
the role of chance and also fails to consider how the interaction of free will and 
imagination with the specifics of the situation at hand essentially makes the 
future open and unpredictable (Lachmann, 1986; Ross & Nisbett, 1991; de 
Rond & Thietart, 2007). Harking back to Austrian economics‟ basis in 
subjectivism, Lachmann (1986) argues that entrepreneurs use creative 
imagination to form plans based on their subjective knowledge and 
expectations oriented towards an unknown and unknowable future. Thus, in 
strategic and entrepreneurial action, rationality combines with intuition, 
chance, and a myriad of processes to determine outcomes (Mintzberg, 
Raisinghani, & Théorêt, 1976). 
Theorists who disagree with the “opportunity discovery” perspective and its 
implications often think of entrepreneurs as individuals who are focused on 
action; on actively exploring ways to produce new products or services rather 
than pursuing perceived opportunities (Sarasvathy, Dew, Velamuri, & 
Venkataraman, 2003). These researchers tend to focus much more on the 
everyday processes and practices of entrepreneurs and take a much finer-
grained look at the reality an entrepreneur perceives and the particular actions 
and events that lead to the creation of a business. I bundle these diverse 
perspectives under the umbrella term “opportunity construction processes” 
and review some of the most relevant ones, (see Table 1 for a review). 
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Table 1 – Entrepreneurial and creative processes described in the 
management literature. 
 
Entrepreneurial / 
creative process 
Description 
Entrepreneurial bricolage 
- Making do with materials at hand 
- Refusal to enact limitations 
- Recombination of resources for new purposes 
(Baker, Miner, & Eesley, 
2003; Garud & Karnøe, 2003; 
Baker & Nelson, 2005; Lévi-
Strauss, 1968) 
Muddling through / 
disjointed incrementalism 
- Goals and values are selected at same time as 
empirical analysis is done 
- Only very marginal and incremental activities are 
considered, the universe of possible outcomes, 
alternatives, and values is mostly ignored 
(Lindblom, 1959, 1979; 
Michael, 1973) 
Effectuation - Focus on getting other parties to commit resources to 
the venture under goal ambiguity 
- Seek affordable losses rather than calculating 
opportunity costs 
(Sarasvathy, 2001; 
Wiltbank et al 2006; 
Sarasvathy, 2008) 
Entrepreneurial and 
organizational 
improvisation - Degree to which composition and execution converge 
in time 
- Combine existing routines with unscripted action (Bhidé, 1994; Moorman & 
Miner, 1998; Baker, Miner, & 
Eesley, 2003)  
Reflective practice, 
knowing in practice - Problem-setting – Simultaneously define decision to 
be made, ends to achieve and means to use 
- Active synthetic skills of designing a desirable future 
and inventing ways of bringing it about 
(Polanyi, 1958; Schön, 
1982; Orlikowski, 2002) 
Interpretive process - Deliberate exploration of ambiguity to generate new 
ideas 
- Exploration happens as a conversation among actors (Lester & Piore, 2004) 
Organizational knowledge 
creation, managing flow - Knowledge is product of interactions 
- Knowledge itself is situated and embodied in 
relationships and dialogue 
(Nonaka & Takeuchi, 
1995; Nonaka, Toyama, & 
Hirata, 2008) 
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Effectuation 
Sarasvathy (2001, 2008) contends that opportunities are constructed rather 
than discovered because entrepreneurs create new businesses by focusing 
more on their means than on their ends, an operative logic she calls 
“effectuation”. In effectuation, expert entrepreneurs prioritize the building of a 
network of committed stakeholders and the avoidance of losses over the 
pursuit of a pre-specified opportunity or goal. In fact, in effectuation, 
entrepreneurs construct their preferences and their goals at the same time 
they construct their business and their market. As contingencies arise, 
effectuators modify their goals in an attempt to control the future rather than 
predict it. 
Their efforts to uncover slack resources in the environment and to extract 
commitments from other parties (many times their first customers) dominate 
their entrepreneurial activities and drive the opportunity construction process. 
The objectives of the business continually shift depending on who the 
entrepreneur convinces to join the endeavor and what resources and 
preferences each actor brings to the table. 
Sarasvathy (2008) uses the example of a chef cooking dinner to contrast an 
effectual approach to a causal logic (her term for the conventional view of 
entrepreneurship, in which entrepreneurs garner resources to exploit an 
already identified opportunity). In the causal case, the chef decides 
beforehand what she would like to prepare – e.g. duck a l‟Orange. She then 
consults a recipe, identifies the required ingredients, embarks on a shopping 
trip to acquire them, organizes the necessary equipment and utensils, and 
then cooks the dish. In the effectual process, the chef begins by searching in 
the pantry and the kitchen‟s cupboards to see what foods are available and 
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what kind of appliances and utensils she may use. Based on what she finds, 
she then composes a dish on the fly. If her mother offers her some advice 
while she‟s at it, or her partner arrives with new ingredients, she may modify 
what‟s she‟s doing to incorporate them. In many cases, the resulting dish may 
be something she has never prepared before. The example not only illustrates 
how the effectual entrepreneur uses her means (the available ingredients and 
utensils) to determine her goal (the resulting dish), it also implies that the 
outcomes of effectual processes are more likely to be novel and unpredictable 
than those of causal processes. 
 
Muddling through 
Lindblom‟s (1959) “muddling through” theory states that administrators 
develop new policy by applying a set of relatively simple heuristics to existing 
policies because they are very boundedly rational (Simon, 1955; Cyert & 
March, 1963). Administrators are not “rational-comprehensive”, they cannot ex 
ante identify all relevant performance variables, compute all policy outcomes, 
rate and compare all outcomes in light of all performance variables, outline all 
possible policy alternatives, and systematically compare all alternatives to 
identify the one which produces the overall highest performance. 
Thus, administrators engage in a series of oversimplified heuristic-based 
decision processes which enable them to disregard most performance 
variables, outline a much reduced set of policy alternatives based on previous 
policies, and through successive limited comparisons eventually settle on a 
“workable solution”. This process has a point in common with effectuation in 
that evaluation and empirical analysis become intertwined, so means-end 
analyses are inappropriate or of limited value. 
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On the other hand, the process is also known as “disjointed incrementalism” 
(Lindblom, 1979), the implication being that while it may not be possible to 
predict what the resulting policies will look like, they will only be incrementally 
different from the existing ones. In other words, muddling through is not 
conducive to radically novel outcomes. 
 
Entrepreneurial improvisation 
Baker, Miner and Eesley (2003) describe a process they call “improvising 
firms”, contrasting its unpredictability and impulsiveness to “design-precedes-
execution” types of organizational foundings. In their words: 
“Typically, the founding processes of these firms unfolded during 
ongoing interaction between the founder and current customers, 
suppliers, or associates during which the founder recognized some 
"seed deal" as an opportunity to found a firm…. In no case did a 
founder describe a primary focus on a plan or market analysis or even 
thinking through the new firm's overall design or strategy. Founders 
just started moving toward creating their businesses, improvising their 
way towards entrepreneurship…” (Baker, Miner & Eesley, 2003) 
Weick (2001) calls this way of acting “just in time strategy”. The essence of 
improvisation (Weick, 1998) is that the acts of composing and performing are 
inseparable; there is no split between design and production. Improvisation 
also implies a degree of novelty and coherence in the outcome (Moorman & 
Miner, 1998; Miner, Bassoff, & Moorman, 2001). Thus, while improvising, 
entrepreneurs are not pursuing pre-defined opportunities; they are deliberately 
attempting to create something novel. 
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Entrepreneurial Bricolage 
Baker and Nelson (2005) add to the notion of improvising while founding a 
business with the “entrepreneurial bricolage” construct. They define it as “a 
bias toward action and active engagement with problems or opportunities 
rather than lingering over questions of whether a workable outcome can be 
created from what is at hand”. Bricoleurs refuse to enact limitations that reflect 
external rules and standards, and by doing so are able to reframe “the odds 
and ends” they have at hand and recombine them to create fresh resources 
where there weren‟t any beforehand. Rather than search for opportunities, 
bricoleurs construct them by reconfiguring and reenacting the resources they 
have at hand. Bricoleurs also view people as resources they can reframe as 
needed; many customers are originally friends and some customers later 
become friends, suppliers frequently become customers and vice versa. 
Garud and Karnøe‟s (2003) use of the term “bricolage” is slightly different. 
While they do use it to denote resourcefulness and improvisation on the part of 
actors, they suggest that entrepreneurship is “a larger process that builds on 
the efforts of many” and that the accumulation of inputs from multiple actors 
generates a momentum that harnesses the inputs of distributed actors while 
simultaneously enabling and constraining their paths. They describe the 
emergence of the wind turbine industry in Denmark not as the discovery of 
pre-existing underutilized resources by specific individuals, but as the 
transformation of resources by many different actors. In their view, bricolage is 
the mutual, co-shaping of emergent outcomes via knowledge embedded in 
practices. 
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Reflective practice 
Schön (1982) uses the term “reflective practice” to better describe the 
activities accomplished practitioners perform in their everyday lives as they 
deal with situations which are inherently complex, uncertain, unstable, unique, 
and laden with conflicting values. In Ackoff‟s words: 
“…managers are not confronted with problems that are independent of 
each other, but with dynamic situations that consist of complex 
systems of changing problems that interact with each other. I call such 
situations messes. Problems are abstractions extracted from messes 
by analysis; they are to messes as atoms are to tables and charts… 
managers do not solve problems, they manage messes.” (Ackoff, 
1979) 
A professional “reflects in action” and “knows in doing” when she “sets the 
problem” by simultaneously experimenting with the objective to be achieved, 
the means to be used, and the parameters of the decision. As she constructs 
an understanding of the issue through generative metaphors and spins out 
lines of inference, she engages in double-loop learning to continuously 
reframe it in search of a coherence or internal logic that resonates with her 
experience (Argyris & Schön, 1974; Schön, 1982; Orlikowski, 2002). The 
process is a reflective conversation with a unique and uncertain situation 
which is highly dependent on accumulated tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1958) 
and embraces surprise, puzzlement and confusion as resources for building 
novel interpretations. In this view, knowing emerges “from the ongoing and 
situated actions of organizational members as they engage the world” 
(Orlikowski, 2002). Furthermore, and parallel to improvisation, knowing cannot 
be separated from practice (Polanyi, 1958; Schön, 1982; Orlikowski, 2002). 
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Interpretive process 
Building on Schön‟s insights, Lester and Piore (2004) have developed the 
concept of interpretive process which is called for in radically ambiguous 
situations, when the task is “problem eliciting” – to imagine outcomes and 
determine what their properties should be. Rather than focusing on the single 
practitioner dealing individually with an issue, Lester and Piore visualize the 
interpretive process as the emergence of a language community – as an 
ongoing conversation that leverages ambiguity as a resource for the 
generation of new ideas. In this process, the manager‟s role is to invite 
participants to the conversation, set its direction, maintain its open-endedness, 
and encourage different viewpoints and the exploration of ambiguity. Over 
time and through interaction, the participants in the conversation are able to 
recombine disparate elements into new categories which they slowly come to 
internalize. In this manner, an “opportunity” is constructed through interaction 
and the co-creation of new and shared cognitive schema. 
Lester and Piore‟s idea is developed mainly from case studies of these 
conversations occurring within firms, typically around the design of a new 
product or business. The broader literature on organizational interpretation 
defines it as the process of translating events, extracting meaning, developing 
shared understanding, and assembling conceptual schemes among a group of 
organizational members (Daft & Weick, 1984). 
 
Organizational knowledge creation 
Nonaka and Takeuchi‟s (1995) organizational knowledge creation theory (also 
known as the SECI or socialization-externalization-combination-internalization 
model) – although conceived to explain knowledge creation processes within 
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organizations – incorporates or informs many of the opportunity construction 
processes described above. 
In Nonaka, Toyama and Hirata‟s (2008) words, “Knowledge is a resource that 
is created by human beings in relationships… it is not a static substance or 
thing but an ever-changing process of interaction in an ever-expanding field of 
relations”. The SECI model is a frame-breaking creative routine for self-
renewal that incorporates an implicit critique of firms as information processors 
(Teece, 2008) and thus also of the “opportunity discovery” logic; if knowledge 
is created through practice and is not static, then by definition opportunities 
cannot be pre-defined. Nonaka and Toyama (2005) propose that firms differ 
not because they exploit different opportunities, but because they want and 
strive to differ; they evolve differently because they envision different futures 
and create the structures to realize those futures. Nonaka and Takeuchi‟s 
(1995) conceptualization of knowledge creation and strategic direction as the 
product of shared activity and interaction resonates with Lester and Piore‟s 
(2004) notion of a creative process of constructing meaning together. In 
essence, it suggests that fabricating opportunities is a dialectical co-creation 
process. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
 
In this chapter I develop a framework for examining opportunity construction 
processes. I first identify and discuss the elements that the opportunity 
construction theories reviewed in the previous chapter hold in common. I show 
how these elements are embodied in each theory and note the cases in which 
particular elements are not present in some of the theories. I also surface 
some of the elements and assumptions that are contradictory across these 
theories. 
Building on the elements in common – and explaining how I deal with the 
discordant elements – I then synthesize a parsimonious and overarching 
theoretical framework for examining opportunity construction processes. I call 
it the synthetic framework for opportunity construction processes. I end the 
section with a general comparison of the opportunity construction and 
opportunity discovery logics. 
 
OPPORTUNITY CONSTRUCTION PROCESSES 
The very definition of opportunity – a situation or condition favorable for 
attainment of a goal (Webster‟s Dictionary, 2000) – logically implies a set of 
external environmental features independent of the entrepreneur or agent 
pursuing the opportunity. This means that an opportunity creation/opportunity 
discovery dichotomy is problematic – the word opportunity belongs to the 
epistemological domain of the opportunity discovery logic. An opportunity 
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construction logic belongs to a domain where the concept of opportunity itself 
does not make sense – once an opportunity is constructed, it no longer exists, 
what you would have is an exploited opportunity. 
Despite this confusion, I term the processes that underlie these approaches to 
constructing the future: opportunity construction processes. I do this because 
my focus is not on whether opportunities truly exist or not, but on the logics of 
action espoused by individuals engaged in entrepreneurial action. I‟m 
interested in how they act; how their behaviors vary depending on whether 
they see themselves as pursuing opportunities or constructing the future. The 
two logics of action are dichotomous. 
 
Common elements of opportunity construction processes 
Although many of the theories of opportunity construction described in the 
Theory Review Chapter were developed for the most part independently, they 
contain some common elements that provide the basis for an overarching 
theoretical framework for thinking about opportunity construction. In this 
section I describe each of these shared elements and show how they are 
developed in each theory. Table 2 lists and describes these elements and 
Table 3 shows which of the theories embody each element. 
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Table 2 – Common elements of opportunity construction theories. 
 
Shared Element Description 
Focus on means Entrepreneurs rely on their means at hand to shape 
outcomes rather than let specific goals determine the 
means they need to acquire 
Reframing resources Entrepreneurs repurpose existing resources, exploit slack 
resources in the environment, and “create” resources from 
non-resources 
Forging networks Entrepreneurs create innovations by catalyzing new 
networks and adapting the nature of their existing 
relationships 
Spontaneous action Entrepreneurs embrace surprise and react in unscripted 
ways to unforeseen events, many times almost immediately 
 
 
Table 3 – Distribution of common elements across opportunity construction 
theories. 
 
Entrepreneurial / 
creative process 
Focus 
on 
means 
Reframing 
resources 
Forging 
networks 
Spontaneous 
action 
Bricolage     
Muddling through     
Effectuation     
Improvisation     
Reflective practice     
Interpretive process     
Knowledge creation     
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Focus on means 
For the most part, theories of opportunity construction posit inductive, non-
predictive processes coupled to goal ambiguity. The majority of the reviewed 
theories discuss this in terms of means and ends becoming conflated. In the 
extreme, the available means entirely determine the ends to be pursued; 
means are not chosen in light of pre-selected goals. Table 4 lists the primary 
means that influence entrepreneurial action for each of the theories. 
 
Table 4 – Posited means of opportunity construction theories. 
 
Opportunity 
construction process 
Means 
Entrepreneurial bricolage - Reframed resources at hand which others do not 
recognize as such 
Muddling through - Changes at the margins to existing policies 
Effectuation - An effectuator‟s existing abilities, stock of 
knowledge, and social networks 
Entrepreneurial and 
organizational improvisation 
- An organization‟s declarative and procedural 
memory 
- An individual‟s prior learning and professional 
networks 
Reflective practice, knowing 
in practice 
- A practitioner‟s extensive experience, embodied in 
a “knowing in practice” 
Interpretive process - The conversation, who gets invited to it, and the 
objects and practices it revolves around 
Organizational knowledge 
creation, managing flow 
- Dialectical knowledge creation process itself and 
the specific practices its participants engage in to 
maintain it 
 
Lindblom (1959) states “Selection of value goals and empirical analysis of the 
needed action are not distinct from one another but are closely entwined”. He 
classifies a policy as “good” if analysts can agree on the immediate steps to 
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take, independently of whether they agree what the goal should be or whether 
the policy will achieve it. 
Sarasvathy‟s (2001, 2008) entire theory of effectuation – including its name – 
is premised on means being prioritized over ends; the final shape of an 
“effectuated” business depends entirely on who the entrepreneur manages to 
convince to join her (who she knows), and the argument she can make to 
convince partners (who she is and what she knows). In Sarasvathy‟s (2001) 
own words, effectuation processes “take a set of means as given and focus on 
selecting between possible effects that can be created with that set of means”. 
The means that Sarasvathy emphasizes are a person‟s abilities, stock of 
knowledge, and social networks. 
Baker and Nelson (2005) argue that entrepreneurial bricoleurs are able to 
build unique services by recombining elements at hand. Moreover, the form of 
the resulting artifact – the unique service created – is dependent on the 
idiosyncratic manner in which the bricoleur enacts his resource environment 
(Penrose, 1959). While the bricoleur usually wants to solve an immediate 
problem, the act of “making do” with what is readily available often follows a 
“meandering and path-dependent trajectory dominated not by clear vision and 
careful a priori planning, but busy serendipitous combinations” (Baker & 
Nelson, 2005). 
In organizational improvisation (Weick, 1998; Baker, Miner & Eesley, 2003), 
the use of unscripted action is not guided by pre-defined goals. Improvisers do 
not pursue a well delimited opportunity (an end); on the contrary, they seek 
new effects. While their ends are undefined, their means are not – they build 
on their procedural and declarative memory (Moorman & Miner, 1998). As 
Miner, Bassoff, and Moorman (2001) state, “the result of prior learning and 
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organizational memory shapes the skillful and fruitful improvisation of novel 
performances”. It is the reliance on sound means that determines an 
improvisation‟s coherence and innovativeness. Baker, Miner, and Eesley 
(2003) stress the role of personal and professional networks as one of the 
primary means used in improvising firms. 
In the interpretive process (Lester & Piore, 2004), managers deliberately court 
ambiguity as a medium for producing the range of alternatives from which 
business choices are made; it is a generative process for creating new ends. 
Lester and Piore (2004) point out that many times “the product developer 
starts out without really knowing what she is trying to create”. In this process, 
the conversation – and the objects and practices around which it evolves 
(Carlile, 2002) – constitutes the primary means which determines the options 
that will be generated. 
Reflective practitioners (Schön, 1982) are embroiled in conflicts of values, 
goals, purposes, and interests at the same time that they are dealing with 
complex, uncertain, unstable, and unique situations. When they “set the 
problem”, they simultaneously define the decision to be made, the ends to be 
achieved, and the means which may be chosen. The principal meta-means 
brought to bear is the practitioner‟s “knowing in action” (Orlikowski, 2002) or 
ability to “reflect in practice” (Schön, 1982) – an incommunicable ability 
developed through practice to iteratively interrogate a given situation and 
make sense of it in a way that enables the application of existent knowhow in 
a coherent manner. 
Nonaka and Takeuchi‟s (1995) SECI model of tacit knowledge gradually 
becoming explicit and embodied in archetypes transcends the means-
precedes-ends logic – it represents the total conflation of means and ends. In 
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Nonaka and Takeuchi‟s (1995) world, when creating concepts, organization 
members do not choose a set of means to achieve a certain goal, nor do they 
simply let their current means determine their ends; they strive to generate 
new-to-the-world concepts by focusing primarily on the process, constrained 
only by a general direction set by senior management – the organization‟s 
“higher intention”. 
 
Reframing Resources 
Learning to see things differently is an oft quoted maxim for the stimulation of 
creativity. It is also an action implied in most of the reviewed opportunity 
construction theories and is particularly central to entrepreneurial bricolage. 
Baker and Nelson (2005) characterize bricoleurs variously as those with a 
“conscious and frequently willful tendency to disregard the limitation of 
commonly accepted definitions of material inputs, practices, and definitions 
and standards, insisting instead on trying out solutions, observing, and dealing 
with the results”, or those who “refuse to enact the limitations imposed by 
dominant definitions of resource environments” and who “consciously and 
consistently test conventional limitations”. By finding novel uses for what they 
have at hand, bricoleurs are able to construct innovative or personalized 
services on the spot. In Penrose‟s (1959) words: “Different firms will discover 
and elicit different services and combinations of services from similar objective 
resources.” 
Sarasvathy‟s examples (2001, 2008) illustrate the use of resources in novel 
manners in effectuation. In her “Curry in a Hurry” vignette, in which an 
entrepreneur is looking to create a business around Indian cooking, an 
effectual process could lead her to write a book and go on the lecture circuit – 
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based on her “quirky personality”, a resource not recognized at the start of the 
process nor a priori relevant to Indian cuisine businesses. In the example of 
how U-Haul came about, Sarasvathy describes how “the Shoens built the first 
U-Haul trailers using the ranch‟s automobile garage and milk house as the first 
manufacturing plant” and how the trailers themselves were used as 
unconventional ad display sites. As with entrepreneurial bricoleurs, 
effectuators appear to be driven to find new uses for existent artifacts because 
they are deliberately trying to build businesses without committing resources 
up front. In both theories, one of the key resources often reframed is people; 
initial customers are frequently converted to franchisees, investors, 
salespeople, etc. (and vice versa). 
Reframing resources can be viewed as the essence of improvisation. While in 
the organizational literature improvisation has been popularized as the degree 
to which the composition and execution of an action converge in time (Weick, 
1998; Moorman & Miner, 1998; Baker et al., 2003), its original meaning in 
music and artistic performance also incorporates the creative use of existing 
material. It also implies a coherent improvement or the performance of 
something uniquely valuable; random note playing is not improvisation. In 
Berliner‟s (1994) words “Improvisation involves reworking precomposed 
material and designs in relation to unanticipated ideas conceived, shaped, and 
transformed under the special conditions of performance, thereby adding 
unique features to every creation”. Baker, Miner, and Eesley‟s (2003) accounts 
of entrepreneurial improvisation also exemplify how entrepreneurs often 
reframe their customers as potential partners. 
Reflective practitioners (Schön, 1982) set problems by selecting the “things” of 
the situation, setting the boundaries for their attention to it, and imposing upon 
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it a coherence which allows them to say what is wrong and what directions the 
situation needs to be changed in. Selecting the “things” to pay attention to is 
an act of resource construction. Schön describes reflective practice as making 
sense of something troubling, puzzling, or interesting by reflecting on the 
understandings implicit in the practitioner‟s action – understandings which are 
surfaced, criticized, restructured, and embodied in further action. He illustrates 
resource reframing in his example of how a master architect used an 
unforgiving hillside – which his student was visualizing as a handicap to a 
building‟s design – as the actual basis for a coherent and innovative design. 
Lester and Piore (2004) stress how design “conversations” aimed at creating 
new products or services occur around objects and practices – conversation 
pieces, or transient constructs (Lanzara, 1999). These conversations are the 
exploration of different views of the same situation; they are reinterpretations 
or reframings of the situation designed to generate ambiguity, not exchange 
information. 
In Nonaka and Takeuchi‟s (1995) theory of organizational knowledge creation, 
fluctuation and creative chaos are deliberately injected into an organization 
through top management‟s “strategic equivocality” or ambiguity with respect to 
philosophy or vision (and sometimes also a sense of crisis) in an attempt to 
make the organization‟s members “face a „breakdown‟ of routines, habits, or 
cognitive frameworks.” This “breakdown” then offers an opportunity for 
members to reconsider their fundamental thinking and perspective; they can 
reflect or question value and factual premises upon which corporate decision 
making is anchored, and thus generate a wider set of choices. Nonaka and 
Takeuchi‟s (1995) example of how Honda developed the “Tall Boy” concept (a 
car based on a spherical shape) is an extreme version of reframing not a 
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resource, but a liability, into a resource. In their words: 
 “The Tall Boy concept contradicted the conventional wisdom about 
automobile design at the time, which emphasized long, low sedans. 
But the City‟s revolutionary styling and engineering were prophetic. 
The car inaugurated a whole new approach to design.” (Nonaka & 
Takeuchi, 1995) 
 
Forging networks 
Creating and enacting fresh social networks is a critical element of many 
opportunity construction theories. Some of them (e.g. effectuation) advocate 
the outright creation of brand new social networks while others posit the 
transformation of the nature of existing relationships (e.g. network bricolage). 
As described in the section on reframing resources, theories on improvisation, 
bricolage, and effectuation all consider how opportunity constructing 
entrepreneurs leverage existing relationships in novel ways. For example, 
initial customers are many times co-opted to become investors, franchisees, 
promoters, partners, suppliers, friends, advisors, etc. Baker and Nelson (2005) 
call this “multiplex ties”. At more personal levels, family members are many 
times used as unpaid employees (Ruef, Aldrich, & Carter, 2003) – strong ties 
and homophily tend to be more influential factors in shaping incipient 
entrepreneurial networks than are individuals‟ functions or social roles. But 
while leveraging existing networks and using them in novel ways (essentially 
Baker and Nelson‟s definition of network bricolage) is modeled explicitly, the 
dynamic versions of the theories – and their examples – usually imply the 
addition of new relationships. In other words, existing networks are not only 
repurposed, they are also extended. 
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Sarasvathy (2001) proposes as one of effectuation‟s four core principles the 
use of strategic alliances rather than competitive analyses. The central 
mechanism in a dynamic model of effectual entrepreneurship is the nodal 
actor‟s elicitation of commitments from other actors towards the creation of a 
new artifact. As interactions in the effectual network become embodied in 
actual commitments, the network grows and eventually coalesces into a new 
market (Sarasvathy, 2008). The act of creating a new network is the driver of 
the dynamic effectual process. 
In entrepreneurial and network bricolage (Baker et al., 2003; Baker & Nelson, 
2005), the focus is more on exploiting existing relationships for new purposes, 
but in their examples, the authors show how existing relationships are often 
leveraged to create new relationships (contacts of contacts) and thus extend 
the network to access fresh resources. For example, Baker, Miner, and Eesley 
(2003) describe the case of a firm pressing an existing customer to provide 
access to a much larger firm with which the customer was in an alliance with in 
order to make a sales pitch to it. Baker and Nelson (2005) state that firms 
engaged in bricolage “created customers from people who otherwise would 
not be part of the market”. They also recognize that bricoleurs‟ bounded local 
networks are one of the key impediments to growth for firms continuously 
engaged in bricolage – if the entrepreneurs cannot grow their networks, they 
cannot grow their businesses. 
At its heart, Lester and Piore‟s (2004) interpretive process requires the 
formation of new networks composed of parties with different mindsets and 
perspectives. Their examples of product development teams highlight how 
different parts of a business have to be merged or how firms have to seek out 
and then learn to work with partners that have very different cultures and world 
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views. Thus, in their example of the development of cellular telephones, they 
describe how new networks had to be developed between telephone 
equipment makers and radio producers. In the example of Levi‟s transforming 
itself from a manufacturing company to a fashion house, the firm had to cross 
traditional boundaries and create networks into the previously distinct 
industries of textiles, laundering and finishing, and washing machines. The 
metaphor Lester and Piore use for managing the interpretive process – that of 
a cocktail party host that facilitates conversations – starts with choosing the 
guests that will participate and have interesting things to say to each other. 
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) propose a very similar requirement for the 
creation of organizational knowledge. They state: 
“the sharing of tacit knowledge among multiple individuals with 
different backgrounds, perspectives, and motivations becomes the 
critical step for organizational knowledge creation to take place… to 
effect that sharing, we need a „field‟ in which individuals can interact 
with each other through face-to-face dialogues… The typical field of 
interaction is a self-organizing team, in which members from various 
functional departments work together to achieve a common goal… a 
self-organizing team facilitates organizational knowledge creation 
through the requisite variety of the team members.” (Nonaka & 
Takeuchi, 1995) 
Nonaka and Takeuchi do not specify how these new networks are formed, 
only that they must be new networks that incorporate individuals with different 
skills and experience bases. 
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Spontaneous action 
Most of the reviewed theories incorporate extemporaneous action in one way 
or another. The importance of the context in which opportunities are fabricated 
is captured by several of the theories by the way in which they embrace 
unforeseen contingencies, surprises, and ambiguity. A key component of 
Sarasvathy‟s effectuation logic is the entrepreneur‟s penchant for basing his 
action on the features of the environment that he can control, rather those 
which he may try to predict (Wiltbank, Dew, Read, & Sarasvathy, 2006). 
Effectuators almost instinctively distrust information – such as market research 
reports – aimed at predicting future states, and do not formally plan or use 
positioning strategies designed to exploit future situations. Instead, they base 
their actions and decisions on the features of the environment they can 
control, and strive to make as much of the environment endogenous to their 
decision making process (Sarasvathy, 2008). A reduced emphasis on 
prediction goes hand-in-hand with the flexibility needed to be able to quickly 
change direction and harness contingencies as they arise. In her original 
articulation of the theory, Sarasvathy (2001) specifically advanced the 
exploitation of contingencies as one of effectuation‟s four core principles. 
While the theory of “muddling through” (Lindblom, 1959, 1979) does not 
explicitly advocate impromptu action for the exploitation of unforeseen events, 
it does highlight the futility of comprehensive planning. By successively 
comparing a limited set of policy alternatives, all of them minor modifications of 
the existing policy, the decision maker is not planning ahead but simply 
moving forward based on a narrow selection of some elements of the existing 
context (i.e. existing policies). 
By definition, bricoleurs do not plan ahead; making do with what is at hand to 
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solve immediate problems requires spontaneous action. Entrepreneurial 
bricolage does imply the leveraging of emergent contextual features. Baker 
and Nelson‟s (2005) example of Biggs Dig illustrates this. Dig founded a firm 
to buy polluted and shuttered mines on the cheap, clean them up, and 
subsequently sell the restored properties. He was so adept at inventing 
effective restoration processes that he often made money from the restoration 
itself – for example by selling reclaimed coal. On one occasion, he managed 
to clean up a huge, toxic tail pond to such a degree that instead of selling the 
restored property, he decided to start a fish farm in the erstwhile tailing pond. 
Improvisation is obviously about ad lib action; when composition and 
execution of an action converge in time, there is no planning. The way it has 
been developed as a construct, improvisation does not consider the leveraging 
of contingencies, inasmuch as contingencies are defined as emergent external 
features of the environment. To the contrary, improvisation is mostly 
conceptualized as building primarily on the improviser‟s experience and skill 
set (Berliner, 1994; Weick, 1998) or an organization‟s memory (Moorman & 
Miner, 1998). Emergent properties of the context can be said to be 
incorporated into an improvisation when the immediately preceding acts of 
improvisation are considered to constitute the environment; improvisational 
action builds upon itself. This can be more clearly envisioned when 
considering group improvisation – be it a musical band jamming or a comedy 
troupe adlibbing a skit. When improvisation is a shared activity, each individual 
builds upon what is contributed by others, she leverages what are essentially 
unforeseeable contingencies that arise from the collective improvisational 
performance. 
Problem-setting in reflective practice is about incorporating the situation at 
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hand in the simultaneous structuring of the goals and decision parameters. 
Schön (1982) posits that much of reflection-in-action hinges on the experience 
of surprise – of the unexpected – experienced during professional practice, 
which tends to include an element of repetition (e.g. cases, projects, accounts, 
sessions, etc.). A practitioner experiences many variations of a small number 
of types of cases and is thus able to “practice” his practice and develop a 
repertoire of expectations, images, and techniques. If there are no surprises or 
challenging contexts to be incorporated into problem-setting, his knowing-in-
practice becomes tacit, automatic, and specialized, leading to a narrowness of 
vision and eventually to a diminution of reflection while practicing. Without 
unscripted action and the embrace of surprise, reflective practice gradually 
degrades to simple and mindless routine. Schön (1982) advocates: the 
practitioner “must allow himself to experience surprise, puzzlement, or 
confusion” in order to renew and maintain productive and meaningful reflection 
in action. 
Interpretive processes also have spontaneous action at their core. An 
interpretive process can be viewed as an open-ended conversation which 
draws on the experiences and understandings of its participants and thrives on 
their efforts to make their viewpoints compatible. The art of conversation is 
accomplished and dialectical adlibbing; participants cannot plan their 
contributions beforehand, they must spontaneously build upon others‟ 
immediate contributions. Thus, the outcome of the conversation or its final 
form cannot be predicted. 
Spontaneous action is orthogonal to a focus on means. An entrepreneur who 
looks to her means to define her goals can still be pretty deliberate about 
achieving those goals and not engage in any spontaneous action in reaction to 
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unforeseen contingencies. Likewise, goal-oriented entrepreneurs may act 
extemporaneously to achieve said goals, especially when unexpected 
circumstances may threaten to derail them. 
 
Discordant elements of opportunity construction processes 
The reviewed opportunity construction theories also contain some implicit 
assumptions or implications which are incompatible. To create a unified 
framework that synthesizes these theories, I now describe and explore these 
contradicting elements in order to justifiably discard some or propose 
boundary conditions under which either set of the conflicting elements 
function. Table 5 lists and describes these discordant elements. 
 
Table 5 – Discordant elements of opportunity construction theories. 
 
Discordant 
Element 
Description 
Locus of action / 
Driving agent 
Some theories assume an individual entrepreneur drives the 
process or has the innate ability to construct opportunities – 
others model opportunity creation as a result of collective action 
and interaction 
Degree of novelty The theories vary on their reliance on path dependency versus 
path creation as mechanisms for generating novelty and thus 
imply different likelihoods for the generation of novelty 
 
Locus of action / Driving agent 
The reviewed theories represent two distinct perspectives on the role of the 
individual in the fabrication of opportunities. Some of the theories view the 
whole process as driven primarily by a single individual whereas others stress 
the importance of collective action and interaction for the construction of an 
opportunity. Table 6 shows which theories adhere to each perspective. 
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Table 6 – Locus of action in opportunity construction theories. 
 
Individual entrepreneur Collective interaction 
-Effectuation 
-Bricolage 
-Reflective practice 
-Improvisation 
-Muddling through 
-Interpretive process 
-Organizational knowledge creation 
 
The logic of effectuation is derived from the in-depth study of “expert 
entrepreneurs”, individuals who have successfully established and developed 
more than one enterprise (Sarasvathy, 2008). This basis subtly introduces a 
bias towards the innate or learned abilities of the accomplished effectuator – 
an individual with the right expertise and strong drive for assembling networks 
of committed actors and for finding slack resources in the environment. While 
the dynamics of effectuation require the participation of many actors in order to 
crystallize a market, the theory implicitly assumes that a focal effectuator sets 
things in motion and possesses the skills and drive needed to motivate the 
process. 
Entrepreneurial bricolage was also constructed from interviews with individual 
entrepreneurs or business managers (Baker & Nelson, 2005). Thus, the 
bricoleur is characterized as an individual who has an inherent skill for putting 
things together in different ways and creating resources from nothing. In fact, 
Baker and Nelson (2005) show how firms that continually use bricolage cannot 
grow – in part because the bricoleurial capability resides in a single individual. 
Firms founded through bricolage that do grow, do so by abandoning 
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bricoleurial activities once they have established themselves. It must be noted 
that alternative conceptualizations of bricolage, such as Garud and Karnøe‟s 
(2003) do construe it as a broader process that builds upon the efforts of 
many. 
Reflective practice is a theory explicitly created to explain how individuals deal 
with unique and unstable situations. Schön makes no effort to explore what 
the organizational or collective implications of the theory might be and even 
argues that any apparent “collective” order should be treated as merely the 
aggregate impact of actions by individuals (Argyris & Schön, 1978). Orlikowski 
(2002) has attempted to create an organization level construct for knowing-in-
practice, yet the practices she bases it on are mostly focused on establishing 
organizational identity (e.g. sharing identity, interacting face to face, supporting 
participation, etc.) – she does not deal with the practices relevant to 
opportunity construction (e.g. problem setting). 
Improvisation is also generally thought of as occurring at the individual level 
(Berliner, 1994; Weick, 1998); researchers have described improvisation by 
individual musicians, teachers, therapists, actors, and athletes (see Moorman 
& Miner, 1998 for a review). Moorman and Miner (1998) argue that 
improvisation can also be conceptualized at a collective level, as other 
organizational features such as memory, culture, and routines often are. Their 
manner of raising the level of analysis is not by analyzing how improvising 
individuals interact – as they would in improvisational theater – but by 
anthropomorphizing organizations and ascribing to them additional capabilities 
such as memory. 
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The opposite perspective, encapsulated in Nonaka and Takeuchi‟s knowledge 
creation theory as well as Lester and Piore‟s interpretive process, stresses the 
importance of the collective in the emergence and construction of an 
opportunity. It is through dialectic interactions between actors that a new 
artifact arises. These theories do not minimize the role of the individual 
entrepreneur; they simply recast it. In the interpretive process, the 
entrepreneur is a host who invites participants to a conversation, sets its 
direction and nurtures the unfolding process without trying to control it. 
In Nonaka and Takeuchi‟s (1995) SECI model, there are several drivers of the 
process with different roles which they capture in their “knowledge-creating 
crew” composed of knowledge practitioners (front line employees), knowledge 
engineers (middle managers), and knowledge officers (top managers). While 
the top managers provide the visionary ideals or general direction, Nonaka 
and Takeuchi celebrate the middle managers as the key agents who mediate 
between “what should be”, and “what is”. The front line employees are viewed 
as those who really understand what‟s going on, but need the middle 
managers to help them make sense of the reality and align it with the 
organization‟s higher goals. Lindblom‟s “muddling through” logic also implies 
distributed agency in the opportunity construction process as the design and 
implementation of new policies is assumed to occur as a negotiated process 
where the priorities, values, and desired outcomes of any individual policy 
promoter or analyst have to be incorporated into a proposal that all parties can 
agree on. 
 
 50 
Degree of novelty 
A powerful and authoritative perspective on the emergence of novelty is that it 
is a path dependent phenomenon (David, 1985; Arthur, 1990). Rather than a 
negation of the past, path dependent novelty is viewed as elaboration in a 
specific direction that is determined by how a particular sequence of events 
unfolds. Proponents of this perspective often celebrate historical accidents as 
the sources of novelty. David‟s (1990) account of the emergence of the 
QWERTY keyboard is a classic example. 
An alternative perspective on novelty – one that is more aligned with the 
opportunity construction theories – is that of path creation (Garud & Karnøe, 
2001). Entrepreneurs construct a path to novelty as they meaningfully 
navigate a flow of events even as they constitute them. Entrepreneurs are 
thought of as knowledgeable agents with a capacity to reflect and act in 
manners different than those prescribed by existing social rules and taken-for-
granted institutional artifacts. 
In an entrepreneurial context, novelty is not simply the emergence of 
something new or different; it also implies the creation of something valuable 
or useful. Novelty in entrepreneurship echoes the definition of organizational 
creativity: the creation of a valuable, useful new product, service, idea, 
procedure, or process by individuals working together in a complex social 
system (Woodman, Sawyer, & Griffin, 1993). 
The opportunity construction theories reviewed vary in their allegiance to path 
dependency or path creation perspectives on novelty. Table 7 describes how 
each theory relates to this dimension. 
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Muddling through is the theory closest to a path dependency perspective on 
the emergence of novelty. As analysts create new policies by negotiating 
modifications to existing policies that they could potentially agree upon, they 
inevitably produce outcomes which are only incrementally different from the 
status quo. While the value provided by the new policy might be substantive, 
the degree of novelty constructed tends to be low because the policy is likely 
to be quite similar to its predecessor. 
 
Table 7 – Outcome novelty in opportunity construction theories. 
 
Low novelty 
Path dependency 
Mid-level novelty 
Path creation 
High novelty 
Path creation 
Muddling through Bricolage 
Reflective practice 
Improvisation 
Effectuation 
Interpretive process 
Organizational knowledge 
creation 
 
The rest of the theories agree ontologically and epistemologically with a path 
creation perspective but suggest the production of different levels of novelty. 
Some of the theories imply that the novelty produced will tend to have an 
upper boundary, I call these mid-level novelty theories: bricolage, reflective 
practice, improvisation. This is because while the constructed opportunity 
might be different and new-to-the-world, its value and usefulness are often 
limited. Two factors can potentially limit the value of these constructed 
opportunities: the permanence of their outcomes, and their replicability or 
growth potential. 
Entrepreneurial bricoleurs often cobble together unique solutions by using 
unconventional resources, but as Baker and Nelson (2005) point out, these 
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solutions are usually makeshift and impermanent. The bricoleur providing a 
service many times only provides a brief respite from the underlying problem, 
and has to continually revisit his contrivance to ensure it remains functional. In 
many cases, the bricoleur provides a temporary solution and then moves on to 
other issues. This is nicely illustrated by Baker and Nelson‟s (2005) example 
of the motorcycle repairman who provided a temporary fix to a known 
customer free of charge in the hopes of gaining future access to the 
customer‟s “sand-cast engine block”. The customer eventually had to return 
for a conventional repair. 
The novelty produced through reflective practice is limited by the fact that it 
only serves the individual practitioner and the unique case he is working on. 
The motto “treat the person, not the illness” means that each case is “a 
universe of one”. The constructed opportunity cannot be replicated beyond the 
individual case and does not provide a base for growth (other than for honing 
the practitioner‟s reflecting-in-action skills). Improvisation suffers both 
detriments to the creation of value: it is impermanent and its outcomes tend to 
be non-replicable and non-scalable. 
The theories that don‟t place an upper bound on the degree of novelty that 
their constructed opportunities can produce include: effectuation, interpretive 
process, and the SECI model of organizational knowledge creation. While the 
effectuation logic is ultimately algorithmic (an effectuator may apply its 
principles but still fail), its potential for creating novelty is unbounded. Because 
it specifically advocates the creation and incorporation of new networks, it 
includes the necessary mechanisms for potentially multiplying the new value 
that might be created. Sarasvathy‟s (2001) example of how U-Haul grew from 
a single trailer in 1945 to complete coverage of the US by 1949 illustrates this 
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ingrained potential for growth. 
The interpretive process‟s and SECI‟s focus on the production of an 
opportunity at the collective level also allows for the creation and propagation 
of value beyond an individual case. Moreover, both of these theories are more 
applicable to interacting members of organizations who are specifically tasked 
with creating new products and services. Once an opportunity is embodied in 
a particular product or standardized service that a firm will offer, the provided 
value can expand well beyond the focal actors involved in its original creation. 
The broader organization also provides the resources for concretizing the 
opportunity and making it more permanent. 
 
SYNTHETIC FRAMEWORK FOR OPPORTUNITY CONSTRUCTION 
The shared elements of the reviewed theories provide sound bases for the 
development of a set of synthesizing constructs to underpin an overarching 
framework for examining and thinking about opportunity construction. The 
theories‟ discordant elements enable us to bound the framework and specify 
the kind of opportunity construction it serves to examine. 
The constructs (see Table 8 and Figure 1) synthesized from the shared 
elements of the reviewed theories include: flexible goals, reenactment of 
resources, network transformation, and leveraging of emergent contingencies. 
Each of these constructs is itself a reframing and elaboration of the shared 
elements already discussed. 
The discordant elements already examined – locus of action and degree of 
novelty – have implications for determining which situations and processes the 
proposed synthetic framework is more relevant to. 
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Table 8 – Constructs of the synthetic framework for opportunity construction 
and their basis in shared elements of relevant extant theories. 
 
Synthetic construct Shared element of extant theories 
Flexible goals Focus on means 
Reenacting resources Reframing resources 
Transforming networks Forging networks 
Leveraging contingencies  Spontaneous action 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Synthetic framework for opportunity construction processes. 
 
In the following subsections I describe each synthetic construct, point out any 
differences or elaborations it may have over the shared element it was derived 
from, and contrast the construct to what usually occurs when an opportunity 
discovery logic is applied. In the subsection on construct agreement I use a 
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vignette to demonstrate how these four constructs interact and counterbalance 
each other in the framework. Lastly, I end with a subsection on limitations that 
explains the implications of the discordant elements of opportunity 
construction theories on the synthetic framework. 
 
Flexible goals 
Opportunity discovery models focus on first clearly identifying and delimiting 
an opportunity. This naturally becomes a clear goal to be aimed for. The 
entrepreneur then gathers and configures the resources considered necessary 
to exploit the opportunity and achieve the objectified goal. 
With goal flexibility – meaning that the entrepreneur‟s goal is not rigidly defined 
from the outset – opportunity construction models maintain plasticity regarding 
the means that have to be assembled or how they have to be deployed. The 
goal can be kept generic and broad, such as “the generalized aspiration of 
building a successful business of her own” (Sarasvathy, 2001), or it can be 
framed in deliberately equivocal terms such as “let‟s change the flow,” 
“develop a „$1,000 copier‟ based on a totally new concept,” “make an excellent 
company by transcending the camera business,” or “create human electronics” 
(Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). An alternative way of maintaining goal flexibility, 
especially in cases where the resources are clearly defined (for example when 
a salesperson is tasked with selling cars), is to be willing to add complexity to 
the outcome or recast it in broader terms. In the case of the car salesperson, 
the goal could be broadened by recasting her job as providing clients with 
comprehensive and customized mobility solutions, thus enabling the use of 
many alternate resources and options such as leasing, service plans, 
extended warrantees, trade-ins, rentals, etc. 
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I propose the construct of goal flexibility goals rather than a focus on means or 
the conflation of means and ends (as many of the theories frame the issue), 
simply because it is easier to grasp. Rather than having to juggle two 
interplaying concepts (ends and means) within a single construct, a focus only 
on ends makes for a cleaner logic. It also helps avoid some of the confusion 
that can be sown by trying to think of means as ends. Let‟s take for example a 
gardener with a spade. If we say that ends and means are conflated, we could 
be implying that the spade is or could become part of the gardener‟s goal. This 
doesn‟t make much sense, at least in most gardeners‟ cases. If we posit goal 
flexibility instead, then the spade can comfortably remain a means. In this 
case, the question becomes, what will the gardener use the spade for? Or 
what can a gardener create or do with a spade? Loading all the uncertainty 
onto the goal still agrees with the underlying logic from the reviewed theories. 
An important property of goal flexibility as a construct is that it is applicable to 
groups of interacting individuals and collectives, not only individual 
entrepreneurs. Goals can be ambiguous or plastic for a group even when each 
member has clear goals because it is unclear how the members‟ goals will 
interact and what the interaction will produce. On the other hand, if each 
member has flexible goals, the collective‟s goals will also be flexible. Also, 
each member does not have to have individualized goals for collective goal 
flexibility to hold, they simply have to be vague about the group-level goals. 
 
Reenacting resources 
Opportunity discovery models assume resources are objective and have clear 
and pre-defined purposes; to pursue an opportunity, an entrepreneur needs to 
first acquire and deploy the appropriate resources. Opportunity construction 
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theories recognize that resources can be used in many ways and that no two 
firms or individuals will create the same effect from the same resources. 
Furthermore, they posit that synthetic skills can be deployed to actively 
construct new resources or create new uses for existing ones. 
I use the term enacting rather than framing to emphasize the notion that 
resources are really only tangible and existent when they are in actual use. If a 
resource is not being actively used, deployed, or considered – in other words, 
enacted – then it doesn‟t make sense to classify it as a resource in opportunity 
construction logic. I add re to the term to denote that in opportunity 
construction processes the resources may be enacted in ways that are 
different than the more conventional ways they would be when following an 
opportunity discovery logic. 
The term “enactment” also brings to mind the idea of social construction 
(Berger & Luckman, 1967). Baker and Nelson (2005) continually reference it 
while discussing bricolage to make the case that resources are not necessarily 
objective features of the environment. But their focus on the individual 
bricoleur detracts from the social aspect of construction. A socially constructed 
artifact is something that has become objectified by shared experience and 
then been incorporated into a sign system (language) (Berger & Luckman, 
1967). Part of the reason bricolage is so unstable is that often only the 
bricoleur is capable of reframing the resource and maintaining its new 
function. In the present framework, reenacting is meant to connote that the 
construction of resources can be a shared activity (and is more potent when it 
is) – resources are reenacted when all the participants involved tend to agree 
on what the synthesized resource actually is or understand its function within 
their activity. 
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Network transformation 
In opportunity discovery processes, networks are usually used instrumentally 
in one of three ways: 
 Entrepreneurs use their networks to search for the opportunities; they 
use them as extended environmental sensing organs. Many 
entrepreneurs actively “network”, deliberately increasing the size of 
their network in search of opportunities. 
 Actors in an entrepreneur‟s network are seen as resources that need to 
be deployed to exploit an opportunity. Thus an entrepreneur founding a 
trucking enterprise may scan his network for licensed commercial 
drivers he may hire. 
 Lastly, entrepreneurs may search for and exploit opportunities within 
their networks. In Burt‟s (1995) theory of structural holes and social 
capital, an entrepreneur is the individual who brokers a relationship 
between two previously disconnected players and then continues to 
control the information flow between them in order to benefit from the 
added value created by the new relationship. 
 
The artifacts that result from opportunity construction are the products of 
nurturing the growth of social networks and leveraging them as needed. In 
many cases, the nature of existing relationships is transformed or augmented 
to allow different kinds of transactions: for example, a friend may be converted 
into a lead user (von Hippel, 2005). The networks may also be enlarged in the 
process of creating a new artifact. In the synthetic framework for opportunity 
construction, network transformation encompasses both processes: 
repurposing existing relationships and adding new actors to the network. 
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Leveraging contingencies 
Opportunity discovery models emphasize the need to plan and to stabilize the 
environment. If conditions shift as resources are being deployed, the targeted 
opportunity may vanish before it can be exploited. Alternatively, the 
opportunity may change and require a regrouping and redeployment of 
resources. 
Opportunity construction processes retain flexibility so that emergent 
contingencies may be dealt with as they arise and ideally be fluidly 
incorporated into the processes. Leveraging contingencies moves beyond 
simple spontaneous reactions to circumstances, which is the common 
denominator of the reviewed theories, to include a positive and constructive 
approach to unforeseen events. When constructing an opportunity, the 
entrepreneur strives to make use of unanticipated eventualities rather than 
avoid them or overcome them. This posture is captured by the idiom “When 
life hands you lemons, you make lemonade.” 
 
Construct agreement 
The four proposed constructs (see Table 8 and Figure 1) complement and 
balance each other in a framework for opportunity construction. They can be 
seen as elements of a simultaneous equation or pairings of abductor and 
adductor muscles. The following hypothetical example highlights the interplay 
between them. 
Imagine the owner of a motorized yacht who wants to start a business. At first, 
he is not certain what specific business he‟d like to start, other than it be 
related to the ocean and the use of his boat; his initial goal is ambiguous. As 
he is pondering – over a drink at the marina‟s bar – whether to invest in rods 
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and reels in order to offer fishing charters or to become certified as a dive 
master so that he can take people scuba diving (the two main tourist industries 
in the marina), he overhears another patron asking the bartender which is the 
best outlook in the area for watching the sunset. He instinctively leans over to 
the inquiring patron and asks, “Have you ever seen a green flash3?” 
They then fall into a conversation and our entrepreneur discovers that the 
tourist is an avid sunset photographer, and is now really excited to try and 
capture a green flash on film. The yacht owner agrees to take the 
photographer out to sea at sunset, away from the city‟s smog to increase his 
chance of photographing a green flash in return for picking up the bar tab and 
covering the outing‟s fuel cost. On their way to the marina, the entrepreneur 
calls his friend, who is a local portrait photographer, and invites her to join 
them. She jumps at the offer and meets them at the marina an hour before 
sunset. 
The trio heads out and is so lucky that they actually manage to photograph a 
green ray, the first time this phenomenon has ever been photographed in the 
area. Upon their return, the tourist is so excited that he e-mails his 
photography club back home and begins to organize a group trip with the 
specific intent of photographing green flashes. He naturally asks the yacht 
owner if he would host the group on his “lucky” boat. The entrepreneur 
glances at his photographer friend, who encourages him to accept and offers 
to help set up the boat so that it may accommodate a group of photographers. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
3
 Green flashes and green rays are optical phenomena that occur shortly after sunset, when a 
green spot becomes visible above the sun for a second or two, or a green ray shoots up from 
the sunset point. Green flashes/rays are rare, as they depend on a specific confluence of 
atmospheric conditions, and they require an unobstructed view of the horizon. 
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The tourist returns two weeks later with his photography club friends, and this 
time they pay charter rates for using the boat. They don‟t get to see a green 
ray, but they do manage to photograph a small green flash after several 
outings. They are also treated to a pod of photogenic dolphins and some 
jumping mobula rays. They return happy to their homes and post their pictures 
on the club website. The photographer subsequently realizes that there is an 
intense online interest in the green flash pictures his club members have 
posted to the site and calls the yacht owner to let him know. As they discuss 
this, it slowly dawns on the yacht owner that he could begin to create a niche 
in “green flash” and photography charters. Simultaneously, the photographer 
realizes he could earn some money on the side by promoting and organizing 
trips of photography aficionados to try and capture the elusive green flash. 
Before they know it, the yacht owner has hired his portrait photographer friend 
full time as a deck hand, and is offering “green flash cruises” that are being 
populated by the now famous website “green flash photography”, managed by 
the photographer. 
This example shows how the different elements of opportunity construction 
processes enable and reinforce each other. For example, the yacht is 
obviously a potential resource, but it can be used – or reenacted – in a number 
of ways. Traditionally, yachts in the locality have been used commercially for 
sport fishing and scuba diving. They could be used for a myriad other 
purposes, from hosting cocktail parties to serving as libraries. In this case, 
because the owner did not have a defined goal, he was able to recast it as a 
photography platform. His enactment of the resource was also tightly linked to 
transforming his network, and leveraging contingencies. Using the boat for 
photography enabled him to establish a new relationship with the 
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photographer and let him change the nature of his relationship with the portrait 
photographer from friend, to employee. Reenacting the yacht as a 
photography platform was crucial for leveraging a chance encounter with a 
visiting tourist into the seed of a business. Other resources which weren‟t 
resources until they were reenacted as such include the sunsets and the local 
sea life. The yacht owner‟s goal flexibility was also related to the leveraging of 
contingencies, namely, the encounter with the photographer and mutual 
interest in green flashes. Had the yacht owner‟s pre-defined goal been to offer 
fishing charters, he would not have engaged the photographer or offered his 
yacht as a photography platform. 
Table 9 describes some instances of each of the synthetic constructs in the 
vignette and Table 10 is a matrix that shows instances of how each pair of 
synthetic constructs interacts in the vignette – from the perspective of the 
yacht owner. 
 
Table 9 – Instances of the synthetic constructs in the green flash vignette. 
 
Synthetic 
construct 
Instances in vignette 
Goal flexibility 
-Yacht owner is not sure what kind of business he‟d like to start 
-Photographer doesn‟t even know about green flashes 
Reenacting 
resources 
-The yacht is used as a photography platform 
-The tourist uses his photography club as a source of clients 
Network 
transformation 
-Yacht owner and photographer become business associates 
-Friend of yacht owner gets converted into employee 
Leveraging 
contingency 
-Yacht owner and tourist use chance encounter to start activities that 
lead to the creation of the business 
-Tourist harnesses the unexpected popularity of green flash photos 
posted by his club members on their website to create a customer 
stream 
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Table 10 – Interactions between synthetic constructs in green flash vignette. 
 
Synthetic 
construct 
Reenacting 
resources 
Network 
transformation 
Leveraging contingency 
Goal 
flexibility 
Non-focus on 
diving services 
allowed yacht 
owner to 
reframe 
sunsets as a 
client attractor 
Openness to 
different outcomes 
enabled the yacht 
owner to start a 
business that relied 
on a photographer 
he had just met 
Not being wedded to 
fishing charters, the yacht 
owner was able to harness 
a chance encounter and 
mutual interest in green 
flashes 
Reenacting 
resources 
 Reframing sunsets 
as photo ops 
enabled the yacht- 
man to create a 
new network 
amongst 
photographers that 
served as clients 
Reframing the yacht as a 
photography platform let 
the yacht owner use a 
random conversation on 
green flashes as the basis 
for offering a unique 
service 
Network 
transformation 
  The new relationship with 
the photographer enabled 
the yacht owner to tap into 
the unfor-seeable interest 
in green flash photography 
 
Boundary conditions 
The discordant elements of the reviewed opportunity construction theories 
have some implications for the synthetic framework. As we saw, some of the 
theories posit an individual as the driving force behind opportunity construction 
processes while others claim it is more of a collective process. The theories 
also disagree on the extent to which opportunity creation processes will 
produce novel outcomes; some of them put upper bounds on the potential 
novelty of the outcomes by stressing path dependency or incorporating 
constraints to the creation of value while others do not limit the potential 
novelty. Table 11 describes the implications of these discordant elements. 
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Table 11 – Implications of the discordant elements of extant theories for the 
synthetic framework for opportunity construction. 
 
Discordant element of extant 
theories 
Implication for synthetic 
framework 
Locus of action / Driving agent 
Focus on collective interaction and on 
the entrepreneur‟s role as a facilitator 
Degree of novelty 
Focus on processes that are not 
bounded by the level of potential value 
they may create 
 
The synthetic framework has been abstracted to the point that it can consider 
opportunity construction processes as either driven by an individual agent, or 
as the product of interacting individuals. In the analysis of the vignette 
presented in the previous subsection (see Table 10), the framework is used to 
examine the creation of Green Flash Cruises as if the yacht owner had 
“driven” the process. The interactions of the elements described in Table 10 
are described from his perspective. But it should be obvious from reading the 
vignette itself, that the artifacts were created by the social interaction of 
several individuals. In this case, the participation of the photographer/tourist is 
almost as important as the yachtsman‟s in order to concretize the opportunity. 
Viewing the acts of entrepreneurship and of opportunity construction as 
pertaining to a focal agent might make for convenient theorizing – most 
westerners naturally think in terms of individuals with their own volition and 
freedom of choice – but runs the risk of overlooking important elements of the 
process and lots of its relevant richness. The synthetic framework does enable 
us posit a more distributed locus of action. In the vignette, we can see how the 
photographer, as well as the yachtsman, was flexible about his goals, 
reenacted resources, leveraged unforeseen events, and transformed his 
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networks. Alternatively, we can apply the constructs at a higher level of 
analysis and examine how the yachtsman and the photographer together 
maintained flexible goals, reenacted resources, leveraged contingencies, and 
transformed networks. 
If we still want to think of particular individuals as driving the process, it may 
make more sense to think of entrepreneurs as those who facilitate these open-
ended processes in which several actors interact with the broad goal of 
creating a new artifact by reframing resources and leveraging contingencies. 
This conceptualization of the entrepreneur is broadly analogous to Lester and 
Piore‟s (2004) cocktail party host, or Nonaka and Takeuchi‟s (1995) 
knowledge engineer. 
Regarding the degree of novelty that may be produced, the synthetic 
framework does not suggest an upper boundary because it does not include 
the constraints on the potential value of the resulting construct that bricolage, 
reflective practice, and improvisation do. Drawing again on the Green Flash 
vignette, there is no inherent factor that would limit the degree of newness-to-
the-world of the outcome, nor the potential value it could produce. The Green 
Flash business is not inherently unstable (only operable by the original 
yachtsman), intrinsically incapable of being scaled, or congenitally unable to 
impact more than a single individual or case. Also, the framework does not 
favor path dependency over path creation. 
 
Opportunity discovery vs. opportunity construction logic 
Opportunity construction processes many times appear to be opportunistic, 
aimless, poorly motivated, and unstructured. This may not concur with how 
most of us perceive reality; we hold the attainment of goals very close to heart 
 66 
and assume that goal-oriented action (Austin & Vancouver, 1996) is the 
bedrock of human behavior. To the Western mind, the intentional individual is 
the ultimate building block of society. The idea of autonomous individuals 
acting in their self-interest has been the basic organizing principle of modernity 
and modern capitalism. In this Aristotelian, Cartesian, and consequentialist 
theology, action is invariably seen as choice, and choice is driven by 
anticipations, incentives, and desires (Berlin, 1997; March, 2003; Chia, 2003; 
de Rond & Thietart, 2007). 
Clarity of goals and purposive action are inherent to the opportunity discovery 
logic and agree with the strategic choice and planning school streams in 
strategic management that emphasize the importance of systematic analysis 
and integrative planning (Ansoff, 1979, Porter, 1980, Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, & 
Lampel, 2005; de Rond & Thietart, 2007). 
In their development of the interpretive process perspective, Lester and Piore 
illustrate how engineers are deliberately trained to think and behave in terms 
of goals. In their words: 
“Would-be practitioners learn to begin by making a sharp distinction 
between ends and means - between the goal they are trying to achieve 
and the resources available for achieving it. Their next step is to 
specify a causal model connecting the means to the ends. Finally they 
optimize – that is, to solve the causal model so as to maximize the 
degree to which the goal is achieved, given the constraints on 
resources. When there are multiple, possibly conflicting goals, they are 
taught to identify trade-offs among them and to look for solutions that 
achieve acceptable performance with regard to each goal at minimum 
cost.” (Lester & Piore, 2004) 
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An opportunity discovery stance towards launching new businesses typically 
leads to the kind of information gathering and analysis activities described in 
the introduction for most firms expanding to new geographies. The individual 
who believes in pre-existing opportunities typically takes the traditional 
“environment scanning ► opportunity recognition ► resource configuration ► 
resource deployment ► business launch” approach to initiating a new venture. 
The opportunity construction mindset, on the other hand, agrees much more 
with an Eastern mindset which is essentially pragmatic and existential (Chia, 
2003). In this view, the world is experienced as of the actors and is not viewed 
as an external object to be apprehended (Nonaka & Konno, 1998); it is 
recognized that that which is changing cannot be given a stable identity and 
thus cannot be located in a system of causal relationships (Nonaka, Toyama, 
& Hirata, 2008). Action in the world is perfected through direct and unmediated 
involvement. James (1912) called for a radical empiricism, arguing that 
knowing, spontaneous action, and inspired performances are the result of 
being open to „pure experience‟ – which occurs before conscious thought 
intervenes and separates subject from object. In the extreme version, there 
isn‟t an assumption that the self exists before experience; the self is realized 
through the act of experiencing – the individual is not an a priori entity but an 
emergent property of experience itself (Nishida, 1921). 
Thus, individuals who believe they create opportunities are much more likely 
to take action within the environment from the start, before trying to garner 
resources or configure their resource bases. The process will be much more 
iterative, will likely start small, and be much more experimental. In the 
extreme, these entrepreneurs will be willing to try almost anything that's legal 
to get their first sales of whatever they can get ahold of to sell. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH STRATEGY 
 
The primary thrust of this dissertation is to develop theory that helps us 
understand how firms create novel businesses in new market space. From a 
methodological perspective, the main conundrum is how to develop a deep 
understanding of a phenomenon that is inherently non-linear, unstable, and 
ephemeral. In a sense, studying processes that are not routine and are 
intended to produce unique outcomes is akin to the biologists‟ examination of 
the emergence of life. Evolutionary theory can explain and provide 
methodological guidance for studying how life forms change over time, but it 
has little to say about how life originally emerged. Similarly, research methods 
designed to study existing organizations and stable organizational routines 
may not be appropriate for learning about chaotic and unpredictable founding 
processes. In fact, conventional or “variance” research approaches can drive 
researchers to “sample on the dependent variable” in these conditions (Van de 
Ven & Poole, 2005). 
For example, each year four to six percent of the working population of the 
United States take action to start new ventures, less than half succeed, and 
fewer than one in ten of these entrepreneurs are able to make their 
organizations grow significantly (Duncan & Handler, 1994; Reynolds & White, 
1997). Thus, methods that favor the examination of existing or fully formed 
organizations may divert our attention from the “nascent entrepreneurial” 
processes and the “organizational fermentation simmering just below the 
surface of society” (Aldrich & Martinez, 2001), which in the case of this 
dissertation, are the very processes of interest. 
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From the critical realist and positivist perspectives, quantitative research 
methods are considered to offer understandings that are more reliable and 
valid (Cook & Campbell, 1979; Bhaskar, 1998). But these methods require 
numerical data, which implies measurement, and measurement requires a 
base level of convention, as well as a certain phenomenological stability or 
repetitiveness. Emergence and non-routine processes that have unique 
outcomes are very difficult if not impossible to measure, and there is little 
agreement on how they can be measured. Thus, the research strategy crafted 
to answer this dissertation‟s question is a “qualitative” and “process” based 
one – one based on words and on explaining the sequence of events in time 
and context (Miles & Huberman, 1984; Van de Ven & Pool, 2005). It is an 
approach that relies heavily on ethnographic practice but also draws from case 
study analysis and action research methodologies. While these approaches 
may be based in different epistemologies, it is precisely the combination of 
multiple epistemologies which is intended to drive the production of creative 
theory (Kilduff, Mehra, & Dunn, 2011; Suddaby, Hardy, & Huy, 2011). 
 
EPISTEMOLOGICAL STANCE 
Epistemology refers to the rationale whereby a researcher makes and 
assesses “truth” claims. Mainstream organizational research is mostly based 
on a realist perspective –one that assumes that causal relationships exist 
beyond the human mind and that scientific theories provide approximately true 
descriptions of the world (Cook & Campbell, 1979; Putnam, 1987). These 
theories replace each other over time as they provide better accounts of 
phenomena, and can be evaluated rationally in terms of how well they explain 
the phenomena (Kilduff, Mehra, & Dunn, 2011). 
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An alternative epistemology in organizational research can be broadly 
construed as phenomenology or social constructionism (Berger & Luckman, 
1967; Van Manen, 1990). Within this line of thought, the social world is a 
continuous process that is constructed anew in each social encounter, as 
individuals build shared meanings. A social construct is thus a concept or 
practice that is the artifact of a particular group of people, and its persistence 
and meaning is contingent on it being constantly maintained and reproduced 
by them; social constructs (e.g. good and evil) cannot be separated from the 
societies or groups that bring them about. In Morgan and Smircich‟s (1980) 
words, “the realm of social affairs has no concrete status of any kind; it is a 
symbolic construction”. 
The use of qualitative methods tends to agree more with a social 
constructionist perspective. Social constructionists recognize that knowledge 
is situated; it belongs to the social situation that produces it, and may be 
irrelevant or meaningless when abstracted from the context. This is one of the 
main differences with realist perspectives that ultimately assume that 
knowledge can be abstracted, and that results are generalizable across 
situations – given that certain conditions hold. Realists believe that the 
problem of induction can be at least partially solved (Hume, 1888; Ketokivi & 
Mantere, 2010). In a quest for positivistic validity and reliability, some 
methodologists strive to apply the “rigor” of quantitative methods to qualitative 
ones. Thus, Miles and Huberman (1984) argue for a “transcendental realism” 
whereby theory that accounts for real world phenomena is built from the 
careful analysis of qualitative data. Eisenhardt (1989a) structures her method 
for analyzing cases in a manner analogous to quantitative methods; in 
Eisenhardt and Graebner‟s (2007) words, “each case serves as a distinct 
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experiment that stands on its own as an analytic unit”. 
My selection of research methods was not contingent on the adoption of either 
one of these epistemological stances, but on the desire to produce an 
understanding of the situation that is the most practical. For this, I borrow from 
the action research, pragmatic, and instrumentalist perspectives that assert 
that knowledge should be judged in terms of how useful it is (James, 1912; 
Laudan, 1977; Susman, 1983). In Mintzberg‟s words: 
“All theories are false, because all abstract from data and simplify the 
world they purport to describe. Our choice, then, is not between true 
and false theories so much as between more and less useful theories.” 
(Mintzberg, 1979) 
To generate a useful theory about how firms build novel businesses in new 
market space – where processes are unstable and of relatively short duration, 
and there is little agreement on what can and should be measured – the most 
appropriate method is a blend of ethnography and action research that 
enables “disciplined imagination” (Weick, 1989). 
 
ETHNOGRAPHY AND PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION 
I used mostly participant observation for gathering data and building theory. It 
is very similar to the “participant observer” mode of ethnography that is the 
most commonly used and legitimate variant in organizational studies (Van 
Maanen, 1979a). Most importantly, I spent considerable amounts of time 
participating directly in each of the described cases – this is the essential 
practice of ethnography (Reeves Sanday, 1979). Where I diverged from 
conventional ethnography was in that besides being an observer, I had a 
functional role in both cases I studied. 
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Ethnographers, although they strive to participate in “everyday life” and 
understand reality from the perspective of their subjects (Reeves Sanday, 
1979), never truly lose their status of observers or outsiders because they do 
not have a traditional role nor a long term commitment to the setting or society 
they are studying – they are not fathers, chiefs, or bosses. Venkatesh‟s (2008) 
experience with Chicago inner-city gangs illustrates this point. Even after 
“hanging out” with a gang for seven years, Venkatesh was never able to be 
fully accepted as “one of them” nor permitted to view many of the behaviors 
that were of interest to him. Towards the end of his study, he finally became “a 
gang leader for a day” and had to actually commit crimes and perpetrate acts 
of violence; he had to abandon his detached researcher personae in order to 
gain full access and a closer emic perspective. This exquisitely illustrates the 
dilemma an ethnographer faces in trying to balance participation and 
observation. In reality, most participant observation in organizational settings 
is composed mainly of observation and interviews. Participation is usually 
delegated to trying out a few peripheral tasks (e.g. using a microscope in a 
laboratory, or cleaning a latrine), not actively participating in the decision-
making that is locally considered important. The village chief does not usually 
ask the visiting ethnographer‟s opinion on who he should marry his daughter 
off to, and the CEO does not invite the researcher to actively participate in a 
board meeting and debate strategic direction. A more accurate term for the 
strain of participant observation practiced in the study of organizations might 
be “embedded observation”. 
In my study, I was by design an active participant; I had significant roles to 
play in each of the cases, and therefore commitments and responsibilities to 
the local actors that were independent of my research requirements. This 
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almost completely eliminated my “outsiderness” or “third person on a date” 
quality; I was not the unobtrusive and taken-for-granted “fly on the wall”, but an 
actual boss, adviser, or employee. The price paid for this could be seen as a 
loss of “objectivity”, or of “going native”. Yet it is not clear that active 
participation, in and of itself, is a greater threat to the generation of solid theory 
than the ethnographer‟s eternal dilemma of trying to maintain a third party‟s 
view while simultaneously understanding the emic perspective (Reeves 
Sanday, 1979). 
The main hazard of active participation was the lack of time and energy it left 
for disciplined note-taking, reflection, and on-site text analysis. Most 
ethnographers spend the majority of their time taking field notes, which they 
ideally transcribe and pre-analyze on the same day. Active participation in 
high-intensity entrepreneurial processes left little time for detached note-
taking, and even less time for quiet in-field analysis. My typical day in the field 
started early in the morning and often ended past midnight, with the great 
majority of the time spent participating and immersed in the business creation 
activities. Fortunately, my role in each case was in part to be a kind of 
evaluator, trainer, and facilitator, so a great deal of the direct activities and 
outputs of my participation were directly aligned with my research 
requirements. For example, at the end of each workday in the field I would 
facilitate a debriefing session in which the field team would reflect on the day‟s 
activities and revisit its short and long term action plans. On another occasion, 
I spent an entire day debriefing field team members after their home stay 
experiences. 
While active participation may have decreased the amount of time for personal 
note-taking and in-field reflection, a formal and legitimate role provided access 
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to an enormous reservoir of archival data that was generated during the 
processes. To buttress my field notes, I had access to all sorts of internal 
documents; including more than 2,000 searchable e-mails for each of the 
cases that nicely tracked their development (see the Data Collection section 
for more detail). The wealth of archival data that was generated during the 
processes and which was available to me as a participant, enabled 
triangulation of data to solidify or discard my own observations as well as 
partially postponing analysis to when I was not in the field or the 
observation/participation periods had ended. I also developed much closer 
relationships with the studies‟ subjects through shared experience; I was “an 
insider”. This provided access to all kinds of behaviors and actions that would 
normally be shielded from an observer. 
The other main reason for structuring a more participative role was to sidestep 
some of traditional ethnography‟s built-in constraints. Ethnography is a 
methodology for researching and learning about cultures – established and, 
self-reproducing systems of meanings (Van Maanen, 1979b; Reeves Sanday, 
1979). Ethnographers automatically assume that cultures are relatively 
permanent artifacts (at least more perdurable than their study period) 
composed of repetitive, routine, and structural elements – from the traditional 
ways in which power is distributed within a household to the intricacies of 
language. When ethnography is used to study organizational life, it is naturally 
assumed that there is an equivalent of a culture to be studied; that is, a 
relatively stable set of self-reproducing structures that the ethnographer will 
learn about (Smircich, 1983). Thus Van Maanen (1975a) studied how job 
attitudes of police recruits evolved over time, Howard-Grenville (2005) studied 
organizational routines in a high-tech manufacturing organization, and Barley 
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(1986) looked at how new medical imaging devices challenged the traditional 
role relations among radiologists and radiological technologists. 
But the assumptions underlying this methodological stance do not apply 
cleanly to the phenomena of interest to me. My intent was not study a culture 
or a stable set of institutionalized roles and relationships, my goal was to 
understand a phenomenon that is ephemeral, unstable, unplanned, non-linear, 
and relatively unstructured. In real life, this meant that there wasn‟t a radiology 
room, police department, or high tech manufacturing plant I could go “hang 
out” at and unobtrusively observe how its delimited set of actors operated in a 
routine manner. I had to find a way to be “present” in a process that occurs 
across geographical boundaries, with a shifting group of actors, and in an 
unpredictable manner. The way to do so was to be involved and relevant to 
the process. 
To summarize, a more participative version of ethnography allowed me to: (1) 
get a much deeper access and understanding of the phenomenon, and (2) 
fully examine a non-linear and relatively unstructured process that takes place 
across locations, actors, and time. 
 
SAMPLE SELECTION 
The cases I studied were not chosen randomly; they were selected for 
“theoretical” reasons (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007); they were suitable for 
exploring a particular phenomenon and illuminating and extending 
relationships and logic among relevant constructs. At the core, these were two 
initiatives that addressed my research question spot-on; they were explicitly 
launched by firms to create novel businesses in new market space. A very 
important element in their selection was the fact that they enabled me to 
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observe the phenomenon from its very inception, and thus avoid “sampling on 
the dependent variable” or missing out on the early “effervescence” (Aldrich & 
Martinez, 2001). While single-case studies can richly describe the existence of 
a phenomenon (Siggelkow, 2007), multiple case studies typically provide a 
stronger base for theory building (Yin, 1994). Given the ethnographical nature 
of the data collection, two cases were the maximum that could be done within 
the scope of this dissertation. However, most ethnographical studies are single 
cases (e.g. Gudeman, 1986); showing the emergence of the phenomenon in 
such detail in two separate cases greatly strengthens the resulting theory. 
Pre-identifying these kinds of cases and then getting full access to them in real 
time is one of the great barriers to this kind of research. The vehicle that 
allowed me to gain full access to these initiatives at their inception was the 
BOP Protocol (Simanis et al., 2008), a process-based framework for co-
creating innovative businesses in close partnership with low-income 
communities. Both firms decided from the start to use this framework to guide 
their business development initiatives. As a coauthor of the BOP Protocol, I 
was invited to participate in the processes. 
The use of the BOP Protocol injected some methodological kinks into sample 
selection and theory induction. At first glance, the use of a particular business 
development methodology would appear to “pollute” the sample; any theory 
developed would not be applicable beyond firms that decided to use the BOP 
Protocol, and were able to apply it consistently. 
The central thrusts of the BOP Protocol are the generation of mutual value, 
and the use of co-creative techniques as drivers of innovation and the social 
embeddedness of the resulting business. In broad terms, the main effect of 
employing the BOP Protocol is the deployment of field teams to immerse 
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themselves in the target communities in order to be able to co-create 
businesses that are mutually beneficial. In appreciation of the differences in 
contexts and implementing firms – and the open-endedness of creative 
processes – the BOP Protocol is very vague in its instructions for actual 
behavior in the field or even within the firm; it is not a field guide or a manual. 
Thus, the actual business creation processes in the field tend to be shaped 
primarily by the “structure” of the situation – a field team immersed in a foreign 
environment trying to create a novel business that is locally accepted while 
trying to communicate its experience to its superiors. 
This basic dynamic, which forms the core of the resulting theory of 
entrepreneurial sensemaking, is generally applicable to cases that show the 
same basic structural elements, regardless of whether they are following the 
BOP Protocol or not; that is, the theory is useful for cases when firms attempt 
to build novel businesses in new market space by deploying field teams to do 
so. 
In fact, the Discussion Chapter suggests that sampling based on the use of 
the BOP Protocol actually created a strong test of the theory. By using the 
BOP Protocol and openly acknowledging that they were deploying field teams 
to create novel businesses, senior managers at ACB and SCJ were initially 
assumed to be quite goal flexible and intent on “constructing” opportunities. 
But the fact that we observe different corporate echelons enacting distinct 
opportunity mindsets (rather than all espousing the single logic implicit in the 
BOP Protocol) suggests that firms that do not use the BOP Protocol are even 
more likely to develop this tension and subsequently undergo the 
sensemaking process. 
At the end of the day, selecting the sample based on firms implementing the 
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BOP Protocol was an overall strength of the study because it ensured that the 
firms would deliberately attempt to create novel businesses, allot significant 
resources to the task, deploy field teams to immerse themselves in the local 
environment, and allow me deep access from the outset. 
 
DATA COLLECTION 
As a research project leader, I was fully immersed in the initiatives and an 
important decision-maker in the processes. I participated in a diversity of 
business creation activities and practices such as: human resource 
management (selecting, hiring, firing team members), producing and 
managing budgets, personnel training and oversight, work plan design and 
implementation, prototype design and deployment, sales fieldwork, customer 
acquisition, milestone setting and evaluation, report writing, organizational 
design, strategy setting, organizational partner selection and management, 
grant preparation, field team management, site selection, homestays, in-field 
market research, fund raising, accounting, record keeping, training manual 
development, financial projections and analysis, business plan development, 
etc. 
In the course of this work, I interacted with actors from all levels of the 
processes, including: prospective and actual customers, community leaders, 
NGO personnel, field-level employees, middle managers, senior managers, 
R&D specialists, government ministers and representatives, consultants, 
boards of directors, suppliers, funders, etc. I developed deep and lasting 
relationships with the key players, especially the field managers (whom I hired 
or helped hire) and each initiative‟s key corporate driver or backer. 
I visited each field site on numerous occasions, spending a total of more than 
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nine months in the field across the three sites. Furthermore, I participated in 
managing and monitoring the businesses from afar (the US) in a consistent 
manner, participating in weekly management conference calls, e-mail 
discussions, and innumerable one-on-one conversations, meetings, and calls. 
I participated in the ACB case, as a functional member of the initiative for 
twelve months. I led or co-led the SCJ initiative for eighteen months. 
The primary means of data collection was personal, first-hand observation. 
This was supplemented by access to a wealth of archival data sources, 
informant reports, and interviews. The most important source of data beyond 
the field notes and write-ups derived from first-hand observation were the e-
mail conversations I was part of during the study periods. In each case, I 
generated searchable e-mail databases with over two thousand e-mails each. 
The e-mails were related to all the business creation activities mentioned 
above. The stream of documents that were created as a natural outcome of 
creating a business were the third most important source of data for analysis, 
triangulation, and confirmation. These documents ranged from transcripts of 
conference calls and presentation slides to personal essays about homestays 
and financial projections. I reviewed more than 800 documents per case. 
Table 12 provides a summarized list of types of archival data sources and 
Table 13 provides a more detailed list. 
An important non-verbal data source was a database of videos, photos, and 
recordings I made for each case – with hundreds of photos per case. Lastly, I 
conducted “exit” and “post-event” interviews with several of the most important 
players to gain their reflections and ex post perspectives on the events and 
processes. 
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Table 12 – Summary list of types of data sources. 
 
Source Medium 
Personal field notes Written 
Internal conference calls Written notes, audio recordings 
Internal meeting notes and materials Written, audiovisual 
Community meeting notes and materials Written, audiovisual, photographic 
Internal presentations Written, audiovisual 
Presentations to external stakeholders Written, audiovisual 
Interviews Written, audio recordings 
Internal documents (work plans, meeting 
minutes, white papers, budgets, project 
evaluations, etc.) 
Written 
E-mail communications Written 
 
  
Table 13 – Detailed examples of types of archival data sources. 
 
Meetings Reports Plans Evaluations Others 
Agendas Assessment Action plans Consultant's reports Case studies 
Briefing notes     reports Business plans Interview Communication flow charts 
Conference. call  Brainstorm results Financial     assessments Contact lists 
    recordings External     projections Metric & criteria lists Contracts 
Conference call     presentations Grant proposals Performance Costing/pricing tools 
    transcripts Financial reports Objectives     evaluations E-mails 
Minutes Field trip Operational Site visit evaluations Expense sheets 
Notes from calls     report backs     budgets Third party Fact sheets 
PowerPoint slides Focus group Project budgets     evaluations FAQ lists 
Workshop flipcharts     reports Road maps 
 
Feedback documents 
Workshop photos Focus group Task lists 
 
Invoices 
 
    transcripts Timelines 
 
Job descriptions 
 
Internal To do lists 
 
Marketing materials 
 
    presentations 
  
Mission/vision statements 
 
Journal entries 
  
MOUs 
 
Operational reports 
  
Organizational charts 
 
Personal essays 
  
Price & cost lists 
 
Personal notes 
  
Product lists 
 
Progress reports 
  
Recruitment process documents 
 
Survey results 
  
Statements of interest, CVs 
 
Weekly updates 
  
Training manuals 
 
8
1
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DATA ANALYSIS 
Van de Ven and Poole affirm: 
“Process theories may incorporate several different types of effects 
into their explanations, including critical events and turning points, 
contextual inﬂuence, formative patterns that give overall direction to 
the change, and causal factors that inﬂuence the sequencing of 
events” (Van de Ven & Poole, 2005) 
In order to develop a process theory of entrepreneurial action, my main effort 
of “data reduction” (Miles & Huberman, 1984) was to write a “thick description” 
of each of the cases in which I took thousands of pages of field notes, e-mails, 
and corporate documents and weaved them into two narratives that 
highlighted the social processes that are distinct to the ventures and relevant 
to the research question. 
Cognizant of Van Maanen‟s (1979a) observation that “we tend to theorize well 
in advance of our facts” I did not start writing the thick descriptions with a set 
of hypotheses in mind, but with a more open perspective to allow the themes 
present in the situation to emerge (Smircich, 1983). This “openness” stance 
was also maintained during the field work (as pre-analysis inevitably occurs at 
that point). In order to participate fully in the processes, the stance I took in the 
field could not be one of questioning absolutely every assumption about how 
reality is perceived, as Latour and Woolgar (1979) do when examining the 
functioning of a scientific laboratory. I did share a basic set of tacit 
assumptions and understandings with the rest of the participants, but in 
general, the nature of the phenomenon was so new to everyone involved, that 
the emergent elements of interest could be readily questioned, and even 
examined in a collective manner (Van de Ven & Johnson, 2006a). For 
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example, because of the involvement of community members and not-for-
profit partners in the processes, basic questions about the structure and 
nature of businesses (who should benefit, what‟s the main purpose) which are 
usually taken-for-granted in conventional start-ups were continually debated 
and questioned. 
The bases for each of the thick descriptions are timelines that chronicle the 
major activities and events related to creating and launching the businesses. 
These timelines are complemented by depictions of the firm personnel 
involved (at different organizational levels and at different times) in the 
processes, as well as characterizations of other key actors (e.g. consultants, 
customers, local partners, etc.). The descriptions of these actors include their 
roles, the extent and nature of their involvement, the level and kinds of 
decision-making they were engaged in, and how their relationships with other 
actors evolved over time. 
The writing of the final thick descriptions was an iterative process, with several 
versions being written and sharpened as I “interrogated” them. These thick 
descriptions and the process of writing them served as building blocks for 
grounded theory generation – an approach (not really a specific technique or 
method) that emphasizes the situational and structural contexts and requires a 
detailed, intensive, microscopic examination of a corpus of data in order to 
bring out its complexity (Corbin & Strauss, 2007). Successively evolving 
interpretations of the data were guided by my technical and personal 
experience (Corbin & Strauss, 2007), but also by simultaneously reviewing the 
relevant literature. I iterated between the cases and extant theories until a 
particular way of framing the cases resonated deeply with my experience and 
with the literature. I then sharpened the cases to highlight dimensions relevant 
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to the research question in relation to literature. 
As I rewrote the cases, I double checked to ensure that newer versions 
remained concordant with all the data sources, consistently triangulating 
between them. As the cases cohered, drafts were then reviewed by key actors 
(Yin, 1994). A rule of thumb in data analysis proposed by Miles and Huberman 
(1984) is that one should only rely on information that is provided by two 
respondents and not contradicted by anyone. This makes sense for traditional 
case analysis, when cases are constructed from interviews, intermittent 
observation, and ex post recollections. But it is a conservative rule of thumb 
which can lead the researcher to disregard important events or processes that 
the informants do not want examined. Ethnographers approach this with a 
different perspective, exemplified by Robert Hall‟s Law, “you can never believe 
the answer to a direct question about behavior”, or more crudely 
“businessmen always lie” (Piore, 1979) and the tenet “a central postulate of 
the ethnographic method is that people lie about the things that matter most to 
them” (Van Maanen, 1979a). 
With participant reviews of my drafts, my intention was to incorporate their 
feedback carefully in an attempt to: (1) correct factual mistakes, (2) maintain 
the cases‟ integrity, (3) minimize political fall-out. This was a delicate process, 
as reviewers sometimes practiced impression management and retrospective 
sensemaking that directly contradicted the rest of the data sources, including 
the reviewers‟ own correspondence. Engaged dialogue with the reviewers 
enabled modifications to the cases that did not dilute their essence and 
continued to provide depictions of the ventures “with warts and all”. 
I did not use quotes extensively in the thick descriptions – as is commonly 
done in conventional case study analysis to show the basis of one‟s reasoning 
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– because they are not based primarily on ex post interviews. Although I 
conducted interviews, these were a minor (and mostly cross-checking) 
component of the research. My intent is to avoid the readers‟ response 
described by Eisenhardt and Graebner: 
“Interviews also often provoke a „knee-jerk‟ reaction that the data are 
biased in which impression management and retrospective 
sensemaking are deemed the prime culprits. The prototypical reader 
asks, „Is the theory just retrospective sensemaking by image-conscious 
informants?‟” (Eisenhardt & Graebner (2007) 
Also, the extensive use of quotes supports the criticism of qualitative research 
that “it is simply the study of verbally expressed sentiments and beliefs rather 
than the study of conduct” (Van Maanen, 1979b). 
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CHAPTER 5 
CASE STUDY: SC JOHNSON IN KENYA 
 
FIRM BACKGROUND 
SC Johnson (SCJ) is a privately-held multinational firm headquartered in the 
United States. With annual revenue in excess of eight billion dollars, it 
employs over twelve thousand people in more than seventy countries and 
distributes products in over one hundred and ten countries. Founded in 
Racine, Wisconsin in 1886 by Samuel Curtis Johnson, SCJ began operations 
as a parquet flooring company. Its focus evolved after the success of an early 
floor maintenance product – Johnson‟s Prepared Paste Wax – and the firm 
came to be known as Johnson Wax. Led by five successive generations of 
Johnson family members, SCJ grew into a consumer packaged goods 
company, producing and marketing consumer household brands in categories 
such as food storage (Saran Wrap, Ziploc), home cleaning (Drano, Fantastik, 
Mr. Muscle, Nature‟s Source, Pledge, Scrubbing Bubbles, Shout, Toilet Duck, 
Windex), pest control (Allout, Autan, Baygon, Off, Raid), air care (Glade, Oust) 
and auto care (Gran Prix, Tempo). 
Continued family ownership has imbued the firm with a unique and somewhat 
idiosyncratic culture. Its headquarters remain in Racine – not in a globalized 
capital city – despite the fact that most of the firm‟s production and sales 
activities are conducted elsewhere. One of the corporate office‟s main 
functions is to continue to foster a clear and unified identity throughout the 
globalized company. It does so around a few key principles: 
 Customer‟s welfare – SCJ‟s focus on service to customers was 
memorably captured by H.F. Johnson, Sr. in his Profit Sharing speech 
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of 1927, “The goodwill of people is the only enduring thing in any 
business. It is the sole substance…the rest is shadow!” This quote is 
known to all SCJ employees and headlines the firm‟s statement of 
company philosophy “This We Believe.” 
 Caring for its employees –SCJ‟s motto, “A Family Company” strongly 
demonstrates its commitment to its employees. In fact, they are 
acknowledged and attended to within the firm‟s statement of philosophy 
before any other stakeholder, including customers. An objective of 
every country and regional manager is to have his or her unit be 
recognized by external parties as one of the best places to work. 
 Long term view – While certainly subject to the short-term forces that 
buffet the market and its competitors, SCJ has traditionally taken a 
longer view on some particular issues. It is willing to forgo short-term 
profits or growth in order to create a stronger or more resilient position 
for the longer term. This view is exemplified by SCJ‟s modification of its 
food wrap product, Saran. Originally made of polyvinylidene chloride 
(PVDC), which is an excellent oxygen barrier and thus prevents food 
spoilage, SCJ switched to polyethylene -- which is not as effective – 
due to environmental concerns related to PVDC‟s halogenation, even 
though it was not required by the government or its customers to do so. 
 Sustainability – Maybe due to its history of producing and selling 
chemical-based products, SCJ has incorporated environmental 
sustainability principles deep into its operational structure in an attempt 
to always “do what‟s right”. It has developed four global platforms for 
sustainability that it strives to integrate into its business plans at all 
levels: (1) using earth-responsible materials, (2) advancing social 
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progress and health, (3) preventing insect-borne diseases, (4) reducing 
consumption and emissions. These platforms are customized to the 
nature of SCJ‟s business, but also enable it look beyond the 
organization and visualize how it can best leverage its resources to 
have the greatest positive impact on society and the natural 
environment. 
 
PRELAUNCH PROCESSES 
In 2003, Samuel Curtis Johnson, then CEO and Chairman of SCJ, endowed a 
chair in Sustainable Global Enterprise at Cornell University‟s Johnson 
Graduate School of Management and funded the founding of a matching 
research center – the Center for Sustainable Global Enterprise. The first 
person to hold the chair was Dr. Stuart Hart, a professor of management 
whose research and outreach activities focus on how multinational firms can 
engage with low income populations (the BOP) to drive sustainable change. 
Stuart began to develop strong relationships with SCJ‟s senior leadership, and 
expectations grew within the firm for a concrete initiative that would put into 
practice his research ideas and SCJ‟s commitment to innovate in this area. 
The person within SCJ that over time came to be most identified with this 
emergent initiative was Scott Johnson (no relation to the founding family). 
Scott was Vice President for Global Environmental & Safety Actions, and 
naturally became Stuart‟s counterpart within SCJ. Their first important joint 
effort centered on the collaborative development of the “BOP Protocol”, a 
process-based framework for large multinational corporations to incubate 
sustainable new businesses in low-income communities. Stuart, Scott, and 
several of their associates brought together a collection of experts on 
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development, corporate executives, management scholars, and relevant 
practitioners to develop the BOP Protocol in a dedicated workshop held at the 
Johnson Foundation‟s conference center in October of 2004. The 
development of the BOP Protocol was supported by other multinational firms, 
including Hewlett Packard, DuPont, and Tetra Pak as well as by several 
foundations, university research centers, and non-profit organizations. 
The results of the initial BOP Protocol workshop included a set of operating 
guidelines, a code of conduct, and the protocol that outlined the broad steps a 
firm should take to incubate an innovative, sustainable, and socially-
embedded business at the BOP. Commitment to the initiative grew during the 
design workshop, and Scott and Stuart ended it by announcing a commitment 
by SCJ to “field test” the resulting protocol in Kenya and to convene the 
workshop‟s participants within a year to evaluate the field test and incorporate 
the lessons derived from it into an improved version of the BOP Protocol. 
 
Framing of the Kenya initiative 
SCJ over time had increasingly incorporated environmental sustainability 
concerns into its global operations. This had culminated in its award-winning 
Greenlist™ method for evaluating all material inputs into its products 
according to their environmental impacts. Looking beyond the firm, in an effort 
to tie its brands to beneficial social effects on consumers in developing 
countries, SCJ had launched a few unrelated programs in different countries. 
Focusing primarily on vector-borne diseases, SCJ initiated its “Iwas Dengue” 
public service program in the Philippines in 1998 and the “Healthy Children, 
Healthy Homes” program in South Africa in 2004 – a collaborative effort 
between the Raid pest control brand, South Africa‟s National Department of 
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Health, and other partners to train educators on how to avoid malaria. 
Underwriting the BOP Protocol effort was portrayed internally as the next step 
in formalizing SCJ‟s emerging approach to driving positive social change more 
broadly and systematically. 
At the time of the BOP Protocol design workshop, Scot had been working 
extensively on Greenlist™ and also monitoring several small pilot projects 
related to SCJ‟s supply chain. One of the issues SCJ was grappling with at the 
time involved the sourcing of pyrethrum, a natural insecticide produced by the 
flowers of certain species of chrysanthemum. Pyrethrum is toxic to insects, but 
harmless to humans and the environment, and is thus widely used in pest 
control products. At its peak, Kenya produced around 70% of the world‟s 
pyrethrum – with about 200,000 families and small-holder farmers engaged in 
its cultivation – and SCJ had traditionally been the single largest buyer. For the 
country as a whole, pyrethrum was an important foreign exchange earner and 
a significant contributor to the national economy. To regulate this resource, the 
Kenyan government set up the Pyrethrum Board of Kenya with a mandate to 
register and license pyrethrum growers and control the substance‟s 
production, extraction and marketing. The Pyrethrum Board remains the sole 
processor and marketer of pyrethrum in Kenya. 
Due to a series of internal problems, Kenya‟s pyrethrum extract production 
had been falling since 2002. Additionally, Sumitomo Chemical – a Japanese 
firm – had started producing pyrethroids, synthetic insecticides based on 
natural pyrethrum. SCJ was in the process of deciding to what extent and in 
what order it should reformulate its pest control products in order to switch to 
the cheaper and more stably supplied synthetic pyrethroids and how much 
pyrethrum it should continue to source from Kenya. Continuing to use Kenyan 
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pyrethrum would help to avoid having to reformulate products and would also 
help sustain the natural pyrethrum market which was estimated to support one 
million Kenyans. On the other hand, the erratic supply of natural pyrethrum 
could constrain SCJ‟s production, and the firm would remain hostage to the 
maneuverings of a single supplier run by political appointees. 
Scott had been in conversations with a non-governmental organization (NGO) 
based in Kenya called Approtec (now called Kickstart) which produced and 
sold a treadle pump geared to small-holder farmers for irrigation. The 
discussion was to see if Approtec‟s pump could be used by pyrethrum growers 
to increase their production, thereby simultaneously improving their livelihoods 
and stabilizing SCJ‟s supply. 
So when Scott and Stuart announced the field test of the BOP Protocol, they 
were able to say that it would be done in Kenya, in part because they wanted 
to use to the BOP Protocol to bring to fruition Scott‟s discussions with 
Approtec. In other words, the BOP Protocol immersion team was to deploy to 
Kenya to collaborate with Approtec in developing a program that would 
encourage small-holder farmers to use treadle pumps and similar technologies 
to increase and stabilize their production of pyrethrum. 
 
Immersion team formation and preparation 
Given Stuart and other academics‟ central role in nurturing the BOP Protocol, 
as well as the collaborative multi-party way in which it had been developed, it 
was decided that the team that would carry out the first field test of the BOP 
Protocol be composed primarily of graduate students and recent graduates. 
Several interrelated factors supported this rationale: 
 Cost and risk minimization – It was overall much cheaper to hire 
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students and use the partner universities‟ internship structures than to 
add personnel to SCJ„s payroll. The reduction in costs extended 
beyond simple salary and hiring costs. For example, students could fly 
commercial rather than business class, could be deployed for three 
months with no need to return home before the end of the project, did 
not require additional corporate insurance coverage, etc. 
 Experimental nature – Internships and short-term contracts enabled 
SCJ to retain the experimental nature of the initiative and invest in it 
gradually – as it provided results – rather than having to commit full-
heartedly upfront. SCJ would also be able to “test” people in the field 
before deciding to make any permanent hires. Maintaining the 
experimental nature of the initiative was important to Scott from an 
organizational perspective, as it enabled him to fund it entirely from 
within his own department‟s budget and protect it from premature 
evaluation using traditional business metrics. He could give the initiative 
“space to breathe”. 
 Freedom to operate – It was assumed that a fresh team, built 
independently of SCJ‟s current operations would have a greater 
freedom and flexibility in implementing the BOP Protocol than a team of 
existent SCJ employees who had to think of their careers in the longer 
term and may already be habituated to “the way things are done”. 
 Unique capabilities – Assembling a fresh team would let SCJ tailor it to 
the task and include individuals with specific and appropriate talents 
and knowledge bases. 
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The decision to use students for the field test had one large and unexamined 
implication; the field test could only last three months. It would have to be 
carried out during the academic summer break. At this point, not much thought 
was given to how the initiative would be supported and staffed beyond its first 
three months. 
From the outset, Erik Simanis – one of Stuart‟s Ph.D. students – was selected 
as the team leader. Erik had been instrumental in organizing the BOP Protocol 
design workshop and was informally viewed as one of the key drivers of the 
whole effort. During the fall of 2004, Scott and Stuart delegated to Erik the job 
of putting together the initial student immersion team and training it for 
deployment to Kenya during the summer of 2005. 
Erik set about building a team that drew its members primarily from the 
business schools of the three universities that were subscribing to the BOP 
Protocol. He did not create a job or internship listing and then interview the 
most promising applicants. Instead, he relied on the informal academic 
network that was emerging around the BOP Protocol to provide him a reduced 
number of already vetted candidates. Ultimately, the screening and selection 
of candidates was performed informally and primarily by the academic 
contacts that provided them to Erik. Erik rejected very few of the suggestions, 
although he did decide to add a new team member for part of the field test 
who had not been put forward and vouched for by other academics involved 
with the BOP Protocol. 
The temporary nature of the team was also a key factor in some of the 
downsides to this approach. It proved difficult to hire the people with the 
appropriate mix of skill sets and experience for a one-off project – few 
students have the necessary capabilities for such an ambitious yet ambiguous 
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undertaking. Attracting more experienced talent (which usually does not mean 
students) was very difficult for positions that only lasted three months. Another 
downside to using students was the fact that most of them did not speak local 
dialects, were not conversant with and comfortable in the local culture, did not 
have established local networks, or could easily embed themselves socially. 
Erik selected five graduate students in the fall of 2004 to form the team. One 
of them was a native Kenyan studying an MBA at the University of Michigan 
and another had experience working in Kenya in nature conservation. The 
team members were dispersed across the US during the spring of 2005. Erik 
began their training with the support of other BOP Protocol designers in this 
period by establishing a series of periodic conference calls. In these calls, the 
team members would discuss readings they had been assigned that helped 
develop their understanding of the principles behind the BOP Protocol, as well 
as some of the local intricacies of life in Kenya. Two of the team members, 
even began taking informal lessons in Kiswahili, the most widespread local 
language. 
 
Site and partner selection 
The selection of sites was closely tied to the search for initial partners. As 
mentioned, Scott‟s original plan was that the team would deploy to Nairobi – 
Kenya‟s capital – and work there with Approtec to determine the best site or 
community to work with in Kenya‟s rural, pyrethrum-growing areas. Before the 
team deployed, intense negotiations had already been undertaken to 
determine what resources (such as transportation, fund management, etc.) 
Approtec would provide, and how SCJ would reimburse the organization. Even 
though this particular project was not central to Approtec‟s mission, it wanted 
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SCJ‟s goodwill in order to garner support for its own projects. 
Upon its arrival to Kenya, and its first interactions with Approtec‟s staff, the 
immersion team realized that Approtec did not operate in Kenya‟s pyrethrum 
cultivation areas – which were located primarily in Kenya‟s western highlands. 
It also became clear that the team would not co-create a fresh business 
concept around Approtec‟s main product (human-powered treadle pumps) and 
that Approtec was more interested in extending its existing business model 
rather than supporting the creation of brand new one. So while Approtec did 
provide logistical support in the early days of the project, the immersion team 
soon began to cover its own logistical requirements and to reduce its 
interactions with Approtec. After a few months, the ground-level relationship 
had died out, even though SCJ continued its corporate-level partnership with 
the organization. 
Lacking a partner that could provide the deep social legitimacy the team 
needed in order to implement the BOP Protocol, it was soon obliged to engage 
entities other than Approtec in its search for a suitable community to interact 
with. The partner most influential in helping select the rural site was Egerton 
University. Erik had established contact with Egerton University through 
academic contacts at Cornell University prior to his departure. He had 
communicated with them originally because they were known for their skills in 
applying Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) techniques – practices central to 
the BOP Protocol and which the immersion team members would need to 
learn in Kenya, as they would not physically come together as a team before 
they left the US. Erik organized for a full week‟s training of the team in PRA 
imparted by Egerton specialists. Egerton‟s location – in the city of Nakuru, 
near Kenya‟s western highlands and pyrethrum growing regions – and its 
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experience conducting PRA in neighboring rural villages made it a natural 
choice for serving as a partner that could assist in selecting and supporting a 
rural site. 
The actual site selected – Nyota Township – is a small village an hour‟s drive 
away from Nakuru (under good weather conditions), and four hours away from 
Nairobi. The team settled on Nyota because of the offers of support and 
guidance it received from two additional local partners: the Ministry of 
Agriculture‟s local extension officer and a self-help farmer‟s group called 
Pamoja Pioneers. Ironically, no pyrethrum was cultivated in Nyota – but the 
team had been unable to find the right kind of partners in a village that did 
grow pyrethrum. Nyota is so remote, that the team members deployed there 
were the first mzungu (white people) that the villagers had seen in fifteen 
years. 
Even though Scott and Stuart hadn‟t originally envisioned it, the immersion 
team early on decided to select and run two sites. The main rationale for this 
was that two sites – one rural, and one urban – would produce two distinct 
business concepts and thus increase SCJ‟s chances of establishing a 
successful business. 
Personnel from SCJ‟s local office reinforced the team‟s decision to launch an 
urban site. Upon its arrival to Kenya, the team had made efforts to establish 
relationships with the local branch of SCJ in order to understand what 
resources SCJ already had in Kenya which could be used to kick-start the 
business creation process. All of SCJ‟s personnel and operations in Kenya 
were centered in Nairobi. In fact, Nairobi served as SCJ‟s headquarters and 
distribution center for all of Eastern Africa (Tanzania, Rwanda, Uganda, etc.). 
But SCJ had a reduced set of capabilities in Kenya; it didn‟t produce anything 
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locally, nor did it handle distribution. Its main function was to manage large 
accounts, such as the local supermarket chains. All other functions, such as 
warehousing, distribution, and sales were outsourced to a local distributor. 
In order to create a business that leveraged SCJ‟s existing capabilities in 
Kenya – mostly around marketing a subset of SCJ products – it made sense to 
explore options around urban end-consumers. So as the team was training 
itself in participatory development techniques and scouting rural options, it 
searched for a suitable urban site. Its search naturally centered on Nairobi. 
The team toured several of Nairobi‟s famous shantytowns but spent most of its 
time in Kibera – the largest and most famous of them all4. One of the reasons 
for the team‟s spending most of its time in Kibera was its relationship with the 
NGO “Carolina for Kibera” (CFK). Before leaving the US, Erik had made 
contact with the North Carolina based organization – whose mission it is to 
reduce inter-tribal violence in Kibera – and convinced them to support SCJ‟s 
activities in the slum for three months. CFK‟s Kenyan office was located on the 
outskirts of Kibera. Kibera was also home to a great variety of local and 
international NGOs and aid agencies; the section of Kibera where most of 
them have set up office is informally known as “Washington, DC”. As the team 
came to rely on CFK‟s Kenyan personnel to introduce them to locals and 
create opportunities for interaction (such as participating in “Trash for Cash” 
community clean-ups), the team naturally gravitated towards completing its 
formal community immersion in Kibera and creating a business concept that 
 
                                                                                                                                            
4
 Often considered East Africa‟s largest slum, Kibera appears in the film “The Constant 
Gardener”; it has been visited by Barack Obama, Melissa Gates, Hillary Clinton, and many 
other famous politicians and celebrities. It has become Africa‟s poster child slum and hosts a 
disproportionate number of development and urban-renewal NGOs and aid agencies. 
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would serve that community. 
In sum, Kenya was selected as country because of SCJ‟s prior intentions, 
incipient projects, specific supply issues it was dealing with at the time, and 
existent relationships with non-commercial partners. The country was selected 
before a team was built; it was selected by the originators of the project (Stu 
and Scott) and it was done with relatively little formal analysis and without 
much due diligence on alternate options. The specific sites were chosen by 
the immersion team, and were settled upon mainly by a process of “snowball 
networking” whereby the teams engaged with potential partners, and the 
choice of partner ended up determining the site. Although the search for sites 
was not systematic, the team did explore several options by engaging with 
different potential partners. The partners the immersion team ended up 
working with more extensively were those the team itself chose after extensive 
interaction in the field rather than the partners selected beforehand by top 
management. 
 
BUSINESS CONCEPT CO-CREATION PROCESSES 
When the immersion team members arrived in Kenya, at the beginning of 
June of 2005, they spent almost a full month getting acclimatized, meeting 
face-to-face with their partners, establishing a relationship with the local SCJ 
office, and attending to basic logistics like finding a place to live. By the fifth 
week, the team had split into two in order to run the co-creation process 
simultaneously in the rural and urban sites and was ready to begin its formal 
immersion in the communities. 
In accordance with the BOP Protocol, Erik had structured the following two-
month stage into a series of processes designed to produce a set of business 
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ideas co-created with members of each community The original intent was to 
fully immerse the teams in the communities by means of homestays in order to 
garner insights and community trust that would prove useful for creating a 
business. The second step was to identify community needs, as well the 
assets each community could bring to bear in developing a new business. The 
final step would be to generate business ideas and evaluate them. 
 
Community immersion 
Besides some sporadic field trips to different urban and rural sites, the main 
activity planned for immersing the teams in the target communities was a 
series of seven-day homestays. One of the main responsibilities of the local 
partners – CFK in Kibera, and the Ministry of Agriculture agent in Nakuru – at 
this stage, was to locate local families willing to host the team members and 
let them participate in their daily lives as an additional family member rather 
than as a guest. Despite some problems in selecting the right variety of 
households to live with, each team member was eventually assigned to a 
family or community member. 
In order to gain a deep appreciation of local practices, the team members 
were instructed to participate fully in all their host families‟ activities, work as 
well as recreational and social ones. In some cases, homestays were 
hampered by language, personal or cultural barriers. In the Nyota site, no 
team member spoke the local language, and few locals were fluent in English. 
Despite the challenges, the homestays turned out to be immensely valuable to 
the overall process. Though the original intent had been one of team 
acclimation and ethnographic learning, it became evident to the teams that the 
benefits really lay in the strength of the personal relationships built with the 
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hosts – which could later be leveraged for accessing more community 
members – and in the strong signal inadvertently sent to the community that 
their effort was a serious and different one; they were here to build a business 
together, not as missionaries or aid workers. Despite all the NGO activity in 
Kibera, very few outsiders are committed enough to the community that they 
are willing to spend the night in the slum, let alone a full week. 
 
Needs and assets identification 
In accordance with the BOP Protocol, the goals for this stage were to: 
 Co-identify unmet needs with the community. 
 Co-map with the community local assets and systems. 
 Co-create with the community metrics for determining performance of 
the process. 
 Assess which firm resources would be critical to the subsequent 
process. 
 Identify capability gaps in both the firm and the community partners. 
The BOP Protocol purposefully did not specify how these goals were to be 
achieved, and thus the urban and rural teams began to diverge in their 
approaches. The rural team completed this stage in five days by applying a 
series of techniques borrowed from PRA such as: social mapping, historical 
timelines, problem-ranking, and resource flow mapping. They relied primarily 
on these techniques because: (1) these are what they‟d been trained in two 
weeks before at Egerton, (2) they had to work through translators at all times, 
and these techniques are designed for such situations, (3) the local population 
was familiar with these techniques and felt comfortable using them, (4) the 
translators, facilitators, and local partners were experts in these practices. 
 101 
The rural team – down to two people at that time – designed a three-day 
workshop around these techniques in which almost two hundred fifty people 
participated. At the end of the workshop, the team retired to Nairobi for two 
weeks, where they analyzed and synthesized the workshop‟s output. The 
result of applying the PRA techniques without any adaptation was that the 
output centered solely on the community‟s resources, concerns, and goals and 
did not include any of SCJ‟s. It was also unclear who among the two hundred 
fifty people would work with SCJ initially to launch a business. 
The urban team, confronted by a slum with hundreds of thousands of 
residents, first had to determine which subset of the community to work with. It 
logically began its search with CFK‟s existing networks, but did not explore 
much beyond them. It decided to work with the youth groups involved in the 
Taka ni Pato (Trash for Cash) program, of which CFK was a sponsor. The 
urban team focused on these groups because: 
 CFK had existing relationships with them and could lend its social 
capital towards recruiting them to the SCJ initiative. 
 They had already been vetted and selected by CFK and other NGOs, 
and been provided some rudimentary business and organizational 
training and marketing support. 
 They were already involved in entrepreneurial and income-generating 
activities, in some cases operating substantial businesses within the 
slums. 
 Their current activities centered on trash collection, recycling, and 
composting – activities which could conceivably be linked to SCJ‟s 
consumer product portfolio available in Kenya. 
 They were proto-organizations with functional hierarchies, established 
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practices, and relatively stable memberships. 
 
Overall, the Taka ni Pato youth groups looked like an established social 
platform in the slum that the team could work with to co-create a new 
business. But Erik soon realized that the local idea of what it meant to 
“partner” with an external organization to build a new business was not in 
synchrony with his nor SCJ‟s intentions. Based on their extensive experience 
with NGO‟s, most locals expected the external organization to simply provide 
them with resources to build their own small businesses or to participate in a 
branding or CSR initiative in which they‟d wear or use company-branded 
clothing or tools in exchange for some resource. It was apparent that this kind 
of relationship would not lead to the co-creation of an innovative venture, and 
that thus simply identifying and mapping local resources and assets would be 
insufficient. 
Accordingly, the urban team departed from its PRA training and stated work 
plan, and instead spent three weeks developing and implementing a series of 
“Participatory Entrepreneurship Development” workshops designed to change 
the youth groups‟ perspective on business development and prepare them to 
be effective partners for SCJ. Over a period of ten days, the urban team ran 
four workshops with about thirty youth group members each in which they 
used participatory techniques borrowed from PRA, but adapted to the task at 
hand. The workshops covered themes and issues such as: creating alignment, 
discovering opportunities, combining resources, and learning to partner with 
large firms. 
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Business idea generation 
The final planned activity of the immersion team was to co-create a series of 
business ideas that “had some legs” to them and which SCJ and the 
communities would want to pursue further. The initial plan was to produce 
several ideas so that SCJ could select the one it liked the most. The team‟s 
main objective was to generate innovative business concepts, ones that had a 
“coolness factor” to them, rather ideas that could seem pedestrian or obvious. 
This criterion was a key driver of the idea generation process. The teams also 
wanted the ideas to emerge through a process of integration and 
recombination of community-originated and SCJ elements, rather than through 
the imposition of a particular party‟s idea or vision. 
But before the teams got to the stage of idea generation, a visit to the field by 
SCJ‟s executive team had short-circuited the process to some extent. During 
the visit, while the teams were identifying needs and assets, Scott asked for a 
shortlist of business ideas. Erik complied by suggesting that SCJ could 
leverage the youth groups‟ business of door-to-door trash collection in the 
slums to create a direct-to-home cleaning business using SCJ products – an 
idea the immersion team had already discussed. He was unable at that point 
to provide a compelling idea for the rural site, as he had not been participating 
in that need and asset identification process. 
By the time the teams began their business idea generation activities, Scott 
had signaled that SCJ was interested in pursuing the cleaning business idea 
and did not expect a viable business in the rural area. Even before the idea 
generation process had begun, Erik had written a proposal for a nine-month 
follow-up and implementation process. 
Nonetheless, the immersion team persevered in implementing the BOP 
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Protocol and carrying out its idea generation component. To do so, they again 
designed a series of “brainstorming” workshops to which they invited the most 
promising participants from the previous stage as well as representatives from 
SCJ, the local partners, and other organizations which they thought could 
provide valuable material, resources, or insights. 
SCJ again signaled its reduced interest in the rural option by sending only a 
single person for two days of workshops in Nyota. In addition, because the 
rural team had been absent so long from the site and had not identified a 
strong subset of the community to work with, they were only able to get five 
community members to participate in the workshops, for a grand total of 
thirteen participants. The business ideas that emerged from that exercise, 
while potentially beneficial to the community members, were neither terribly 
innovative, nor of interest to SCJ. Suspecting that this would occur, the team 
had managed the workshops with the intention to allow SCJ to exit by offering 
alternative partners to the Nyota community members. At the end of the 
process, the team members left the township permanently and none of the 
business ideas was pursued further. 
In Kibera, on the other hand, SCJ was already interested in a business idea, 
and the team had a broad sense of the idea that had to emerge from the 
process. But the team still went through the ideation process in order to flesh 
out the concept appropriately and gain some measure of local buy-in. Over 
two and half days, the team held a workshop with twenty five people, including 
representatives from the youth groups, SCJ‟s Kenyan office, the partners 
(CFK, Egerton, and Approtec), and assorted NGO representatives. Using the 
metaphor of building a house, the team facilitated the workshop so that its 
participants recombined already identified resources into business ideas. Of 
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the five ideas generated, the team indicated SCJ would pursue the one called 
“Community Based Cleaning and Waste Management Company” which was to 
have the youth groups expand their trash collection services to include in-
home cleaning and pest control services in the slums using bundles of SCJ 
products. The name of the business was later shortened to Community 
Cleaning Services (CCS). 
 
BUSINESS CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT PROCESSES 
SCJ‟s initial business concept was proposed by Erik, and later by the 
participants of the urban ideation workshop, in July of 2005. At the same time, 
Erik generated a nine-month business development plan for continuing the 
initiative upon the departure of the immersion team at the end of the month. Its 
main objectives were: 
 To guide the participating youth groups in developing the necessary 
skillsets, capabilities, and vision for implementing the business. 
 To better understand the market in order to build a business that 
resonated with the community. 
 
He received a verbal sign-off on the plan and its budget from SCJ and quickly 
moved to set it up before departing Kenya. His primary actions in this regard 
where to: 
 Select a community liaison to be hired full-time by SCJ. 
 Convince SCJ‟s East Africa manager to commit 20% of an SCJ‟s 
manager time to the project. 
 Reach an agreement with CFK for the NGO to provide working space 
for the community liaison and continue its involvement in the project. 
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Project transition to Kenyan field team 
When the immersion team left at the end of the summer of 2005, the initiative 
was entrusted to Edwin, a local community member who had collaborated with 
the immersion team during its stay in Kenya, and who was now designated 
“community liaison”. He was provided space and support at CFK and was 
eventually hired as an independent contractor. After he left Kenya, Erik agreed 
with Antoine – SCJ‟s general manager for Kenya and East Africa – that the 
director of operations, Joseph, would be the ideal person within SCJ to 
manage the project given his communication abilities. Joseph was assigned a 
day a week to the project. 
Edwin soon proved unable to perform the tasks which suddenly became 
expected of him. Rather than simply operate as a “liaison”, he found himself in 
the role of main driver of the project, having to develop work plans, mobilize 
work on the ground, and generally lead all the activities necessary for 
launching a new business. As Joseph became increasingly anxious about the 
lack of progress, he turned to Kimeu, a locally-based social entrepreneur with 
a management degree and strong leadership style whom he had met during 
the ideation workshops. Joseph convinced Kimeu to help with the project on 
an informal basis, and Kimeu quickly developed a comprehensive market 
research plan for the youth to implement. 
Erik, who despite not being an SCJ employee still retained budget control of 
the project, returned to Nairobi in November of the same year to evaluate its 
progress. Upon realizing that not much progress had been made in the three 
months since he‟d left, and that no one in the community had a clear idea of 
what the business was to be or any great commitment to pursuing it, he did 
the following: 
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 Hired Kimeu on a half-time basis to be the on-the-ground leader of the 
project and repositioned Edwin in a supporting role. 
 Established an agreement with CFK for the NGO to play a more central 
role in the project, including using their administrative apparatus for 
hiring people in Kenya and managing all the project‟s funds and 
expenditures in Kenya. 
 Convinced SCJ Kenya to commit an intern to participate in the initiative, 
beginning in January of 2006. 
 Held a “Launching the Partnership” workshop with the youth groups to 
refocus and reenergize them. 
 Created a detailed three month work plan for developing the business 
in order to launch a pilot. 
 
Capacity development and preparation for business launch 
According to the work-plan developed by Erik in November, the field team – 
now consistent of Kimeu and Edwin, soon to be joined by an SCJ intern, and 
supported by Joseph – would focus on developing three areas with an eye to 
formally launching a business: 
 Training the youth groups. 
 Creating a business identity. 
 Pilot testing components of the business to evolve a value proposition. 
 
Kimeu and Joseph proceeded to coordinate a series of training workshops 
(imparted by them or close associates) to develop the youths‟ ability to run a 
business with SCJ products. Some workshops focused on SCJ product lines 
and how they should be used, others covered business basics such as: 
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accounting, marketing, and customer management. Three representatives 
from each of the nine participating youth groups were supposed to attend 
each workshop. In reality, attendance was sketchy and in many cases different 
people from each group turned up for each of the workshops, diminishing 
continuity and knowledge accumulation. 
The groups also performed a marketing survey in two slums, administering a 
questionnaire to several hundred residents, and collected data on the kinds 
and quantities of insect control products used and on alternative pest control 
techniques practiced. 
As the field team worked with the youth groups to prepare them to launch a 
business, it became increasingly obvious that Edwin was unable to perform his 
duties as liaison and supporting coordinator, and in January 2006, he was 
replaced by George, a CFK program officer with experience as a social worker 
and existing relationships with all the youth groups. 
When confronting the issue of the business‟s identity, it became apparent that 
the nine different youth groups had differing capabilities and levels of interest 
in the business. Some groups had strong identities, local offices, good 
organizational skills, and ran profitable businesses, while others were not 
much more than amorphous groups of friends. The field team, in consultation 
with the youth groups and with Erik, decided in January that all the youth 
groups should be integrated into a single federation with which SCJ could 
officially partner. Under this arrangement, each group would retain its identity 
and existing operations, but would apportion part of its efforts to the SCJ 
initiative. In addition, this new federation – the Coalition of Young 
Entrepreneurs (CYE) – would be able to partner with firms other than SCJ. 
Erik visited Kenya in March of 2006 to assess progress. He was accompanied 
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on the trip by Duncan, another Ph.D. student and BOP Protocol designer to 
which he planned to transfer project leadership to in order to head up a 
separate project with another firm. Two other graduate students who were 
participating in a practicum to analyze the potential of SCJ‟s BOP initiative 
also travelled to Kenya on that occasion. The group of graduate students 
quickly realized upon their arrival that things had drifted from the intended 
work plan, and that the youth groups and field team were unprepared for 
launching the business in the immediate future. The process of forming and 
then formalizing CYE had engulfed most of the participants‟ attention and 
energy. The focus on creating CYE had politicized the business development 
process and made it overly bureaucratic. Numerous meetings had been held 
amongst representatives of the youth groups to design and ratify a 
constitution, determine voting rights, create the organization‟s bylaws, assign 
responsibilities, etc. 
To add to the complexity, different representatives from each youth group 
were often sent to each meeting, thereby increasing confusion and lack of 
continuity. This politicized process, in which different individuals and youth 
groups jockeyed for position and influence, also served to inflate expectations 
about future earnings and precipitated involved negotiations for apportioning 
the sharing of the future profits. Also, each youth group had its own 
organizational structure, separate constituency, and sometimes operating 
businesses which needed to be somehow separated from or integrated into 
CYE. 
Activities designed to build organizational capability, test components of the 
business model, and begin to stimulate demand had been carried out 
perfunctorily or not at all. For example, though the youth had been provided 
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SCJ products to carry out field tests to determine how they could be used in 
slum conditions and observe customer reactions, all the products had been 
used up in unaccountable manners and very little data had been generated – 
most of it untrustworthy and of very little value. Despite a few workshops on 
the subjects, the youth had no real sense of how to use the products, how 
much it would cost them to provide services, how much they would be able to 
charge for the services, who their customers would be, how they would handle 
supply and storage, how they would keep accounts, etc. 
An additional issue was that the original business concept – to bundle SCJ‟s 
varied products to provide in-home cleaning services – had been narrowed to 
a focus on insect control. This was driven primarily by the field team, which did 
not really comprehend the original business concept – its members hadn‟t 
been around for its creation – and did not see much use for SCJ‟s non-
insecticide products within the slums. This perspective was also supported by 
SCJ‟s overall vision of linking their sustainable development initiatives – such 
as this one – to their products related to insect control and vector borne 
diseases. So the field team provided the youth groups mainly with Baygon and 
Raid insecticide products. 
Despite this lack of preparedness, the youth groups were very impatient to 
launch the business and start making money. By this time, the youth had been 
“developing” the business concept and its supporting structure for eight 
months. During this time, neither SCJ nor CFK had remunerated them for their 
efforts and commitment to the process, all rewards were contingent on making 
a profit on the business once it launched. This also meant that there had been 
considerable turnover among the participating youth as some got jobs, started 
school, or dropped out of their respective youth groups. To make up for this, 
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new youth were continually being recruited to the venture. 
After the visit in March of 2006, Erik began to transfer leadership 
responsibilities to Duncan. Duncan intended to manage the project on an 
interim basis while SCJ hired a manager to take it over. He would train this 
manager and then shift to an advisory role. To this end, he traveled again to 
Kenya within two months with an SCJ consultant and Justin, one of the 
graduate students who had participated in the original immersion in 2005, and 
who SCJ was considering hiring as full time executive manager for the 
initiative, among others. 
During the May trip, as Duncan introduced the consultant and Justin to the 
youth groups and the field team, it was apparent that the field team had still 
been unable to begin building the necessary capabilities within the youth 
groups, and that it had continued to promote and spend most of its attention 
on forming CYE. By this time, the pressure to launch the business was being 
felt not only from the youth groups, but from SCJ itself, which felt it was now 
time to “stop the academics‟ studying” and “get down to business”. But both 
the consultant and Justin agreed that the youth needed more preparation 
before the business could be launched with any realistic chance of success. 
Upon returning to the US, Duncan set about recruiting a fresh team which 
could be deployed over the summer to Kenya to accomplish two objectives: 
support the field team and youth groups in preparing to launch the business; 
and train and restructure the field team so that it could successfully manage, 
coach, and support the entrepreneurial efforts of the youth groups. 
He selected two people with experience in international development and 
personal knowledge of the initiative, and deployed them to Kenya for the 
summer of 2006. Duncan set up living quarters for this “summer team” right 
 112 
beside Kibera, and the two-person team then spent the entire summer working 
with the youth groups and the field team. To get things done in time and have 
an official business launch before their departure, the summer team had to 
take a very hands-on approach and provide strong leadership. This was in 
stark contrast to how the field team had become accustomed to managing the 
business development process. As per their experience and training, the field 
team had been “facilitating” the youth groups‟ efforts, nudging them and 
supporting the groups‟ ideas, rather than setting a clear direction and clearly 
conveying the objectives that needed to be accomplished in order to keep the 
initiative viable. 
The summer team instituted a series of more effective training workshops 
designed around the specific tasks inherent to the business, worked to 
adequately cost and price the proposed services, developed appropriate 
marketing materials, set up logistics and administrative systems, and 
supported the development of the business launch activities. At the same time, 
they worked with the field team, attempting to professionalize its members and 
provide them with the leadership and organizational skills needed to better 
support the youth groups. 
One of the practices they implemented was a Friday morning breakfast 
meeting with Joseph, SCJ‟s director of operations. Over time, Joseph‟s main 
responsibilities had kept him evermore distant from the field team and the 
youth, to the point that he was doing most of his communicating indirectly 
through the SCJ intern, John. John had been assigned to the field team on a 
part time basis in January of 2006 – and spent half his time at SCJ‟s offices on 
other duties – enabling Joseph to communicate with him without having to visit 
the field. But Joseph had real business experience, knowledge of SCJ‟s 
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products and organizational culture, was local to Kenya, and had a knack for 
communicating with the field team and the youth groups – the reasons why he 
had originally been tasked with running the project for SCJ. 
Through the breakfast meetings and other activities, the summer team 
reinvigorated communication between Joseph and the field team, thereby 
leveraging his coaching and management talents. They also reengaged 
Antoine, Joseph‟s boss and SCJ‟s general manager for Kenya and East 
Africa. Antoine began to participate intermittently in the breakfast meetings 
and also spent a day each month in the slums with the youth groups. By the 
time of the official launch in July, SCJ‟s Kenyan staff was finally becoming 
more directly involved in the initiative and starting to take partial ownership of 
it. 
As it spent more time with the field team, the summer team realized that the 
field team leader was the main reason the process of building CYE had been 
so drawn out and politicized, and that capability building had been so 
ineffective. Duncan instructed the summer team to search for a suitable 
replacement, but in the short time they had, and given the unconventional 
nature of the project and the unique skillset it required, they were unable to 
locate a promising candidate. Instead, they decided to cultivate George, the 
CFK officer who had been seconded to the field team in the spring, to become 
the team‟s leader. While recognizing that he needed to improve some of his 
leadership and management skills, they believed he was the best option at the 
time. At the end of the summer, George was promoted to field team leader 
and Kimeu left the team. 
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Business launch 
In late July, before the summer team left Kenya and twelve months after the 
immersion team had left Kenya, “Community Cleaning Services” (CCS) was 
officially launched with a series of community events held sequentially in three 
different Nairobi slums. More than a hundred youth group members 
participated. The launches consisted of a series of community mobilization 
and customer awareness building activities in each slum, such as a parade 
with music and uniformed youth, community theatre with themed skits, and 
distribution of marketing materials. 
To begin actual operations, the participating youth group members were 
provided with uniforms they had helped design, cleaning gear, and SCJ 
product on consignment –using the administrative systems the summer team 
had developed. Once equipped and provisioned, the CCS members set out to 
search for customers. They initially sold a few services to their families and 
close friends, but once they had exhausted their inner circle of contacts, sales 
for all the youth groups fell precipitously. 
When they realized that customer awareness built through the business 
launch activities did not automatically translate into sales, and that acquiring 
customer leads and closing sales took time, effort and discipline, the youth‟s 
efforts quickly waned. Besides a natural human inclination to avoid hard work 
and trying to sell things to complete strangers, many youth could not afford to 
spend considerable amounts of time on an activity that did not offer a 
guaranteed income and impinged on their ability to generate other 
opportunities for generating income or sustenance. Three weeks after the 
official launch, all sales and most sales efforts had ground to a halt. 
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BUSINESS CONCEPT IMPLEMENTATION 
Once the initial business concept had been fleshed out, CYE created, and 
CCS officially launched, it quickly became apparent that the business would 
not simply take off on its own. The level of engagement and amount of time 
spent developing the business prior to its launch had unwittingly raised CCS 
members‟ expectations of its public acceptance and uptake. Yet a few weeks 
of operation quickly demonstrated how difficult it would be to generate demand 
for its novel commercial offering, and how unprepared all the parties 
participating in CCS really were for dealing with the task of creating a market 
while solidifying a functional organizational structure. 
The field team, SCJ management, and the youth groups had to deal with a 
series of barriers that crystallized when the business was being rolled out. To 
respond to them, they devised an array of strategies and actions which they 
implemented over the course of the first year of operations. 
 
Initial barriers to business development 
In the first weeks after the business launch, many issues surfaced, both 
foreseen and unforeseen ones. First of all, it had been clear from the outset 
that SCJ‟s insect control products were not designed for slum conditions, and 
therefore pretty ineffective when used as originally designed. To give an 
example, pre-launch field tests conducted by CCS had shown that a single 
two-by-three meter porous mud brick wall of a slum dwelling usually housed 
more than a hundred large cockroaches, and that an entire can of Raid or 
Baygon spray was insufficient to eliminate pests from the wall, or protect it 
from later infestation. Knowing this, the summer team had worked to try and 
reincorporate other SCJ products into the business concept (such as air 
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fresheners and surface cleaners) so that the youth would have a varied toolset 
with which to provide in-home cleanliness. The summer team had also 
augmented the youth‟s service repertoire beyond the ones based solely on 
SCJ‟s products so that they could offer services which were complementary 
and which helped attack the root cause of the issues they were dealing with. 
For example, by offering to clear weeds and remove junk and garbage 
surrounding a shanty, cockroaches and other periurban pests were denied 
alternative habitats when the inside of a dwelling was treated. 
But even these adaptations proved insufficient for providing meaningful pest 
control and cleanliness at a reasonable cost. Conditions in each slum were 
different, but overall, it proved very difficult to isolate a single dwelling from its 
surroundings in order to keep it clean and pest free. It also proved very difficult 
to eliminate within-dwelling pests in a cost and time-effective manner. The few 
repeat customers CCS managed to acquire were usually of higher income 
within the slums, and even in those cases it usually took a series of long and 
relatively expensive visits to do an initial “spring cleaning” and simply rid the 
dwelling of its extraneous internal junk and debris. 
Another worrisome issue was the cost of the SCJ products. In an attempt to 
ensure that CCS would be profitable for the company and not develop loss-
incurring habits from its inception, SCJ adopted a firm stance on prices. It 
provided products to CCS at the highest volume discount price available to 
distributors. This meant that CCS‟ margins were pretty slim as the end-price of 
the services would naturally be bracketed by the price for the same products 
available in the local supermarket chains. In some cases, when the 
supermarkets offered SCJ products on sale, it was cheaper for CCS to acquire 
the products in the supermarkets than directly from SCJ. So in order to make 
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money on sales, CCS had to price its services relatively expensively yet 
accept very slim margins and hope for large volumes of sales. Scaling to large 
sales volumes was hindered by the fact that there weren‟t many significant 
economies of scale to be achieved in the service-to-home model. 
CCS also offered a novel service with which the market was unfamiliar. 
Willingness to pay was something that had been very difficult to ascertain 
beforehand since no comparable service offering existed, but it was suspected 
to be quite low. With high costs on one side, and low willingness to pay on the 
other, the summer team had done its best to strike a balance by searching for 
the ideal bundles of products and services, and training the youth groups to be 
as efficient as possible. 
Despite these issues, it wasn‟t prices, product configuration, or ineffectiveness 
of the services which led to CCS members‟ early discouragement; it was the 
youth‟s inability to even get customers interested. The business concept was 
too foreign to the community. No business in the slums is conducted on a 
home-to-home basis, people visit a few main arteries in the slums where the 
businesses are located and commerce occurs. Beyond the issue of having 
salesmen coming to their doors and trying to conduct business in 
nontraditional settings (someone‟s home), no one in the slums was 
accustomed to let strangers into their homes to provide services. CCS 
members learned that many slum dwellers are ashamed of their living 
quarters, and would not conceive of letting strangers in. Nor for that matter do 
most slum dwellers use their homes for entertaining or meeting family and 
friends. In general, most community members proved to be distrustful of 
strangers in their homes – even fellow shantytown dwellers – for a number of 
reasons. 
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CCS members discovered that – contrary to a common assumption in 
development circles5 – social capital can be quite weak in Nairobi‟s slums. 
There are so many people in such a small area that social networks and 
strong ties often peter out within a few dozen yards of a person‟s home or 
place of business. Crime, especially theft, is rampant, and it‟s mostly visited 
upon slum dwellers by other slum dwellers. Additionally, Kenya‟s ethnic and 
tribal diversity is tainted by an undercurrent of violence that erupts sporadically 
and unexpectedly – as it did after the 2007 presidential elections. It‟s difficult 
for westerners to appreciate, but local life is interwoven with subtle racial and 
tribal distinctions which greatly affect social relations and the ability to gain the 
trust of strangers. 
Another barrier that CCS encountered was related to religious and traditional 
practices. In many cases, the person at home was the wife, and it was seen as 
very unseemly that she let male strangers into the home when the husband 
was not around. In other cases, the wife or housekeeper (even in the slums 
there are housekeepers and nannies) did not have the authority to authorize 
such expenditures, even if she had the cash. 
Overall, the social fabric, which on the surface can look strong, proved to be 
quite thin and precarious in Nairobi‟s slums. It‟s often unrealized how 
important the social fabric and the basic levels of trust it engenders are 
necessary for business to flourish, especially for new and innovative ones that 
require significant changes in customer behavior. But in CCS‟s case it became 
 
                                                                                                                                            
5
 For example, Hernando de Soto has made famous the story of how the barking of dogs 
indicated to him when he was crossing informal property boundaries in Bali, thus implying that 
there is a level of social cohesion that ensures property rights despite the lack of formal 
systems of property contracts. 
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quite clear. Thus, within three weeks of the launch, most of the youth groups 
participating in CCS had stopped trying to offer the services. 
 
Implementation tactics and actions 
At first, the field team – now composed solely of George, the CFK officer, and 
John, the SCJ intern – simply tried to encourage the youth to try harder by 
visiting them and talking with them. In August of 2006, Justin was hired full-
time by SCJ and posted to London with the mandate of coordinating SCJ‟s 
sustainability efforts in Africa, including BOP business development. In 
September, he began to interact with the field team with an eye to becoming 
its full time manager. Thus, in consultation with Joseph, Duncan, Justin, and 
Antoine, the field team settled on a specific strategy to counteract the 
lackluster sales and drooping effort that followed the business launch. It 
decided to focus its efforts and attention on a single youth group at a time in 
an effort to develop a series of “success cases” which it could then use to 
motivate the rest of the youth groups. 
But beyond spending most of its time working with a single group at a time, the 
field team really didn‟t know exactly what to do. Joseph‟s experience in sales 
and operations became invaluable at this point, and he provided the guidance 
the field team needed. George and John began to accompany the selected 
youth groups on their house calls, to see for themselves what the youth were 
encountering. Given that continually knocking on doors and getting no sales 
quickly gets discouraging, the field team had to spend lots of energy 
motivating the youth to continue trying as the team ascended its learning curve 
and got a better understanding of the situation. The unstated policy had 
always been to not pay the youth to participate in CCS – they were to be 
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partners and would accrue benefits when the partnership was successful – but 
the field team had to resort to some forms of compensation, such as “lunch 
money” to ensure that the youth continued knocking on doors. 
The field team first focused on a youth group from Kibera called Bunker which 
at the time had a strong leader and a motivated and cohesive cadre of 
members, all of whom were participating in CCS. Over the course of several 
weeks of working with the group, sales gradually crept up as Bunker‟s 
members gained confidence, cultivated customers, adapted their offerings, 
and honed their marketing. When the sales trend looked promising, but before 
Bunker was making meaningful profits, the field team turned its attention to a 
youth group in a separate slum. But as soon as George and John stopped 
focusing full time on Bunker, its sales efforts immediately declined. 
This experience repeated itself with each of the groups the field team 
sequentially focused on during the fall of 2006. Over the course of the fall, 
Joseph distanced himself from the field team as he prepared to exit SCJ and 
Justin gradually took over more of the day-to-day management of the field 
team, despite being located in London and traveling to Kenya about once 
every month or two. Duncan continued to manage the project‟s budget and 
worked with Justin and the field team in determining its overall direction. 
By December of 2006, the field team had worked extensively with youth 
groups in three different slums and helped seed hundreds of sales and clients 
but had been unable to lead any of the groups to sustained profitability. Given 
that the overall trend over the first six months of business was not positive, 
and that the efforts by the field team were not turning things around, Duncan 
began to press for more profound changes to the initiative. His two main 
objectives were to strengthen the field team‟s leadership and to reduce the 
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cost of SCJ material inputs to improve CCS‟s margins. 
George had not developed the leadership capabilities that the summer team 
had hoped for, and Joseph had stopped guiding the team when he left SCJ in 
September. Justin did his best to provide hands-on-guidance, but besides not 
being local to Kenya, he was only there sporadically as he was assigned to the 
initiative on a part-time basis (thirty percent of his time). Additionally, 
communication costs and poor quality severely limited his ability to interact 
meaningfully and in a timely manner with the field team. 
Justin initially considered that the business had to show signs of growth and 
sustained performance in order for SCJ‟s senior management to approve 
modifying or expanding the field team. But as it became increasingly obvious 
that a major barrier to improving performance was the composition of the field 
team, Justin and Duncan were able to secure approval for hiring Joseph as a 
part-time consultant to the project for six months, with the expectation that he 
would gradually be incorporated full-time as the field team‟s local leader. 
Joseph was the natural choice for leader as he had already demonstrated that 
he had the right skill set, knew how SCJ operated, was local to the area, and 
was the person in SCJ with the most intimate knowledge of CCS and its 
history. At the time of his hiring, Joseph had set himself up as an independent 
entrepreneur and was able to join the initiative as a consultant. 
The team‟s second objective – reducing SCJ‟s prices to CCS – was more 
difficult and time-consuming to implement. The products SCJ marketed in East 
Africa at the time were not designed for slum conditions, or for service-
oriented applications. In some cases, the cost of the packaging and delivery 
mechanism (e.g. an aerosol can and its nozzle) could account for more than 
fifty percent of the cost of the product. Due to the regulatory hurdles for 
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designing, registering, and introducing new products to Kenya with the 
characteristics needed for the CCS business model, the team proposed selling 
the existing products to CCS at a price that would reflect what the new 
products would cost once they‟d been formulated, packaged, and transported 
appropriately for “branded service providers” such as CCS. This would afford 
lower price points and better margins for the service providers, innovative 
application modes better adapted to slum conditions, better environmental 
attributes (less packaging waste, more precise applications), and more 
effective service administration (easier to cost out, measure, distribute, store, 
etc.). An example of one of these alternatives could be SCJ selling super-
concentrates of some of their products to CCS, who would then dilute, dose 
and package them as needed. 
During the 2006 end of year review with senior management, Duncan formally 
asked for the option of experimenting with different regimens of reduced prices 
to CCS. The proposal was initially resisted in the view that the CCS model of 
pro-rating the cost of existing products across several buyers by means of 
“servicizing” had to be tested. Reducing prices to CCS below SCJ‟s current 
production costs would imply a different, untested, and more comprehensive 
business model which would require significant changes in SCJ operating 
procedures. There was also concern within SCJ – espoused also by Antoine – 
that if CCS members received SCJ products at prices well below those 
available to supermarkets and storekeepers, that they would be tempted to 
simply resell them on the black market rather than perform services. 
But the continued underperformance of CCS eventually enabled Justin and 
Duncan to negotiate a proposal that would effectively lower the cost of SCJ‟s 
products to CCS. Rather than simply offer the products at lower prices, 
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Duncan, Justin, and Joseph developed a rebate system whereby the CCS 
members would get the reduced-price differential applied to their subsequent 
consignment, once the services had been provided. The system was meant to 
protect against the creation of a black market while simultaneously 
encouraging the development of robust book-keeping and reporting, as 
rebates were only made effective upon proof of services rendered. 
The existing budget did not have to be increased to hire Joseph nor to 
implement the rebate system due to savings in other areas that reflected the 
reduced number of CCS members active in the initiative and the small size of 
the field team. The process of getting approval for both changes took several 
months of discussions, presentations, and negotiations. Their implementation 
also took time; Joseph joined the initiative as a part-time consultant in March 
of 2007, and the rebate system was rolled out during April and May of 2007. 
 
BUSINESS EVOLUTION 
During its first year of operations, CCS did not generate any profits for SCJ, 
but yielded rich insights into Nairobi‟s low-income urban market and the 
capabilities SCJ needed to develop in order to nurture businesses that 
effectively served it. About fifty individuals from youth groups in three different 
slums had coalesced as the core of CCS, but operating profits did not grow to 
be sufficient to meet their income needs. They all participated in CCS on a 
part-time basis in the hope that it would eventually reach a level of profitability 
that enabled them to focus on it full-time. The different youth groups, each in a 
different slum, evolved different flavors of CCS, with services and prices 
tailored to their community and specific circumstances. During the second 
year of operations, the business continued to diverge and eventually only a 
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single version survived. 
CCS‟s organizational structure also evolved during its second year. Originally 
conceived as an additional service provided by a confederation of youth 
groups partnered with SCJ and CFK, CCS was gradually transformed into a 
micro-franchise model of individual entrepreneurs that reported to the field 
team – which itself was slated to become the “master franchisee”. 
The initiative‟s administrative structure was adapted during this period to 
reflect the changing roles of the different institutions and individuals involved, 
incorporate new players, and better support CCS‟s emerging business 
structure. Duncan transferred most leadership responsibilities to Justin, 
Joseph became the field team lead, and CFK shifted to a social auditor role. 
 
Business model bifurcation 
At the start of the second year of operations, during the summer of 2007, the 
youth groups Bunker and Tuff Gong kept refining and playing on variations of 
the in-home cleaning service concept. The business was now strengthened by 
lower prices for the SCJ inputs, even if the rebate system was cumbersome 
and not attractive to the youth. The groups continued to adapt the business to 
their communities and to diverge in the market segments they were serving. 
For example, Bunker – which operated in a predominantly Muslim and Nubian 
community of Kibera – began to offer carpet-cleaning services, as most 
Muslim homes had them and most had never been cleaned. 
In general, Bunker served the richer and more established slum residents, 
some of which had multi-family compounds and extensive businesses. For 
these clients, Bunker would offer time-consuming and labor-intensive 
customized services, such as polishing all a home‟s furniture or plastering all 
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the cracks in a room‟s walls. The prices for these services were much higher 
than what most slum residents could afford, and each service took time to be 
secured, negotiated, set up, and ultimately performed. 
Tuff Gong originally also wanted to penetrate higher income markets – in their 
case nearby middle-class gated communities – to which they hoped their CCS 
affiliation and uniforms would gain them access. In essence, they wanted to 
leverage the legitimacy CCS provided them to become glorified janitors and 
gardeners. But the field team nixed this idea, as the central purpose of CCS 
was to serve the slum communities. In view of this, and inhabiting the poorest 
slum (Mitumba), Tuff Gong slowly drifted towards offering the cheapest service 
possible and using a very small amount of SCJ product to ensure that it would 
not lose money on each transaction. The amount of product used was usually 
too small to have much beneficial effect in slum conditions. Additionally, Tuff 
Gong‟s service was simplified to a degree that it became merely the 
application of the product; the youth group unbundled the products from CCS‟s 
associated labor and skill-intensive services in order to reduce the time spent 
with each customer and thus be able to pursue more customers in search of 
larger sales volumes. 
The third group, “Mathare Environmental Conservation Youth Group” – known 
as Pequeninos for its soccer team – operated in one of Nairobi‟s largest and 
most violent slums, Mathare6. The section of Mathare in which Pequeninos 
operated is markedly different from Kibera (mud shacks) and Mitumba 
 
                                                                                                                                            
6
 There is a debate as to which is Nairobi‟s largest slum, Kibera or Mathare. It is difficult to 
gauge their populations, with estimates ranging from 170,000 to 2 million people in each. Their 
levels of violence are also difficult to quantify, with Mathare known as hotbed of gang warfare, 
and Kibera as a center of political and ethnic rioting. 
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(corrugated metal shacks) in that most of its dwellings are multifamily high rise 
buildings made of concrete. The archetypal building has six stories, with six or 
seven rooms and a shared toilet and washing area per floor. Each room is 
typically a single dwelling, holding a family or a bachelor. Pequeninos was a 
long-established youth group that had developed a thriving trash collection 
business in Mathare. It had over two thousand regular clients from whom it 
collected trash on a weekly basis. SCJ and the field team initially wanted to 
work with Pequeninos in order to use its established client base as a platform 
for spreading CCS. But early on in the process, the members of the group in 
charge of trash collection abandoned CCS due to its low profitability vis-à-vis 
their existent business. The more junior members of the group – the ones who 
had to carry all the trash but received the lesser salaries – were the ones that 
remained committed to CCS. Since these junior members did not control the 
relationships with the existing customer base, they had to establish a new 
customer base for CCS in Mathare in order to retain a larger portion of the 
revenue derived from each customer. 
Due to Mathare‟s built environment, pest control services were not very 
attractive there. But as the Pequeninos members experimented with SCJ‟s 
different products, they eventually discovered that there was a significant 
demand for toilet cleaning services7. Because the toilet on each floor of an 
apartment building was typically shared by six or seven families, a “tragedy of 
the commons” usually ensued in which no single user wanted to clean up after 
the others. Thus, the toilets tended to become incredibly filthy and in many 
 
                                                                                                                                            
7
 I use the term “toilet” loosely. In this context, it includes a variety of latrines, privies, 
outhouses, washing areas, lavatories, and restrooms. 
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cases unusable; parents would forbid their children from using them and resort 
instead to the infamous “flying toilets”. CCS members eventually landed 
contracts to clean the toilets on some floors on a regular basis, either by 
negotiating with landlords or by mobilizing all the members on a single floor to 
cooperate and each pay their share. For this service, Pequeninos used Toilet 
Duck which was the most cost-effective of all SCJ‟s products, and the one 
best suited for service applications in slum conditions. These contracts 
provided a steady and recurring source of income, reduced the need of door-
to-door sales efforts, and created a work schedule for CCS in Mathare that 
enabled its members to hold other jobs concurrently. 
Over time, CCS in Mathare evolved to focus solely on toilet cleaning. The 
most difficult part of the business tended to be the procurement of contracts; 
some level of social mobilization or coercion was needed to get all the families 
on a floor to agree to participate and police free riding. In many cases, 
landlords also had to be dealt with. CCS experimented with several different 
strategies for acquiring new contracts. For example, in one case, CCS 
invested significant resources in fixing up a floor‟s common washing area and 
toilet, painting and retiling it to make it usable again in exchange for a fixed 
contract. Once a contract was landed, clients tended to be very happy with the 
results and were more inclined to continue payments. Some clients mentioned 
that the service was life-changing in several ways; their children could now 
safely use the bathroom, they now felt comfortable having guests visit them, 
etc. 
To summarize, during the second year of operations, the original CCS 
business concept split into three distinct business models. Each of the three 
participating youth groups gradually evolved the concept to fit its operating 
 128 
environment and capitalize on the opportunities it perceived. Bunker provided 
infrequent, labor-intensive, customized in-home cleaning and home-
improvement services to Kibera‟s richer residents; Tuff Gong offered low-
priced, short-duration services for air freshening, mosquito control, and bed 
bug eradication; Pequeninos cleaned and maintained shared toilets on a 
contract basis. 
 
CCS structural changes 
CCS was initially structured as a service-providing organization built on top of 
CYE. CYE in turn, was a loose coalition of nine youth groups guided by a 
committee with members from SCJ and CFK (see Figure 2). CYE was 
originally conceptualized as a vehicle for harnessing the youth‟s existing 
organizational structures and community networks, and as a single coherent 
organizational entity that SCJ could partner with. The specifics of CYE‟s 
structure were the result of several forces operating during the business‟s 
formation. 
From the outset of activities in Kenya, Erik had channeled the process so that 
the resulting organization would be based in, and run by community members, 
for the benefit of the community. This desire was in tune with the BOP 
Protocol‟s overall mission of providing mutual value – to the community as well 
as to the implementing firm. The prevailing vision at the start of the initiative 
was that meaningful value for the community and becoming “local to place” – 
or truly becoming socially embedded – relied on partnering with the 
community, not hiring its members into SCJ, or introducing external people to 
the community to provide products or services. The intent was also to leverage 
existing social structures, not to replace them. Thus, the formation of a 
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community-based organization (CBO) built on existing social structures was a 
natural outcome. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 –The initial organizational structure of CCS, from a slide created by 
Justin DeKoszmovszky for a group presentation to the Business for Social 
Responsibility Conference, Nov. 2006. 
 
Also, SCJ‟s caution in hiring full-time personnel to the field team and its 
preference for contracting external organizations and consultants to midwife 
the creation of a local organization that operated on the ground ensured that 
the resulting entity would not be an integral part of SCJ – it would be a partner. 
An additional factor in the shaping of CYE‟s structure was Kimeu‟s leadership 
style during the formation process. Instead of setting out clear criteria that 
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CYE had to comply with as an organization in order to partner effectively with 
SCJ and be able to implement CCS, he let the youth group members guide 
the process of CYE‟s creation – as per his training and experience in 
participatory development. This meant that many issues relating to the 
distribution of power and rights among the existing youth groups became the 
foundational bed of CYE and embedded themselves in its culture. 
As the official business launch date approached, the main appeal of the CYE-
CCS structure lay in its potential for a broad roll-out. With nine youth groups 
participating –each one with ten to thirty members – CCS would have more 
than a hundred active members in three slums from day one. But the very 
structure of CYE, which encouraged debate over action, guaranteed that none 
of the hundred or more participating members were sufficiently prepared for 
operating the business successfully at the time of its launch. 
The inclusion of the already-existent youth groups in CCS simply injected their 
internal politics into the larger organization rather than enable CCS to leverage 
their existing businesses and social networks. In most cases, only a subset of 
a youth group‟s members participated in CCS while the rest operated the pre-
existent businesses and engaged in other non-commercial activities. This 
internal division of labor – and in a sense, divided loyalties – led to continual 
clashes between CYE‟s leadership (which consisted of a committee with 
representatives drawn from each youth group) and each youth group‟s original 
leadership. 
A few weeks after the business launch, when on-the-ground activities basically 
ceased, CYE became largely inoperative. The field team (at the time led by 
George) focused its efforts primarily on those groups whose entire 
membership was committed to CCS, and began to manage each group 
 131 
separately. So once the business was operating, it was for the most part each 
operating youth group on its own, without paying any attention or dues to CYE. 
During the first year of operations, the field team continued to respect each 
youth group‟s existent identity and manage it as a coherent group that could 
manage its internal operations. Thus, for example, their uniforms would bear 
the SCJ, CCS, and youth group logo or name; and SCJ product would be 
delivered on consignment to the groups, not to individuals. The breakdown of 
CYE and the organizational and logistical issues that arose from dealing with 
groups of fluid membership and shifting hierarchy led Justin to realize that 
CCS might function more effectively as a micro-franchise model which would 
admit single entrepreneurs or entrepreneurs willing to hire other people and 
form their own commercial organizations. Duncan was opposed to the single 
entrepreneur model because of what he perceived would be its diminished 
capacity for providing meaningful social benefits and the loss of community 
embeddedness. 
The urgent need to streamline and simplify the management structure, and 
Joseph‟s preference for dealing with single entrepreneurs rather than groups, 
consolidated the shift to a micro-franchise model. The model promised several 
advantages attractive to SCJ and potential franchisees. Firstly, it was hoped 
that franchisees with more traditional entrepreneur-based or boss-employee 
structures would suffer much less from the squabbling and consensus-based 
decision making that resulted from the flat hierarchies of the youth groups. The 
field team would then only have to deal with a single franchisee or 
entrepreneur, not facilitate the decision-making process of an entire group. A 
second advantage would be that the franchisees would be committed only to 
CCS – the youth groups‟ other businesses and non-commercial activities 
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usually distracted from CCS or clashed with it. A third reason for shifting to a 
franchise model was to enable the field team, now lead by Joseph, to 
transition into the role of a self-sustaining “master-franchisee” in charge of 
managing the business in the whole city or country. In this manner, SCJ would 
be able to develop a BOP distribution channel of sorts without having to own 
or operate it itself. 
Franchisees would accrue benefits on several levels. Firstly, their incentive 
structure would be much more transparent and direct. Franchisees who 
actually worked \would handle revenue directly and only pay for their direct 
costs, they would not have to share their profits with other group members 
who did not participate but were higher in the group hierarchy or “owned” the 
clients. Secondly, the franchise structure opened the opportunity for 
participating to the whole community. Individuals would not have to already 
belong to an existing group or need to become a member of a group in order 
to become part of CCS and have an opportunity for generating personal 
income. 
After the first year of CCS operations, only three youth groups remained 
operational. The two groups using the in-home cleaning service business 
model stopped operating during the course of the second year. Given these 
circumstances, the field team decided to recruit new franchisees. The first 
franchisees were individuals in Mathare that had been in some way related to 
Pequeninos. These entrepreneurs simply picked up the contract toilet-cleaning 
model and implemented it with a shifting team of friends or employees whom 
they paid on a service-per-service basis. Thus, the management team only 
had to deal with the lead entrepreneurs who then assembled their teams as 
needed. 
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The toilet cleaning business was relatively straightforward and profitable for 
the new franchisees, but because the in-home cleaning services one had not 
evolved into a profitable proposition for the youth groups trying to implement it, 
it proved more difficult to recruit franchisees for. The field team leveraged its 
relationship with CFK and with another local NGO to contact potential 
franchisees (both individuals and existing self-help groups), but was unable to 
recruit anyone for the in-home cleaning services model. In the course of the 
second year of operations, the in-home cleaning model was dropped from 
CCS. 
Expanding the toilet cleaning business required finding low income 
communities that also had Mathare‟s “shared toilet” structure. In September of 
2007, the field team recruited a youth group in a new community that met this 
criterion. Even though dealing with a pre-existent youth group contradicted 
some of the reasoning behind the shift to the micro-franchise model, the field 
team moved ahead because it had not been able to recruit individual 
franchisees outside Mathare. The new youth group, called Montana, appeared 
to have a strong and entrepreneurial leadership which could act as a 
franchisee; and it operated in a community that had shared bathrooms and 
wanted them serviced. Initial operations with Montana were pretty successful, 
but over time, the aforementioned internal group dynamics issues emerged – 
and together with the loss of key members who moved away – the business‟s 
development slowed down. In addition, the community, being quite self-
contained, did not have enough shared toilets for the business to grow to a 
size where it could provide sufficient income for all the members of the group. 
To summarize, over the course of the second year of operations CCS 
morphed from a coalition of existing youth groups co-opted to offer door-to-
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door in-home cleaning services to a micro-franchise model of individuals and 
small entrepreneurial teams cleaning shared toilets on a contract basis. 
 
Reorganization of the administrative structure 
When the original student team left Kenya in July of 2005, Erik had to quickly 
cobble together an administrative structure to keep the initiative moving 
forward. Over the fall of 2005 he devised a structure meant to support the 
youth groups‟ business development efforts on the ground while 
simultaneously avoiding the deployment of full-time SCJ personnel to the field. 
The youth groups were to be supported and led by a field team of independent 
contractors (Edwin, then Kimeu) legally working for CFK. In January of 2006, 
SCJ added an unpaid intern on a half-time basis to the field team (John). The 
field team was to be guided by Salim, CFK‟s Executive Director for Kenya; 
Joseph, SCJ‟s Director of Operations for East Africa; and Antoine, SCJ‟s 
General Manager for East Africa – all of them based in Nairobi. This 
management tier would in turn liaise with Erik, who controlled the budget. Erik 
reported to the upper echelons of SCJ: Scott and Mark. Figure 3 shows this 
structure. 
The initiative was ultimately funded by Scott‟s department, which was 
hierarchically separate from SCJ East Africa for which Antoine and Joseph 
worked, and most funds were directed to Kenya through an outside 
organization, CFK. This structure was a result of the particular manner in 
which the initiative had come into being – it had started as a collaboration 
between Scott‟s department and an external consortium, SCJ was unwilling to 
hire personnel in Kenya at the start, a non-SCJ employee had been the 
initiative‟s leader its first two years, etc. – and thus proved unwieldy for several 
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reasons. First of all, the initiative‟s main driver was not part of the field team, 
was not located in Kenya, and was not a part of SCJ. Secondly, the field team 
did not have an experienced enough leader that could guide the youth groups 
through the very ambiguous process of creating and cumulatively modifying an 
innovative business. The management tier with the right level of capacity (in 
yellow in Figure 3) to lead such a venture only dedicated a few hours a week 
to it. 
 
 
 
Figure 3 – Administrative structure of CCS in the fall of 2005, from an internal 
document prepared by Erik Simanis. 
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A third source of awkwardness stemmed from the tangled lines of authority 
that resulted from having the field team respond to “bosses” from three 
different organizations. This was reinforced by the way the budget flowed and 
was controlled, and by each field team member‟s original organizational 
allegiance and paycheck source. 
With this structure in place, Erik handed the project off to Duncan in the spring 
of 2006. Duncan began operating under this structure, but with the objective of 
streamlining it and handing the project‟s leadership to Justin, now an SCJ full-
time employee. Over the course of the first year and a half of CCS operations, 
Duncan transitioned the overall leadership role to Justin. In the process, they 
strengthened the field team‟s leadership by hiring Joseph, and streamlined its 
administrative procedures by internalizing the fund flow within SCJ and shifting 
CFK to a social auditor role. Figure 4 shows the administrative structure in the 
summer of 2007 and Figure 5 shows the administrative structure in fall of 
2007. 
In this period, SCJ‟s operations in Africa were restructured and its Kenya 
offices drastically reduced in size. As a result, the SCJ manager for all of 
Africa – based in South Africa – took over for the East Africa manager in CCS 
(Miguel in Figure 5). Joseph was repositioned; from being a consultant, he 
shifted to become the field team lead – now as an independent contractor – 
and George left the team, slated to be replaced by a new hire. 
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Figure 4 – Administrative structure of CCS in the summer of 2006, from an 
internal report prepared by Justin DeKoszmovszky and Duncan Duke. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 – Administrative structure of CCS in the fall of 2006.
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AFTERWORD 
In 2008, SCJ initiated the internal processes necessary for providing low-cost, 
bulk versions of their cleaning products to CCS. Justin coordinated with an 
SCJ production facility in Egypt to have a container of Toilet Duck (a product 
for cleaning toilets) in bulk format exported to Kenya. Joseph gradually moved 
from being a consultant to the project to becoming SCJ‟s “master franchisee” 
in Kenya, in charge of managing CCS as a separate and independent unit. 
Joseph set up facilities for receiving SCJ‟s bulk product and then repackaging 
it within Kenya in the format best suited for providing toilet-cleaning services 
within the slums. Joseph and the field team had some difficulty initially finding 
individual entrepreneurs willing to join CCS. They eventually joined forces with 
another local NGO (Pamoja Trust) with deep ties across Nairobi‟s urban 
slums. Through Pamoja Trust, the team was able to identify and induct into 
CCS several youth groups in different urban slums. 
Over time, the business model bifurcated again. One contingent of CCS 
continued to clean shared toilets within the slums, while another cleaned and 
maintained for-pay public toilets. Not all the for-pay toilets were located in 
slums, but they all tended to have very high traffic and use; thus they had to 
be cleaned daily. This model‟s revenues come from the fees that customers 
paid for using the public toilets. Each set of public toilets is typically owned or 
operated by an existing business or NGO, CCS‟s role was to train the 
operators in cleaning and maintenance in exchange for using SCJ products. 
Current efforts revolve around streamlining the process of importing and 
distributing bulk product and strengthening Joseph‟s “master franchisee” 
organizational infrastructure so that it may become entirely self-sufficient and 
independent of SCJ. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CASE STUDY: ACB IN TIERRA SANTA 
 
AUTHOR’S NOTE 
ACB is a pseudonym for the second firm of this study. Due to intellectual 
property and trade secret issues, the full “thick description” of the case cannot 
be published in this dissertation, even in a disguised form. 
What follows is a brief overview of the firm and the case, culled from publicly 
available information. This overview uses the same pseudonyms used the in 
the full case study for the firm, individuals, organizations, countries, regions, 
cities, industries, technologies, and health issues so that it is consistent with 
the examples and references to the case in the Discussion and Conclusion 
Chapters. 
Readers interested in the full “thick description” of the case are encouraged to 
contact me (dod3@cornell.edu) to discuss the required arrangements needed 
with ACB to gain access to the full version. The complete case is 115 pages 
and covers in detail the evolution of ACB‟s business development efforts in 
Tierra Santa during 2008. 
 
OVERVIEW 
ACB Inc. was formed in the United States with the express purpose of 
developing a suite of technologies specific to a widespread healthcare 
problem – one that mainly affects the poor across the globe – and 
commercializing its products through the development of innovative business 
models in partnership with low-income (BOP) communities of developing 
countries. The firm was founded by Larry, an accomplished entrepreneur who 
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had initiated or been a primary participant in more than a dozen successful 
ventures, some of them with exits valued in the hundreds of millions of dollars. 
Larry recruited a team of principals to his senior management team that 
included among others: 
 Charles – an international consultant with extensive experience and 
contacts in the Latin American development community. 
 Robert – an entrepreneur and tenured professor in material science, 
expert on the physics of the base technologies ACB wanted to develop. 
 Ian – a tenured professor, expert on business innovation processes for 
low income markets. 
 
During its first year of operations, the firm solidified its corporate structure and 
began researching and developing innovative technological solutions to three 
problems underlying the target health-related issue – the Parasite, Virus, and 
Vitamin problems. Conventional solutions in developed countries to these 
problems are based primarily on large-scale, centralized systems that have 
been implemented over decades at huge cumulative costs, are inherently 
inefficient, and environmentally unsustainable. 
ACB‟s core objective has been to develop technological solutions to these 
problems that are low-cost, environmentally friendly, distributed, and adapted 
to local social and environmental conditions. ACB‟s co-creates these solutions 
with its intended BOP customers and partners; this includes co-designing the 
platform itself, as well as co-creating local business models centered on it. 
ACB focuses on creating “community pull” rather than “product push” as its 
basis for market development. 
At the start of it second year of operations, ACB selected a Latin American 
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country – Tierra Santa – as the initial location for incubating its first business. 
In January, the firm hired a manager experienced in collaborative and 
immersive business development at the BOP – Daniel. Daniel was tasked with 
hiring, training, and deploying two separate field teams to Tierra Santa. 
The first field team was deployed by April of that year to Palma, a community 
within the metro area of Madeira that suffered acute Vitamin problems. The 
field team was composed of six people, including an overall leader and a 
technology specialist. The team was supplemented at times with consultants 
and individuals hired on a temporary basis. The field team set up an office 
within Palma, and its leaders and some of its members relocated to the 
community for the first months of operation. 
After three months of immersion, the field team and Daniel had developed 
ACB‟s initial business concept in partnership with Palman community 
members. The concept envisioned an ACB-provided in-home technology 
platform that dealt with the Vitamin problem, coupled to a social support 
network that would enable people to use the platform as a lever for creating 
and establishing healthy lifestyle habits. Through a network of community-
partner hosted “healthy dialogue groups” (HDGs), ACB would distribute its 
technological solution and also enable its local partners to develop and 
provide complementary products and services that help consumers save 
money and establish healthier lifestyles. The services and the HDG activities 
would be synergistically tied to community greening and beautification 
activities designed to extend and position the ACB brand in the broader 
community. 
In July of 2008, ACB hired a Chief Operating Officer – Lance. One of his first 
tasks was to liaison with Robert‟s R&D team (based in the US) to marry the 
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design parameters emerging from the immersion team‟s fieldwork with the 
technology development focused on the Vitamin problem. 
The second semester of 2008 saw lots of prototyping activity, with initial 
prototypes produced in the US, but evermore prototyping and testing work 
devolving to the field team. Simultaneously, the field team began work with a 
core set of about twenty community partners to develop the organizational 
infrastructure for implementing the business concept. Early activities focused 
on getting alignment around the business concept and developing two of its 
main components: the Health Dialogue Groups, and the initial set of 
complementary goods and services. 
During the last trimester of the year, as the Palma field team awaited the 
arrival of the first non-prototype units, it accelerated the development of the 
Health Dialogue Groups and complementary products. By spring of 2009, 
ACB‟s community partners had developed, test-marketed, and were already 
producing and selling a range of innovative complementary products to the 
Vitamin technology platform. 
Once the first units were delivered to Palma, the field team activities shifted to 
honing the structure and function of the HDGs, developing an initial 
payment/billing system and accompanying infrastructure, growing and 
solidifying the complementary products business, establishing the logistical 
and technical basis for delivering and maintaining the units in the field, growing 
and specializing the field team, and preparing the market for rapid deployment 
of large numbers of units in the fall of 2009. 
In late fall of 2008, Daniel trained and deployed a second field team to another 
city in Tierra Santa – Medina. The aim of this field team was to develop a 
scale-out version of the initial business concept in an unconnected location, 
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but with a different core technology, one focused on resolving the Virus 
problem. The Medina field team‟s four members opened up an office in a low-
income urban and set out to engage the community and recruit a set of 
community partners for launching the business. In the winter of 2008-2009, 
this team co-created with its community partners a business concept which 
paralleled the Palma business concept. In late spring of 2009, the team began 
the process of implementing the concept, focusing first on the development of 
complementary products and services tailored to the Medina community and 
the Virus problem. Concurrently it worked with Robert‟s R&D team through 
Lance to develop the technological platform that could deal effectively with the 
Virus problem. 
Eventually, ACB expects to develop a business model focused specifically on 
the needs and requirements of higher-income demographics, but in 2009, its 
focus remained on scaling out the businesses across the Tierra Santa BOP. In 
time, the company aspires to expand throughout Latin America, and as it does 
so, it will continue to adapt and evolve its business models to fit the conditions 
of the communities in which it does business. 
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CHAPTER 7 
DISCUSSION 
 
In the Theory Development Chapter I presented a framework for examining 
opportunity construction processes and discussed the differences between the 
opportunity construction and opportunity discovery logics inherent in 
competing streams of research. In subsequent chapters I examined the cases 
of two firms that deployed field teams to low-income communities to create 
innovative businesses; that is, businesses with the double goal of being 
profitable while also providing social and environmental benefits to their local 
stakeholders. 
In this chapter, I inductively build a theory – entrepreneurial sensemaking – by 
examining the SCJ and ACB cases in light of the opportunity 
discovery/construction logic dichotomy already developed. In the first section 
of this chapter I surface and describe the main factors and conditions that 
induced the emergence of opportunity construction logics in the field teams 
and the enactment of opportunity discovery logics at the senior management 
levels. In the second section of the chapter I build the theory of entrepreneurial 
sensemaking by examining how the interaction between these two 
entrepreneurial logics generates over time a synthetic logic that enables the 
creation of novel artifacts and the attainment of deeper understandings of the 
businesses‟ strategic outlook and direction. 
 145 
FACTORS THAT PROMOTE OPPORTUNITY CONSTRUCTION 
The SCJ and ACB cases reveal three important factors that promote the 
enactment of opportunity construction logic (see Figure 6): 
 Shared decision-making - The extent to which decision-making 
regarding the nature and fundamentals of the business is participative, 
collective, diffuse, and distributed  
 Unclear organizational boundaries – The extent to which non-
organizational members participate in making decisions about the 
business. 
 Conflicting goals - The dissonance between two main expectations: in 
these cases, achieving a pre-specified goal while simultaneously 
producing a novel and innovative business that is socially embedded. 
 
 
 
Figure 6 – Factors that promote opportunity construction. 
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Shared decision-making 
Most theorizing on entrepreneurship conceptualizes the entrepreneur as an 
individual, or places the entrepreneurial function upon a single person‟s 
shoulders. This occurs naturally as theorists strive for parsimony in their 
models and try to identify “underlying causes,” “main effects,” and “causal 
relationships”; positing agency on a single entity greatly reduces theoretical 
complexity. It is also a reflection of a western cultural perspective that tends to 
stress the individual over the collective (Hofstede, 2001) and of our 
widespread narrative style of discourse which favors a “Great Man” 
perspective of history and human action (Carlyle, 1966). Even the literature on 
corporate entrepreneurship (Burgelman & Sayles, 1986; Birkinshaw, 1997) – 
which by definition looks at collective entrepreneurship – suggests the need 
for a "product champion" or a “risk taking employee” to hatch and then lead a 
corporate venture through its entrepreneurial stage until it becomes an 
established business. The overall implication in the literature is that 
entrepreneurial ventures usually require strong leaders to ensure their early 
success (see Gartner, 1988 for an extensive review). Even when focused on a 
“behavioral” approach to entrepreneurship – meaning the process by which 
new organizations get created – most writers tend to inadvertently regress to 
positing a single entrepreneurial entity as the driver of the process, even when 
they do manage to avoid becoming embroiled in trying to pin down the 
entrepreneur‟s inherent qualities. 
In the SCJ and ACB cases, it is clear that the entrepreneurial processes 
described cannot be ascribed to a single individual. While some individuals 
play more significant roles than others – for example, Larry is obviously more 
relevant to the evolution of ACB‟s business than Paloma is – the outcomes are 
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shaped by the interactions of multiple actors. This mirrors Garud and Karnøe‟s 
(2003) conception of bricolage, in which agency is not only distributed, but is 
also embedded in the process itself. It also is in accordance with the literature 
on the social construction of technological systems which provides detailed 
accounts of the micro-processes that support the emergence of technologies 
(Bijker, Hughes, & Pinch; 1987). 
Moreover, this process cannot be simply modeled as an assortment of 
individual entities, each making its decisions in response to decisions made by 
its peers – as in a neural network – because decisions are not only made at 
the individual level, some are also made at the team or group level, and others 
for the initiative as a whole. Most of the decisions that affected the ACB and 
SCJ initiatives were the result of intense negotiation between different people 
or sets of people, mostly within the firm, but also with external parties. ACB‟s 
selection of Madeira as its first site nicely illustrates the participatory, 
collective, multi-level, and diffuse nature of the decision-making in the venture 
creation process, as well as the cumulative and critical effects these actions 
have on the fundamentals of the business. 
Within ACB, Larry, Charles and Daniel played the most important roles in 
selecting Madeira, each individual motivated by different concerns. Each of 
these protagonists was in turn propelled and constrained by other actors, 
some within ACB and some without. Larry wanted a site that would appeal to 
ACERO in order to gain its support. He also preferred the site suffer a Vitamin 
problem, partly because of Robert‟s incipient R&D efforts in that realm. 
Charles, on the other hand, wanted a site that would enable him to leverage 
his relationships, in particular the one with PERALTA, while Daniel preferred a 
dense urban site with a strong population of potential immersion partners. The 
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decision to launch the first field team in Madeira was not arrived at lightly, or 
by mechanical means such as rank-ordering priorities, or by fiat. It involved 
numerous conversations, field trips, consultations with external and internal 
stakeholders, and intense negotiation. Moreover, the decision was not 
structured as a stop-go one or made at a distinct point in time; it was 
implemented gradually, with each action building upon previous ones in a 
cumulative fashion until the commitment to the site was intense enough to 
render it seemingly irreversible. 
The effect of the choice – starting in Madeira – had enormous impacts on the 
evolution of the venture. First of all, as planned, it fixed the broad technology 
trajectory ACB would pursue – a solution to the Vitamin problem. But it had 
unforeseeable effects in other areas. The reduced set of local institutional 
partners (e.g. FUEGO) forced Daniel and the field team to improvise during 
their immersion and greatly decreased the pool of local community members 
ACB would be able to choose from to assist in developing its business model. 
The local community members ACB was ultimately able to work with – 
unemployed women and stay-at-home mothers for the most part – greatly 
influenced the contours of the initial business concept and determined the 
market segment ACB would target. The socio-economic and cultural 
structures of the Palma community were also key determinants of ACB‟s 
actual business model, influencing decisions around distribution channels, the 
specifications of the technological solution, and the development of 
complementary products. 
Most of the important decisions in both the ACB and SCJ cases were 
achieved in this multi-party, multi-level, time-extended fashion. In Mintzberg 
and Water‟s (1985) typology of strategy formation, this is closer to an umbrella 
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or consensus strategy than it is to an entrepreneurial strategy. Table 14 shows 
a sample of decision processes similar to ACB‟s initial site selection from both 
case studies that clearly demonstrate the participation and influence of many 
actors. 
 
Table 14 – Sample of decision processes that had profound effects on the 
ACB and SCJ initiatives 
 
Case Issue Question Duration Participants 
ACB 
2nd site 
selection 
Where shall we 
deploy the second 
field team? 
8 months 
Charles, Daniel, Fausto, 
Lance, Larry, TIERRA 
ACB 
Medina team 
selection 
Who shall be 
recruited to the 
team? 
8 months 
Charles, Daniel, Fausto, 
Gabriel, Lance, Trevor, 
TIERRA 
ACB 
Business 
concept 
development 
What shall our 
business look like? 
6 months 
Alfred, Amanda, Cecilia, 
Daniel, Lance, Gabriel, 
Joshua, Monica, Paola 
and community 
members 
ACB 
Palma 
immersion 
process 
How will we 
interact with the 
community? 
3 months 
Alfred, Amanda, Cecilia, 
Daniel, Fausto, Gabriel, 
Ivan, Joshua, Monica, 
Paola, Trevor 
ACB 
Community 
member 
recruitment 
Who shall we work 
with? 
2 months 
Alfred, Amanda, Cecilia, 
Gabriel, Ivan, Joshua, 
Monica, Paola 
SCJ 
Immersion 
team 
selection 
Who shall be 
recruited to the 
team? 
3 months 
Erik, Gordon, Mike, 
Scott, Stuart, field team 
members 
SCJ 
Initial youth 
group 
training 
What do the youth 
need to learn 
about? 
8 months 
Antoine, Edwin, Erik, 
Joseph, Kimeu, Salim 
and youth groups 
SCJ 
Official 
launch 
When, where and 
how will we launch 
the business? 
4 months 
Aaron, Antoine, Duncan, 
George, Kimeu, Salim, 
Scott, Vivian, CFK and 
youth groups 
SCJ 
Decrease 
the product 
price 
If, when, and how 
shall we lower the 
price of the 
products? 
6 months 
Antoine, Duncan, 
George, Joseph, Justin, 
Scott, Stu, CFK and 
youth groups 
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The deployment of a field team further dilutes the locus of decision making. By 
definition, in a team there is a greater diffusion of decision-making than there 
is in a strictly hierarchical system, or in a decision making group (Katzenbach 
& Smith, 1993). According to Katzenbach and Smith‟s (1993) template: 
 Groups have a definite leader; a team has shared leadership roles. 
 Groups have individual accountability; teams have both individual and 
collective accountability. 
 Groups discuss, decide, and delegate; teams discuss, decide, and do. 
 
In both the ACB and SCJ cases, the original immersion teams experienced 
rather extreme and isolating conditions during their first months in the field. 
Living and working together twenty four hours a day, seven days a week, in 
communities they were initially foreign to, catalyzed strong internal bonding 
within the teams, analogous to what occurs in a military squad or platoon that 
goes through boot camp. But in contrast to military convention, the ACB and 
SCJ immersion teams were trained to make decisions in a very deliberate and 
highly consensual manner. This was done so that the teams would first model 
within themselves the participatory co-creation process they hoped to guide 
their respective communities through. Thus, especially during the immersion 
phases of both cases – when the initial business concepts were hatched – 
decision-making at the field level was very distributed, consensual, and 
participatory. It involved not only team members, but also their local 
organizational partners such as CFK, and the community members the teams 
were co-creating the business concept with. 
Diffuse decision-making about the nature of the venture engendered an 
opportunity construction logic, as opposed to an opportunity discovery one. 
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Participating actors were forced to communicate and negotiate intensively in 
order to create and sustain a shared sense of purpose that lent coherence to 
the process and the venture. In an opportunity discovery mode, a single 
entrepreneur can identify an opportunity and formulate a plan for garnering the 
necessary resources to exploit it. Communication and interaction with his team 
then is mostly about delegation, labor division, and coordination in order to 
execute the plan. Shared decision-making, on the other hand, injects each 
actor‟s goals and concerns into the process; there isn‟t a single, delineated 
objective, but rather a search for ways to accommodate different goals within a 
single stream of action. Resources that may appear objective and 
undisputable to the individual entrepreneur become open to reinterpretation 
and amalgamation through the process of negotiation and the search for 
common ground among parties. The resulting flexibility around goals and 
resource reenactment enable the collective to shape-shift in order to leverage 
contingencies as they arise. 
For example, the ACB field team had to deal with the unforeseen 
circumstance that there were no suitable local organizations with which to 
partner with in Palma. Daniel was initially wary of involving religious actors in 
the venture creation process, but because the field team‟s plans were 
discussed and decided collectively, Gabriel, Fausto, and Ivan were able to 
incorporate their incipient and personal relationship with the local priest into an 
unofficial kind of sponsorship with provided some of the social legitimacy the 
team required at that time. 
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Unclear organizational boundaries 
Creating and maintaining a boundary – a clear distinction between members 
and non-members – is one of the three critical dimensions that define an 
organization (Aldrich, 1999). The conventional account of how organizational 
members are “constructed” relies almost exclusively on hiring practices and 
subsequent socialization processes – an organization is defined by who it 
incorporates and how it then socializes them (Aldrich, 1999). Typically, the first 
employees founders hire are people they or a friend know personally 
(Reynolds & White, 1997; Baker & Aldrich, 1994). Subsequent hires may be 
suggested by existing employees (Fernandez & Weinberg, 1997), but as the 
organization becomes more formalized, traditional human resource practices 
take over; the firm creates and fills positions that are designed to conform to 
industry standards and are thus recognizable and attractive to external 
applicants. The selection of like-minded people and the ensuing processes of 
socialization, promotion, and turnover then serve to actively maintain the 
organizational boundary (Jackson et al., 1991). 
But as Aldrich (1999) points out, founders recruiting their first employee face a 
situation that has received little attention in the human resource management 
literature. What little research there is on the topic shows initial hiring to be 
opportunistic, informal, and unsystematic; human resource practices are 
among the last activities to be formalized in growing firms (Aldrich & Ruef, 
2006). 
The ACB and SCJ cases both show extended periods of amorphous 
organizational boundaries. This agrees with London‟s (2005) study of firms 
attempting to develop businesses to serve the BOP. In his sample, a great 
proportion of the firms developed strong relationships with local NGOs in 
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attempts to incorporate into their efforts personnel with locally relevant 
expertise and knowledge. In the ACB and SCJ cases, these periods of 
shifting, ambiguous, and porous organizational borders coincided with the 
critical stage during which the shape of each business was being 
collaboratively defined. Unclear boundaries endured at two distinct levels: field 
team/senior management, and field team/local actors. 
To wit, the way in which SCJ structured its immersion team guaranteed 
confusion about organizational belonging and identity from the inception of the 
venture. All the members of the immersion team were hired as external 
consultants on short-term contracts, not a single SCJ employee was seconded 
to the team. Thus, when in the field, the immersion team members could not 
represent themselves as “being” SCJ, they had to hedge and say “we 
represent SCJ”. Outsourcing the initiative also ensured almost full delegation 
and a great deal of freedom of action to the immersion team. The team was 
able to disengage from the local partner that had been pre-selected for it, 
choose how to split into two sub-teams, create a partnership with a new NGO, 
decide to create a business around SCJ‟s products available in Kenya, etc. In 
many cases, the immersion team explained the rationale for their decisions to 
upper management after the fact. 
Further on in the process, when SCJ‟s immersion team had been supplanted 
by a more permanent field team, each participating individual‟s core 
institutional allegiance remained with the organization from which he or she 
originally came from. Table 15 shows how the field team remained populated 
with and led by individuals who were not SCJ employees and did not have 
their long term careers tied to the firm. In fact, not a single management layer 
of the initiative was composed entirely of SCJ employees.
  
Table 15 – Management structure of SCJ‟s Kenya initiative over time. 
 
 
Immersion                    
phase 
 
Indv.                 Org. affiliation 
Business concept  
development 
 
Indv.                         Org. affiliation 
Business concept 
implementation 
 
Indv.                 Org affiliation 
Senior 
management 
Scott SCJ corporate US Scott SCJ corporate US Scott SCJ corporate US 
Stuart Cornell Stuart Cornell Stuart Cornell 
  Mark SCJ corporate Africa John SCJ corporate Africa 
Middle 
management 
Antoine SCJ East Afr. Antoine SCJ East Afr. Antoine SCJ East Afr. 
Joseph  SCJ East Afr. Joseph SCJ East Afr. Justin SCJ corporate Afr. 
  Erik Cornell Duncan Cornell 
  Salim CFK Salim CFK 
Field team 
Erik Cornell Kimeu Independent contractor Joseph Independent contr. 
Students None or misc. Edwin Independent contractor George CFK 
  John SCJ East Afr. John SCJ East Afr. 
Local 
partners 
Youth 
groups 
CFK, own youth 
group 
Youth 
groups 
CFK, own youth group 
Youth 
groups 
Own youth group or 
independent 
 
 
1
5
4
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Furthermore, even the SCJ employees directly involved in the initiative did not 
report to a single authority or sub-organizational entity. Some worked for 
different SCJ corporate organs, others reported to operational units. Only one 
employee, John, was fully committed to the initiative and had all his 
performance incentives related to it. 
Thus, the field team did not function as a wholly-owned business unit of SCJ in 
which middle managers strive to implement the strategy formulated by top 
management (Raes , Heiljtjes, Glunk, Roe; 2011). Middle management 
employees (such as Antoine and Joseph) were especially affected by having 
to report to different bosses within SCJ with different expectations; one for 
their traditional roles and another for the BOP initiative. 
As opposed to radical transactiveness (Hart & Sharma, 2004) in which a firm 
engages fringe stakeholders for the express purpose of managing disruptive 
change and building competitive imagination (.i.e. learning from the 
stakeholders), the SCJ field team interacted with youth groups, local partners, 
and community members with the intention of infusing in them a sense of 
ownership of the creation process and its outcome. So, as the field team 
worked with local actors to shape the institutions and practices needed to 
support a new-to-the-world business, the interaction with the potential 
stakeholders became so intense at times that the endeavor felt like a shared 
one, and the distinctions between firm members and local stakeholders were 
blurred. 
For example, CYE was created expressly as a vehicle for merging SCJ‟s and 
the youth groups‟ capabilities; CCS was to be its first offspring. But it quickly 
became difficult to explain who exactly formed part of the venture and what 
each party‟s role was. Some youth identified themselves as belonging to CYE, 
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others to CCS, others to their own youth groups (who had in turn partnered 
with CYE). Even though CYE was eventually registered as a CBO 
(community-based organization), it never really attained an independent 
organizational status with which its members strongly identified themselves 
with. 
The community members‟ relationship to the SCJ field team was also murky 
and shifting. At times, the field team – itself composed of individuals with 
divergent organizational allegiances – was considered an integral part of CCS. 
At other times, it was treated as an external advisor. Its members were 
sometimes considered to represent SCJ, sometimes CFK, sometimes they 
were simply the “BOP” or “BOP-Protocol” representatives. 
These shifting allegiances and somewhat schizophrenic organizational 
identities reduced the field teams‟ ability to make decisions in a clear and 
logical order. Each decision had to be evaluated in light of all participants‟ 
commitments and differing expectations, as well as the need to keep all 
parties engaged in the process. Multiple goals and concerns had to be 
considered and negotiated. Each participating organization recognized 
different resources as valuable and indispensable. The overall result of this 
was a tendency to gradually construct opportunities that could deal with all the 
competing interests rather than simply trying to subdue and align all the 
organizational identities in pursuit of a single pre-determined opportunity. 
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Conflicting goals 
The SCJ and ACB ventures had double-barreled goals which at the outset 
were not obviously compatible. Both initiatives were conceived and funded 
with the intention of providing locally meaningful social or environmental 
benefits while simultaneously creating functioning for-profit businesses. 
Furthermore, they were constrained by their parent firms‟ missions and 
existing endowments – the ventures were expected to “fit” the firms‟ existing 
strategic postures and organizational cultures. In fact, it was anticipated that 
the ventures leverage and incorporate their corporate parents‟ capabilities into 
the resulting businesses. The proclaimed mechanism for bridging these 
potentially divergent goals was the creation of innovative, new-to-the-world 
businesses that could marry existing corporate capabilities to local assets and 
ways of living. 
The expectation that these would be functioning businesses that could be 
scaled up also implied that the communities‟ or markets‟ wishes had to be 
addressed; without demand and willingness-to-pay, the ventures would not be 
self-sustaining and would be unable to grow. In other words, the ventures 
were not structured to pursue identified and clearly delineated opportunities in 
that there was no proven and established demand to be satisfied. While there 
were very obvious humanitarian imperatives to deal with Vitamin and Virus 
issues in Tierra Santa, and with pest control and latrine sanitation in Kenya, 
there was no evidence that the targeted populations were willing to pay to 
have these issues dealt with. Kenyans had been living for generations in pest-
infested huts, and usually preferred to use any additional or discretionary 
income they had on other pursuits. Likewise, the low-income inhabitants of 
Tierra Santa had preferred to not pay for available products and services that 
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solved their Vitamin and Virus problems. On the face of it, the teams were 
deployed to start businesses around themes and issues for which there were 
no immediately apparent profit-making opportunities. 
The need to reconcile two apparently opposing goals led the field teams to 
enact opportunity construction logics and focus on the process of building 
towards solutions, as feasible end-solutions were simply not imaginable at the 
outset. Given the implacability of the need to generate sales (i.e. to satisfy 
some kind of customer demand), the field teams had to explore options for 
different offerings while at the same time pushing to have their corporate 
“hard” goals be made more flexible. 
ACB‟s Palma initiative demonstrates this point. At the outset, the field team‟s 
goal, as stated by top management, was pretty straightforward: the team was 
to build a business around the sale of an in-home or small-scale technological 
solution to the Vitamin problem. The main objectives of the team‟s immersion 
and interaction with the community, as envisioned by senior management, 
would be to: understand the price points which would be successful, 
understand how the technology should “look” in order to be attractive to the 
segment, recruit locals to be salespeople, and establish a mechanism to 
“break the trust barrier” that might exist between ACB and the local 
community. The envisioned social benefit would accrue by the simple use of 
the technology; as long as customers hadn‟t been using an alternative 
solution, every sale could be counted as another household saved from the 
Vitamin problem. Upon deployment, the field team quickly realized that 
households that were suffering the Vitamin problem were unwilling to spend 
money on a product or service meant to solely address it. Consequently, the 
team worked to develop a business concept that included ACB‟s technological 
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solution, but which also addressed other needs that community members were 
willing to pay to have met. The resulting business concept was not one 
designed to exploit a pre-defined opportunity, it was the idiosyncratic product 
of the opportunity construction process the field team underwent as it 
struggled to craft a solution that would conciliate its conflicting goals. 
This dilemma can perhaps best be seen in hybrid organizations, those that try 
to incorporate two distinct institutional logics. Battilana and Dorado (2010) 
describe the problems microfinance institutions have in trying to reconcile the 
“development” and “banking” logics that different employees bring to the 
organizations. The development logic presses employees to retain their 
mission of providing access to financial services to those excluded from the 
conventional financial sector (typically the poorest) while the banking logic 
compels them to fulfill the fiduciary obligations of commercial financial 
institutions. The pressure towards higher profitability increases the risk of 
“mission drift” as it is usually more profitable to market products to customers 
that are already served by the financial sector (i.e. “richer” customers) 
(Mersland & Strom, 2010). 
Both the ACB and the SCJ field teams faced this “mission drift” dilemma. They 
were expected to create businesses that served the poor, but that were 
profitable. They were expected to produce meaningful and unprecedented 
benefits for their clients and local partners, but also create value on a separate 
dimension for their firms. In Battilana and Dorado‟s (2010) analysis, successful 
commercial microfinance organizations bridged the development and banking 
logics by constructing a unique commercial microfinance logic. Bur Battilana 
and Dorado‟s description of this new logic doesn‟t show that it resolves the 
older logics‟ incompatibilities, merely that “balances” are found. For example, 
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the new commercial microfinance logic struck a balance between “maximizing 
access to the disenfranchised to financial services and fulfilling fiduciary 
obligations to depositors and investors” (Battilana & Dorado, 2010). 
The ACB and SCJ teams were unable to simply search for a middle point or 
balance between their conflicting goals; one pole was inexistent, there were no 
extant markets for products and services that provided the envisioned social 
benefits. In both cases, the field teams‟ task became to reframe the issues at 
hand in a manner that would enable the creation of businesses that resolved 
both mandates. To do so, the businesses had to become conceptually greater 
than the simple fulfillment of the pre-defined “needs” (Simanis, Hart, Duke, 
2008). 
The development of the ACB business concept shows this. As mentioned, the 
field team‟s original mandate was to build a retail business around a 
consumer-level technological platform that addressed the Vitamin problem. 
But after some field research and community immersion, the team recognized 
that demand for this product at a feasible price point would not readily emerge 
within the target population. Since disregarding the Vitamin-solving product in 
order to develop a different product altogether that might be readily attractive 
to the market was not an option for the team, it proceeded to explore ways of 
increasing the business‟s scope in order to link the community‟s expressed 
needs – what locals were willing to pay for and found truly valuable – with the 
need to sell a pre-specified technological solution. The resulting business 
concept included ACB‟s Vitamin technological platform, but it also included the 
local development and production of complementary products, a proprietary 
peer-based distribution channel, and a unique branding strategy built around 
the greening of public spaces. It was the iterative development and 
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subsequent alignment of the additional business components that enabled the 
field team to bridge its disparate goals. The business concept was not simply 
drawn up during a meeting, but emerged slowly over a five month period of 
intense learning, dialogue and negotiation with all the stakeholders involved, 
ranging from potential clients to the ACB‟s board of directors. 
To summarize, inductive examination of the ACB and SCJ cases reveals three 
distinct factors that promote the use of an opportunity construction logic: 
 Shared decision making. 
 Unclear organizational boundaries. 
 Conflicting goals. 
 
The examples show that these factors were more prevalent and exerted 
stronger effects at the field team level. 
 
FACTORS THAT PROMOTE OPPORTUNITY DISCOVERY 
The SCJ and ACB cases point to three factors that contribute to the 
actualization of an opportunity discovery logic (see Figure 7): 
 Mediated relationships - The extent to which the decision-maker 
interacts with external stakeholders through other people. 
 Use of abstractions – The extent to which decisions are made based 
upon “data” abstracted from the operational environment. 
 Organizational tenure – A proxy for the extent of socialization to extant 
normative organizational logics a decision-maker has been exposed to. 
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Figure 7 – Factors that promote opportunity discovery. 
 
Mediated relationships 
In contrast to face-to-face shared decision-making which inserts each party‟s 
goals and concerns into the process and requires quick in-the-moment 
agreements, compromises, and mutual understandings, making decisions in 
isolation – or removed “from the action” – permits a sense of detachment and 
facilitates the dismissal or minimization of opposing or contradictory demands 
and viewpoints. When actors interact with the business environment through 
others, they inevitably establish filters for the information that flows to them. 
These filters – which generally are subordinates – have several effects on the 
flow of information. 
First of all, they reduce the total amount of information that gets transmitted. 
Agents on the front line simply cannot convey the wealth of codified and non-
codified information they absorb while dealing day-to-day with clients, vendors, 
suppliers and other stakeholders. They necessarily have to select what 
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information is relevant to share with their superiors and colleagues and can be 
transmitted in relatively short and stylized exchanges, such as meetings, 
conference calls, or memos. 
Secondly, and as consequence of having to parse and curate the information 
flow, the filtering subordinates pre-process the information in idiosyncratic 
ways. They have to try to “filter out the noise” and frame the information in 
ways they think their supervisors “want to hear” and will be liable to act on. 
They also have incentives to present information in ways that will support – or 
at the minimum not detract from – their own personal and organizational 
interests (Guth & MacMillan, 1986). 
Thirdly, in mediated relationships, the information gets “metered” or “chunked 
out”. While frontline employees usually have to make decisions on-the-go to 
deal with stakeholders‟ concerns and interests in real time, their superiors 
often have the opportunity to make decisions at a more leisurely and 
controlled pace. Top managers usually do not have to make decisions 
immediately, as soon as they receive memos, reports, phone calls, or e-mails. 
They can let the information accumulate, analyze information from several 
sources concurrently, and postpone their decisions. In fact, they can even 
schedule their decision-making in advance, as in “marketing decisions get 
made after the Thursday operational review meeting”. On the other hand, 
senior decision makers receive information in “lumps”, as in e-mails, weekly 
meetings, or monthly budgets; they do not have fine-grained access to the 
continuous flow of information occurring at the firm‟s interface with the 
environment. 
In sum, mediated relationships reduce, pre-digest, and meter the information 
provided to the decision-maker. Less information reduces the competing 
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demands that have to be conciliated. Also, not having to deal with the 
stakeholders in person, the decision-maker is shielded from the emotional pull 
to consider and equally weigh all competing demands. The combination of 
less shared goals, reduced time pressure, and more streamlined (but sparse) 
information flows enables second-line decision makers to feel that they are 
“more objective” or “rational”, dismiss concerns that are not aligned, and 
construct more linear representations of reality. This naturally supports the 
opportunity discovery logic of entrepreneurial action in which plans are made 
and strategies devised to pursue the opportunities uncovered by more formal 
analysis. 
Figure 8 provides a snapshot of how relationships with community 
stakeholders were mediated within ACB in August/September, once most of 
the field work for the initial business concept definition had been undertaken 
and Lance had become fully functional as Chief Operating Officer. 
The depicted relationships are strong, indicating at least four hours of direct 
and intense communication per week. The closer to the field, the more intense 
and personal were the relationships, with most interaction being face-to-face. 
The further up the chain of command, the more mediated were the 
relationships with the business environment. At the time, Lance was three 
degrees removed from the market. Importantly, the number of relationships 
also decreases the further one moves up the chain of command. 
These mediated relationships are in relation to the market and operational 
environment of the business, which is the main concern of this study. ACB top 
managers did have extensive networks and unmediated relationships with 
other stakeholders, primarily at the institutional and capital markets levels. On 
those dimensions, the relationships may have engendered an opportunity 
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construction logic, but that is beyond the scope of this study. 
 
 
 
Figure 8 – ACB‟s mediated relationships with community stakeholders in 
August/September. 
 
Use of abstractions 
A factor closely related to mediated relationships, and interdependent with it, is 
the use of information that has been abstracted into higher-order concepts for 
analysis and decision-making. As discussed in the previous section, managers 
who are not on the front line have to make decisions based on information 
presented to them by their subordinates and other external agents. The 
subordinates not only filter the information, they also manipulate it and 
abstract it. Abstraction is the process by which higher-order concepts are 
derived from the usage and classification of “literal” concepts, observed 
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phenomena, or first principles (Mayer, 1993; Stinchcombe, 2001; Webster‟s 
Dictionary, 2000); it is the stripping away of extraneous information in order to 
leave the bare essentials needed for some kind of operation or analysis. 
Abstraction indicates a teleological process; actors decide which information to 
remove from a “concrete” reality dependent on what they believe the resulting 
concept will ultimately be used for. It also implies simplification; in the process 
of abstraction, formerly concrete details are left ambiguous, vague, or 
undefined. 
In firms, the information provided to superiors is usually intended for planning 
and decision-making purposes and is customarily abstracted into numerical 
concepts that can be manipulated mathematically. Front-line employees are 
tasked with providing information related primarily to sales (revenue) and to 
costs. This can take the forms of sales projections and targets, profit and loss 
statements, cash flow and inventory reports, operational budgets, etc. 
Managers dealing with abstractions – in particular numerical concepts – are 
prone to use the left hemispheres of their brains and make decisions in a more 
rationalistic, linear, and purposefully analytical manner (Csikzentmihaly & 
Rochberg-Halton, 1981; Csikzentmihaly, 1996; McManus, 2004). This decision 
making style is not necessarily more comprehensive than intuitive and 
judgmental processes (Nutt, 1993). Eisenhardt‟s (1989b) study of fast decision 
making supports the notion that being closer to the source and using less 
abstract information– in her case, real-time information on the firms‟ 
environments and operations as opposed to forecasted information – leads to 
more intuitive and efficient decision making. Fast and effective decision 
makers preferred operational indicators such as daily bookings of scrap over 
“more refined accounting data such as profit” and favored face-to-face 
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conversation rather than time-delayed and mediated communication 
(Eisenhardt, 1989b). 
While not necessarily more efficient or effective, an analytic stance derived of 
working with abstractions does suggest a positivist “technical rationality” that 
seeks to identify patterns and impose a linear order upon reality (Schön, 
1982). Chambers (1997) suggests that professionals in higher status positions 
within organizations are driven by ideas, values, methods, and behaviors that 
are derived more from things rather than from people, and thus focus on 
quantification. Their working environments tend to be standardized, controlled, 
and predictable; they prize measurement, universals, reductionism, prediction, 
and theory over local, complex, dynamic, and unpredictable realities which are 
what the subordinates in lower status positions that interface with people have 
to deal with (Lipsky, 1983). In terms of opportunity logics, abstracted 
information stimulates opportunity discovery thinking; abstractions are 
attempts to evaluate the environment and make choices based on estimates 
of its future states. 
In ACB‟s case, the kinds of abstracted information that were funneled to senior 
managers varied over time, depending on the maturity of the business. One of 
ACB‟s senior management‟s main concerns throughout was securing a 
second round of financing for the firm. Although a multitude of funding sources 
were explored, the main reason the firm offered in exchange for support was 
that it would soon enter a phase of explosive growth fueled by the widespread 
adoption of its technological platform. While senior management used several 
types and channels of information to build its case, the kind of information it 
expected from the field team revolved around price points acceptable to 
consumers, distribution and customer acquisition costs, and adoption rates; 
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data that could be plugged into its sales projection and firm valuation models. 
At the outset of the field team deployment, ACB senior managers knew it was 
too early in the process to ask for “hard” data around price points and 
distribution costs, but they did expect tangible data and “insights” that would 
be indicative of what the Vitamin technological platform should look like and 
cost in order to be attractive to the market. For example, senior management 
expected the field team to provide an analysis of the local competitive 
landscape in regards to existing solutions to the vitamin problem, including 
competitors‟ sales volumes, revenues, and price points, as well as 
descriptions of their offerings and business models. Later on in the process, as 
the business slowly began to take shape, senior managers began to require 
more quantitative data directly related to ACB‟s sales, including weekly sales, 
individual salespeople‟s targets and performance, rate of salespeople hiring 
and induction, etc. 
The ACB field team, on the other hand lived in a world dominated by verbal, 
face-to-face information exchanges with stakeholders. Despite the team‟s 
efforts at disciplined note-taking and structured documentation processes – for 
example, most activities were photographed and all photos uploaded to a 
website – it proved very difficult to simultaneously capture, analyze, and 
summarize all the knowledge the team members were tacitly acquiring. The 
process of winnowing the information into digestible portions rested heavily 
upon Gabriel and Daniel; writing reports and crafting e-mails to senior 
managers was often a painful exercise which required inordinate amounts of 
time and effort. Gabriel and Daniel often had to discuss at length how to 
convert the “raw” data of their first-hand experience into compact yet 
meaningful representations that would be useful to Lance and Larry. They had 
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to channel and reduce the wealth of contradictory and ambiguous information 
they were experiencing into pre-existing formats such as weekly reports with 
pre-established categories, budgets, financial projections, and sales targets. 
Over time, this process highlighted the costs related to the technological 
platform and minimized the other elements the field team was incorporating 
into the business concept in order to make it attractive to the populace – 
components of the business that not only implied additional costs, but also 
alternative revenue streams. 
As senior management focused on the data provided by the field team to 
continually create and tweak revenue growth and firm valuation models, it 
implicitly emphasized the notion that ACB was pursuing the opportunity of a 
lack of adequate in-home technical solutions to the Vitamin problem and de-
emphasized the community‟s expressed needs, which were much broader. 
In the SCJ case, when Community Cleaning Services was formally launched, 
senior SCJ managers developed – independently of the field team – a series 
of metrics to evaluate the initiative‟s performance. Besides sales, these 
metrics included measures intended to gauge the initiative‟s broader social 
impact, such as the number of jobs created in the slums. When the initiative 
began to falter after the official launch, SCJ‟s operational culture of measuring 
performance primarily through profit and loss statements (P&L) came to 
dominate the information flow between senior management and the field team. 
Senior managers directed the field team to develop P&L statements for CCS 
and for each participating youth group. This required all CCS operators report 
their exact number of sales, the material and product cost of each sale, its 
price, etc. Yet the operational reality in the slums was not conducive to such 
clean data collecting. For example, there was little standardization across 
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services provided, each service had to be customized to the client‟s particular 
conditions; CCS operators had lots of difficulty ascertaining product costs per 
service given the products‟ packaging and dispensation mechanisms; there 
was little real incentive and ability to write receipts and faithfully report 
revenue. 
Over a considerable period of time (more than a year), the field team leaders 
struggled to inculcate an information gathering and processing system within 
CCS that would produce reliable metrics that senior managers could visualize 
in the form of a P&L statement. During this process, the focus centered 
primarily upon sales, costs, and margins, with a continuing debate as to 
whether CCS should experiment with pricing (especially at a loss) to establish 
demand and determine willingness-to-pay. The overarching goal of the 
venture during its second year became to see how much product could be 
sold via the “prorate a can between several huts” model and whether it could 
be done profitably. The social impacts of the business became a topic of 
diminished interest and efforts to measure them faded over time. 
 
Organizational tenure 
Established firms develop ingrained routines for dealing with their habitual and 
regular tasks (Nelson & Winter, 1982) and organizational members adopt their 
industries‟ institutional logics – taken-for-granted social prescriptions that 
represent shared understandings of what are legitimate goals and how they 
may be pursued (Scott, 1994). Most large firms are viewed as structured 
entities in which strategy is formulated by senior management and is then 
implemented by middle management and front-line employees. In Mintzberg 
&Water‟s (1985) typology, most firms view themselves as enactors of planned, 
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deliberate strategies. 
The classic separation between strategy formulation and strategy 
implementation (Cohen & Cyert, 1973; Thompson & Strickland, 2001) agrees 
with the opportunity discovery mindset. When devising a strategy – which 
usually means a plan – its creators per force assume a future state of affairs; 
few firms venture into a new market without formulating a goal, conducting 
formal market research, analyzing the competitive landscape, pre-designing 
their product or service, determining production requirements, establishing 
distribution channels, etc. A great deal of planning and research is conducted 
prior to a product launch, and firms have developed a wide array of analytical 
frameworks and tools for doing this – the classical example of such a 
framework is Porter‟s Five Forces (Porter, 1979). 
Managers, like other humans, seek to order and make sense of their 
experience; they construct realities, interpretations, and ways of construing the 
world (Weick, 1995; Chambers, 1997). The more time managers spend in 
large firms and the greater the portion of their experience they draw from this 
environment, the more they acquire its “dominant logic” (Prahalad & Bettis, 
1986), including its routines and institutionalized stance towards opportunities 
– namely, that they are identified and subsequently exploited. Senior 
managers tend to have longer organizational tenures and be more steeped in 
an industry‟s and firm‟s modus operandi, and thus are more inclined to enact 
an opportunity discovery logic. 
The ACB case shows this effect. Lance had decades‟ worth of experience as a 
manager and vice president in large firms that developed technologies related 
to the Vitamin and Virus problems, albeit primarily for industrial clients in 
developed countries. Though he joined ACB as Chief Operating Officer when 
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the Palma field team had already been deployed and was halfway through its 
community immersion phase, on his first visit to Palma he requested of the 
field team a traditional business plan – one that had to include a national 
market analysis, a local market analysis, competitor analysis, SWOT analysis, 
description of the business, marketing plan, etc. A business plan is the 
epitome of the opportunity discovery logic. Charles – who had extensive 
experience as a consultant to large firms and governmental organizations 
attempting to serve low-income markets – also espoused an entrepreneurial 
logic that was primarily oriented towards opportunity discovery and 
exploitation. When Daniel presented the business concept that had emerged 
from the community immersion phase to ACB‟s board of directors and 
principals, Charles prefaced it with a presentation of his own which 
characterized the country and strategic partner selection process as highly 
rational, planned, and premeditated. Though ACB‟s senior managers – 
especially Larry – were very adept at networking at high levels and obtaining 
commitments to the venture from third parties, they invariably characterized 
the firm as a provider of distributed technological solutions to the Vitamin/Virus 
problems – these were the opportunities the firm was exploiting. This is not to 
imply that ACB‟s top managers did not understand that the field team was in 
an opportunity constructing mode, but the top management‟s institutional 
audience expected information to be portrayed in linear, logical, deductive 
terms. 
In the SCJ case – as described in the previous section – the increasing 
insistence on the use of P&L statements as the main tool for measuring 
performance and supporting decision-making paralleled ACB‟s shift towards 
more traditional business analytics. Senior managers who had “grown up” in 
 173 
SCJ were the main proponents of using P&L statements and of applying 
traditional analytical tools – that assume the pursuit of a pre-existent 
opportunity – for managing the incipient venture. 
 
ENTREPRENEURIAL SENSEMAKING 
In this section I begin by describing a model of conventional market entry, one 
that is in accordance with the application of a pure opportunity discovery logic. 
Next, I present a model of market entry that is more exploratory in nature and 
better reflects the actions of SCJ and ACB, as well as the Patrimonio Hoy and 
Cemex cases described in the introduction. 
Using this exploratory market entry model, I examine how the factors that 
promote opportunity construction and discovery logics affected individuals at 
different hierarchical levels within the firm and the kind of logic they came to 
primarily espouse. I then build the theory of entrepreneurial sensemaking by 
examining how the interaction between actors enacting these two 
entrepreneurial logics over time fed a learning and exploratory process that 
could produce innovative outcomes with some degree of local market 
acceptance as well a deep strategic understanding of the new businesses‟ 
capabilities and potential. 
 
Conventional market entry processes 
Firms enter new product and geographic markets to achieve synergies and 
economies of scope (Teece, 1980), reduce risk (Helfat, 1988), control agency 
costs (Williamson, 1975), internalize transactions (Buckley and Casson, 1976; 
Teece, 1981; Hennart, 2009) and find the optimal use for their resources 
(Barney, 1991; Mosakowski, 2007). Some models of market entry, such as 
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Klepper and Simons‟s (2000), suggest that entry decisions are affected by 
firms‟ possession of pre-entry knowledge about their resources and 
capabilities in regards to the new market (Helfat & Lieberman, 2002). 
Figure 9 schematizes the generic and formalized process for new market entry 
that occurs within established firms, across their hierarchical levels. 
 
 
Figure 9 – Within-firm process of conventional market entry. 
 
As entering a new market typically requires the allocation of significant 
resources to non-routine activities, the decision to seriously explore this option 
lies with senior management. But once the top management team commits to 
exploring options for new markets, the detailed exploration work is typically 
delegated to lower echelons or to outsiders such as consultants. Subordinates 
or contractors gather the intelligence, conduct the actual market research, 
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analyze the competition, and generally take actions to reduce the ambiguity 
surrounding the decision. Once enough information has been gathered to map 
the environment and determine whether the firm has adequate capabilities to 
succeed in the new market, it is then senior management that makes the final 
resource allocation decision to actually enter the market. 
This model complies with the separation of strategy formulation and 
implementation, and epitomizes the opportunity discovery logic. The process 
is very linear; research is conducted to uncover a potential opportunity which 
the firm is well positioned to exploit. 
 
Exploratory market entry processes 
Not all firms follow the normative model for entering new markets. The ACB 
and SCJ cases, as well as the Cemex and Honda cases described in the 
introduction, belong to a second category of market entry modes. In these 
instances, even though it may be unclear whether a ready market that the firm 
is well positioned to enter exists, senior managers commit sufficient resources 
to deploy a dedicated business development unit – or field team – with the 
mandate of creating a new business to either address a perceived market (as 
in Honda‟s case) or to uncover new market needs. 
In these cases, senior managers do perceive an opportunity at the outset, 
usually at a broad and fuzzy level, but with sufficient potential upside for them 
to allocate the necessary resources to seed a business creation process. It is 
the business development unit‟s entrepreneurial efforts to jump-start a 
business on the ground that begin to provide direction to the initiative and 
build the experience that guides its subsequent development. 
This is a path-dependent process that instead of trying to reduce the ambiguity 
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around a narrowly pre-defined opportunity increases the depth and complexity 
of the participants‟ understanding of what is possible and desirable given the 
environment and the firm‟s resources. The learning that occurs as the 
business is developed occurs unevenly in time and across different 
organizational layers that have different kinds of exposures to the relevant 
stakeholders and to the environment. It is as these different perspectives and 
understandings are negotiated and merged that a deeper and almost intuitive 
understanding of what the business is actually about emerges. Figure 10 
shows a model of this process within a firm. 
 
 
 
Figure 10 – Within-firm process of exploratory market entry. 
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Initial entrepreneurial logics 
As Burgelman (1983a) evidenced in his study of corporate entrepreneurship, 
new business development in a firm evolves as employees across different 
levels of the organization become involved. When a firm uses a dedicated 
business development unit to enter a new market in an exploratory manner, it 
inevitably creates divisions within the organization. One of the most important 
divisions is the separation between the field team and senior management. 
The field team, having to be “close to market” operates from dedicated offices 
or facilities which are often in a different country than corporate headquarters. 
The division is not only physical, but cultural as well. Even if the field team is 
not operating in a separate country, its immersion and relative isolation in a 
unique market and stakeholder environment drive the development of an 
independent sub-organizational culture. The concept of “Skunk Works” is to 
deliberately isolate a team in order to cut down on bureaucracy and jumpstart 
an independent, high-effectiveness culture (Rich & Janos, 1996). 
In the ACB case, corporate headquarters are located in northeastern United 
States and all its senior managers reside in the northern part of the country, 
while the field teams operated in low income communities of a Latin American 
country. SCJ‟s corporate headquarters are located in Racine, Wisconsin, 
whereas the field team worked in the slums of Nairobi, Kenya. In both cases, 
site visits by senior management required at least a full day‟s air travel. 
Furthermore, while field team members in both cases lived within or very close 
to the communities they were working with and had offices or facilities there, 
when senior managers visited, they were housed in downtown hotels, which 
they used as their in-country bases of operations. 
The composition of each organizational echelon and the different 
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environments each one inhabits encourage the emergence of distinct 
entrepreneurial logics. At the start of the process, senior managers tended to 
espouse an opportunity discovery logic. The factors that promote this kind of 
logic were prevalent in their situation; senior managers were accustomed to 
dealing in abstractions, were not in direct and constant contact with the 
customers, and were steeped in the institutional logic of their industry. 
To justify the allocation of resources, the decision to explore the market via the 
deployment of an immersive business development unit had to be framed 
externally in terms of a seemingly concrete opportunity. Thus, ACB managers 
cited the worldwide number of people affected by Vitamin and Virus issues 
and built their case on the idea of capturing a fraction of this immense and un-
served market. SCJ‟s leadership framed the opportunity in terms of stabilizing 
the company‟s supply chain while also learning to serve BOP markets. 
But internally, both firms decided to use the BOP Protocol (Simanis et al. 
2008) to guide their business development efforts. The BOP Protocol explicitly 
encourages a logic that is more aligned with opportunity construction than with 
opportunity discovery. So even before they deployed, the field team members 
were being trained in practices meant to enable co-creation and opportunity 
construction. Their immersion in the market and person-on-person relationship 
building efforts in the field strengthened the factors that promote opportunity 
construction. In both cases, most team members were relatively young and 
inexperienced – only one in each field team had significant experience in the 
firm‟s industry –and only Joseph (in the latter stages of SCJ‟s initiative) had 
any meaningful organizational tenure. In other words, the team members were 
relatively unencumbered by the “dominant logics” of their industries. 
Organizational boundaries were diffuse, extremely so in SCJ‟s case, and 
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decision-making quickly became a shared activity – both within the teams and 
with external stakeholders. Most importantly, as the field team members 
became immersed in the BOP environments, developing relationships with 
locals and building personal trust so that a business could be incubated, they 
in effect became “street level bureaucrats”. Street level bureaucrats are public 
servants such as policemen, classroom teachers, legal aid lawyers, and 
welfare workers who are immersed in non-linear environments, with unclear 
outcomes, and rampant multicausality; they deal directly with the public while 
coping with large case loads, ambiguous agency goals, and limited resources 
(Lipsky, 1983). To develop trust and enable community members to 
participate, field team members often had to accommodate and deal intimately 
with matters far beyond the scope of the business. For example, Gabriel had 
to continually interact with the spouses and families of the community partners 
to ensure they would be given the freedom and domestic support necessary 
for them to remain engaged with ACB. At SCJ, George had to find ways for 
the youth group members to move from one slum to another and make sure 
they were fed before asking them to expend time and effort on the venture. 
The position the field teams found themselves in increased their goal tension 
dramatically. While solving the Vitamin or Virus issue seemed like a 
commendable social benefit to deliver when designing the business at ACB‟s 
corporate headquarters, it became obvious to the field team members that 
solving those problems alone would not provide any really meaningful benefits 
in the eyes of the community members. The Vitamin and Virus problems were 
at best minor irritants in lives preoccupied with much more pressing matters, 
or at worst issues so interwoven with other social ills that their solution 
required major systemic social innovations. A solution to the Vitamin or Virus 
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issue would certainly not be enough motivation on its own for customers to 
acquire ACB‟s products and services at reasonable prices. At that point, the 
disjuncture between building a business around a Vitamin/Virus technological 
platform and providing a meaningful social benefit became almost too difficult 
for the field team to handle cognitively. The result was that it began to operate 
under more of an opportunity construction logic – focusing on the process and 
what was immediately possible, rather than on the end goal alone – in an 
effort to build a solution that could conceivably address both constituencies. 
The SCJ field team faced a similar dilemma when rolling out CCS; having 
clean homes was not something the communities appreciated enough (in light 
of other demands on their time, money, and attention) to pay the prices 
necessary to sustain the business. Nor was it clear that having cleaner homes 
entailed a meaningful social benefit. The field team had to continue its 
opportunity construction process while simultaneously operating CCS in order 
to develop a business that showed greater “customer pull”. 
To view the situation in terms of strategy and how these different logics could 
affect the strategic direction of the firms, Hart‟s (1992) integrative framework 
for strategy-making processes is useful. Hart proposes a typology for strategy-
making processes built around the modes of action of an organization and the 
differentiated roles of its top managers and its organizational members. In the 
rational mode – in which strategy is driven by formal analysis – the role of top 
management is to be the “boss” and evaluate and control the subordinates 
who are meant to follow the system and implement directives. In the 
transactive mode, strategy is driven by an internal process of mutual 
adjustment in which top managers act as facilitators to empower and enable 
organizational members to learn and improve as participants of the process. In 
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the generative mode, strategy is driven from the bottom-up by organizational 
members‟ entrepreneurial experimentation and risk taking, while top 
management‟s role is to endorse and support them. 
In the SCJ and ACB cases (see Figure 11), senior managers and the field 
teams were not operating under a single and coherent mode at the start of the 
process and when the field teams where in their initial deep immersions. By 
enacting an opportunity discovery logic, senior managers defaulted to rational 
and command modes of strategy-making – acting as bosses intent on 
providing direction, controlling subordinates, and focused on evaluating 
performance, despite having openly embraced the BOP Protocol to guide 
business development. The field team members, on the other hand, tended 
towards transactive and generative modes of strategy-making – seeking to 
learn by exploring the environment and experimenting in real time. 
 
 
 
Figure 11 – Initial entrepreneurial logics and strategy-making modes. 
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Entrepreneurial sensemaking model 
The interaction between senior managers primarily enacting an opportunity 
discovery logic and field team members living an opportunity construction logic 
is the central process in the development of a deep strategic understanding of 
what the emerging business can become. In fact, the conversation and 
negotiation that occurs between these two echelons – as the field team strives 
to communicate the complexities and nuances of the on-the-ground 
experience in order to maintain support and ensure that the larger 
organizational structures necessary for growth are implemented, and senior 
managers endeavor to keep the field team focused and generating the 
outcomes needed for gaining external support and legitimizing the venture– 
shapes the actual structure of the ongoing business in real time. 
The example of how SCJ‟s Kenya business concept evolved over time 
illustrates this point (see Table 16). At the outset, the intent was for the 
immersion team to develop a business that in some way helped small-holder 
pyrethrum farmers become more successful so that the spread of the business 
would help stabilize the overall supply of pyrethrum. Ideally, the field team 
would work with Approtec, an existing SCJ partner that already had a 
technology (human-powered treadle pumps) and a rural business that served 
farmers. 
The immersion team decided to simultaneously pursue an urban option 
focused on end consumers, in part to hedge against the perceived low 
probabilities of creating a successful business that resolved the pyrethrum 
production issue. The business concept creation process in Nairobi‟s urban 
slums made use mostly of the opportunity construction logic: the team made 
do with what it had at hand (use of SCJ consumer products available in 
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Kenya, despite this not being considered the ideal), created and transformed 
networks within the slum (through CFK), and made creative use of 
contingencies as they arose while retaining flexibility around final goal. The 
resulting business concept – of in-home cleaning services targeted at slum 
dwellers – presented to senior management was far removed from the initial 
thrust of the initiative. Yet at the same time, it was an idea SCJ managers 
could relate to, as it revolved around marketing existing products to end 
consumers – SCJ‟s traditional forte. 
 
Table 16 – Evolution of SCJ‟s BOP business in Kenya. 
 
 Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 
Business 
concept 
Pyrethrum production 
enhancement 
Home cleaning and 
improvement 
services 
Contract toilet 
cleaning and 
maintenance 
Firm 
goal 
Supply chain 
stabilization 
Develop channel for 
selling existing 
products into slum 
markets 
Develop new 
products tailored to 
slum markets 
Social 
benefit 
 Steady income 
generation 
 Cleaner homes 
 Reduced vector-
borne diseases 
 Jobs/income 
 Hygienic restrooms 
 Reduced water-
borne diseases 
 Jobs/income 
Local 
channel 
Unclear at the time Youth groups Individual franchisees 
Target 
market 
Rural small holder 
farmers 
Urban slum dwellers Urban slum dwellers 
 
Once significant time and effort had been spent setting up CCS, the 
“opportunity” it was to exploit gradually crystallized and hardened in senior 
managers‟ eyes into pro-rating the cost of existing products – originally 
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designed for use in single homes – among several slum households by means 
of a “servicizing” business model. But the initiative continued to evolve. The 
field team‟s experience on the ground compelled it to continue enacting an 
opportunity creation logic because the in-home service model was not 
functioning; it did not generate the benefits SCJ required nor any meaningful 
and sustained social benefits. The field team gradually led – and was led by – 
the CCS members to focus the business on contract toilet cleaning. The field 
team‟s initial thought was to continue using the existing social structures – the 
youth groups that constituted CYE and worked in CCS. Senior management, 
on the other hand, was skeptical about trying to build a business around 
preexistent and self-formed youth groups because they required lots of 
facilitation and continuous high-quality management support to remain 
operative. This impeded efficient scale-up of the business and did not fit SCJ‟s 
managerial structure. The field team‟s solution to this concern was to gradually 
shift the business towards a micro-franchise model. 
So after two years of working in Kenya to build an innovative business that 
served the BOP – beginning with a view to impact the production of pyrethrum 
– SCJ had eventually ended up with an individual entrepreneur micro-
franchise model for cleaning toilets on a contract basis. 
Drawing on these cases, I term the multi-level, mixed-logics dynamic process 
of simultaneously building a novel business and developing a deep strategic 
understanding of its implications and potentialities “entrepreneurial 
sensemaking”. The name draws from Weick‟s (1979, 1995) concept of 
sensemaking, variously described as: the active two-way process of fitting 
data into a frame and fitting a frame around the data, the act of converting a 
world of experience into an intelligible world, or as committed interpretation. 
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Figure 12 depicts the process graphically. 
 
 
Figure 12 – Entrepreneurial sensemaking model. 
 
If the interaction between the two different entrepreneurial logics within the 
same organization does not break down, it eventually leads to the 
development of a hybrid perspective that is able to merge some of the firm‟s 
original goals and expectations with the artifacts that are constructed non-
linearly in the field. The resulting synthetic logic is not simply the middle point 
between the opportunity construction and opportunity discovery logics; they 
are not opposite poles of a graduated continuum. It is an intricate and path-
dependent mesh that contains elements of each of the logics, usually applied 
at different times. 
This mirrors Mintzberg and Waters (1985) examination of intended versus 
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realized strategies, in which they find that real world experience lies 
confusingly between the two logics. Mintzberg (1987b) uses the metaphor of a 
potter managing her craft to illustrate how strategy is best viewed as a 
combination of deliberate and opportunistic moves that looks to the future but 
at the same time incorporates patterns from the past. The evolution of ACB‟s 
business concept serves to illustrate the point. 
As described earlier, the opportunity that ACB‟s senior management wanted to 
pursue was the solution to the Vitamin and Virus problems suffered by low-
income communities. The Palma field team‟s main dilemma was creating a 
business that solved problems that were highly relevant to the community, and 
would thus be built upon strong demand. The business concept that evolved 
through the interaction of these two distinct concerns and derivative modes of 
action did not only cater to the community‟s expressed needs or simply 
provide a technological solution to the Vitamin problem; it was a business that 
addressed both concerns by incorporating elements of each within a broader 
framework. While a technological solution was at the core of the business, it 
was wrapped in reinforcing layers that stimulated demand by linking it to 
several strong community needs and to some of the community‟s more 
generalized aspirations. The model included the development of 
complementary products that not only increased the value of the technological 
solution in customers‟ minds, it also stimulated additional economic activity in 
the community and fomented the growth of a local supportive business 
ecosystem. The business‟s main distribution channel was designed in a way 
that would produce “soft” social benefits and help strengthen community 
bonds. 
Without losing sight of the need to sell large numbers of technological units, 
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ACB‟s senior managers broadened their conception of the business and the 
“opportunity” they were pursuing. Praise from external consultants for the 
complementary products component of the business helped reinforce the view 
that creating a business where no market currently exists requires the 
provision of value and benefits on several dimensions, and that these can be 
self-reinforcing. The synthetic logic that emerges over time is not finalized as 
long the underlying conditions hold: the field team remains in close contact 
with the environment and continues constructing opportunities, senior 
managers remain somewhat separate from the field team, and the business 
does not settle into an already accepted category or organizational form 
(Zuckerman, 1999; Pólos, Hannan, & Carroll, 2002). The dialectic interaction 
between the logics may continue indefinitely, producing successive synthetic 
logics and conceptualizations, but the process is expensive to maintain 
because of the pervasive role conflicts it generates (Battilana and Dorado, 
2010). Figure 13 depicts the ongoing process of entrepreneurial sensemaking 
graphically. 
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Figure 13 – Successive waves of entrepreneurial sensemaking. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The main objective of this dissertation is to improve our understanding of how 
novel businesses are built in the absence of established markets and 
associated consumption behaviors. I looked to the BOP as this space – where 
there are no existing services or products like the ones the innovating firms 
plan to offer – and to western firms as the initial drivers and backers of these 
ventures. 
The main strength of this study derives from its field work and in-depth 
observation of the process of business creation. Researchers have been 
calling for this kind of research into entrepreneurial processes for some time; 
Gartner (1989) says “researchers must observe entrepreneurs in the process 
of creating organizations; this work must be described in detail and activities 
systematized and classified”. 
The alignment of the research question with the ethnographical research 
approach, together with the specific ventures selected for study, has produced 
substantive contributions to four distinct theoretical domains: BOP strategies, 
entrepreneurship, strategy process, and innovation processes. The study‟s 
hands-on nature, in conjunction with the examined firms‟ approach to 
grounded innovation, has also generated implications for entrepreneurial and 
management practice. 
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CONTRIBUTIONS TO THEORY 
The framework for examining opportunity construction developed in the 
Theory Development Chapter, and the entrepreneurial sensemaking theory 
from the Discussion Chapter speak directly to the emerging literature on 
strategies for sustainably serving the BOP. Specifically, they help describe and 
inform the strategy development process that occurs when firms decide to 
innovate “with the BOP”, or apply “next generation strategies” (London & Hart, 
2011). 
To the broad academic field of entrepreneurship studies, this dissertation 
provides a unified framework for examining how opportunities are constructed, 
as well as insights into two fundamental questions: 
 Who is the entrepreneur? 
 What conditions drive opportunity construction? 
 
By focusing on the internal workings of firms, this dissertation also contributes 
to our understanding of strategy process. Specifically, entrepreneurial 
sensemaking describes a unique form of strategy development which is not 
bottom-up (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985), nor middle-up-down (Nonaka, 1988), 
but a bottom-up meets top-down process. 
Lastly, this work provides insights into a specific innovation process. Bridging 
the ideas that radical innovation has to be incubated in isolation from 
pressures of existing, everyday businesses (Christensen, 2000), and that 
innovation occurs specifically through technology brokering and the bringing 
together of distinct “worlds” (Hargadon, 2003), entrepreneurial sensemaking 
shows a dynamic process whereby these two tendencies – to develop in 
isolation, and to create bridges between isolated groups – are negotiated in a 
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business innovation process. I conclude the section with some new questions 
this study has helped generate, and thoughts on avenues for future research. 
 
Strategies for the BOP 
The academic literature on the BOP is relatively recent. Despite the fact that 
some efforts at applying business principles to resolve social problems can 
trace their roots to the 1970‟s – such as the Grameen Bank – the term “BOP” 
was coined by Prahalad and Hart in 2002. Most of the subsequent research 
and publishing on BOP strategies and approaches – although central to many 
firms‟ and entrepreneurial ventures‟ practice – still remains at the periphery of 
mainstream management academia. The initial writings on the BOP were 
more aspirational than analytic or evaluative; the seminal article was titled 
“The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid” and strove to draw managers‟ 
attention to this demographic by portraying it as a vast untapped market. 
Prahalad‟s (2005) follow-up book touted the benefits multinational firms could 
bring to the BOP by: giving the poor dignity and choice by “converting” them 
into consumers, creating the capacity to consume, deskilling work, educating 
consumers, achieving new price-performance levels that are “value-oriented”, 
building governance capabilities among the poor, reducing corruption, and 
providing the poor with “identity” by enmeshing them in a firm‟s closed 
consumption system. 
Consequently, the early corporate efforts to serve the BOP were couched in 
top-down and economic terms. The main goal was to design and provide 
services and products to the needy that solved “problems” as defined by the 
corporations and their partners. This approach naturally leveraged managers‟ 
existent product and consumer-centric mindsets; the BOP was seen as a 
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coherent market to simply be tapped with new products, and people at the 
BOP were one-dimensionally conceptualized as consumers. London and Hart 
(2011) term this approach: “finding a fortune at the BOP”; in the introduction, I 
characterized it as “business for the BOP”. 
The initial corporate attempts to “crack the market” were for the most part 
unsuccessful economically, unable to scale quickly, or did not produce the 
desired poverty alleviation effects. Inadvertently, in their haste to apply 
“business thinking” to solving the world‟s problems, many firms simply 
exported to the BOP many of the downsides of a mercantile value system – a 
focus on material wellbeing and consumption, many times at the expense of 
community resilience and local knowledge. This trend came to a head with 
Karnani‟s (2007) critique of Unilever‟s marketing of “Fair & Lovely” skin 
whitening cream to Indian BOP consumers under the guise of providing a 
meaningful social benefit. At that point, the BOP movement was perceived by 
some to be at risk of simply becoming the next wave of corporate imperialism 
(Hart, 2010). 
The reaction to this initial wave of BOP ventures has been a call for “next 
generation” business strategies for the BOP (London & Hart, 2011). In 2004, 
London and Hart presciently proposed that “MNC managers and academics 
must move beyond the „imperialist mindset‟ that everyone must want to look 
and act like Westerners” and acknowledged that western firms‟ existing 
products, resources bases, mindsets, and capabilities might not be adequate 
for truly serving the BOP sustainably. Mirroring the term “business with the 
BOP” developed in the introduction, London and Hart (2011) call this proposed 
approach “business with four billion”. 
Some of the strategies that have been proposed for this next generation 
 193 
include actions such as: collaborate with nontraditional partners, build local 
capacity, co-invent custom solutions, create demand, avoid focusing on 
needs, orchestrate effective low-cost experiments, become indigenous, 
leverage existing local platforms, create mutual value, build social rather than 
legal contracts, and reinvent cost structures (London & Hart, 2004; Prahalad & 
Ramaswamy, 2004; Simanis, Hart & Duke, 2008; Hart, 2010; London, 2011; 
Simanis, 2011). 
This dissertation represents a major step forward in this stream. Most of the 
recommendations for next generation BOP strategies are derived from 
disparate cases that were documented and analyzed after-the-fact by third 
parties who did not experience the processes first hand. Some of the 
recommendations do not emerge from successful cases, but are 
counterfactuals deduced from perceived deficiencies and failures. This study 
builds on this base and extends it by being one of the first to follow in real time 
and at full depth some of the ventures attempting to deliberately implement 
these kinds of strategies8. 
One of its main findings is that firms need to immerse themselves in their 
target markets for a considerable period of time in order to be able to co-
invent, co-create with potential customers, gain locals‟ trust, become 
indigenous, build social contracts, etc. This kind of innovation process cannot 
be implemented effectively at a distance, in a top-down manner, or by hiring 
external specialists to do it; the firms have to deploy their own field teams to 
embed themselves in the target communities for extended periods of time. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
8
 See Simanis (2010), “The Anatomy of Market Creation: Insights from the Base of the 
Pyramid” for another example of a qualitative, in-depth study of the application of next 
generation BOP strategies. 
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The corollary to the deployment of immersion teams is the unique strategy 
development process – entrepreneurial sensemaking – that ensues. 
Entrepreneurial sensemaking ties the bundle of aspirational BOP strategies to 
the concepts of opportunity and of entrepreneurial processes – and to their 
underlying academic literature streams. Using the lens of opportunity 
discovery/construction enables us to make coherent sense of processes that 
on the surface appear to be chaotic and aimless. We can examine in detail 
what these next generation strategies entail and what really occurs when firms 
try to partner and co-invent with their future customers and supply chain 
partners. 
Other consequences of the immersive business development process are the 
integration and assimilation challenges the firm suffers as it attempts to 
nurture and incorporate the new venture it has created that is very different 
from itself. 
This dissertation shows that there is still a lot to learn about strategies for 
sustainably and meaningfully serving the BOP; and that existing corporations 
and western firms, with their existing mindsets and operational routines may 
not be optimally positioned to immediately implement them. Firms require 
time, resources, focus, and practice to develop this new capability; they 
require steadfast commitment to undergo and manage an entrepreneurial 
sensemaking process that helps adapt their vision to the market, and the 
market to their presence. Furthermore, this study suggests that many of the 
components of this new required capability are closely related to the 
processes that are usually associated with de novo startups. Consequently, 
managers looking to implement BOP strategies for their firms would be wise to 
first look at the capabilities and flexibility required for successfully supporting 
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startup ventures. 
The BOP strategies literature, while originating from core strategy canons and 
assumptions, has struggled to find a theoretic home. It has been couched in 
terms of international business (London & Hart, 2004), capability development 
(Hart & London, 2005; London, 2005), welfare economics (Karnani, 2007) and 
design thinking (Whitney, 2011). This is the first time that BOP strategies have 
been examined in terms of entrepreneurship theories – especially ones 
focused on open-ended processes. It turns out that this theoretical lens 
surfaces a great deal of insights and understanding – particularly at the 
granular level – that higher-level strategy theories are unable to provide. 
Conversely, the examination of BOP strategies with an opportunity 
construction lens enriches extant entrepreneurship theories. These 
contributions are discussed in the following section. 
 
Entrepreneurship 
The entrepreneurial sensemaking theory and the opportunity construction 
framework draw heavily from some subfields of the entrepreneurship domain, 
especially those dealing with open-ended processes. The elaboration of these 
elements and their fresh recombination with other constructs leads to a 
number of insights and contributions relevant to the field of entrepreneurship. I 
discuss below three areas of entrepreneurship to which I contribute: (1) 
entrepreneurship as a collective endeavor, (2) the elements of opportunity 
construction, and (3) the contextual elements that favor the enactment of 
opportunity construction logics. 
 196 
Entrepreneurship as collective action 
As discussed in the Theory Development Chapter‟s section on the locus of 
action, and in the Discussion Chapter‟s section on shared decision-making, 
this dissertation highlights the collective nature of entrepreneurial action and 
demonstrates how theorizing around a “solo entrepreneur” (Ruef, 2010) can 
lead to a misrepresentation of the actual entrepreneurial processes. 
In one of the most comprehensive examinations of entrepreneurship as a 
collective activity, Ruef (2010) uses a “relational demographics” lens to 
explore organizational foundings. He looks at demographical characteristics of 
individuals participating in launching a business – such as their age, gender, 
tie strength, and occupation, as well as the network constraints these 
attributes engender – to explain how the “average” organization in the US 
actually comes into being. Ruef distinguishes the roles of different members of 
these entrepreneurial groups by dichotomizing them along two dimensions: (1) 
having a significant financial stake in the venture and (2) being a regular 
contributor to the organization (see Figure 14). In this sociological portrayal of 
entrepreneurial efforts, it is the owner-managers – those that invest significant 
time in the business and have a significant ownership stake – that are typically 
considered the founders, or the focal entrepreneurs. In two thirds of the cases 
in Ruef‟s broad sample, there is a single founder, in a quarter of the occasions 
the founding team is a dyad (typically a husband-wife team), and in less than 
4% of the cases are organizations started by a team of three owner-managers 
(Ruef, 2010). The rest of the members of the entrepreneurial group are 
described as the “startup assistance network”, and much of Ruef‟s research is 
focused on how the focal entrepreneurs access, control and leverage the 
members of this network. 
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Figure 14 – Typology of entrepreneurial group members, adapted from Xu & 
Ruef, 2007. 
 
So even in Ruef‟s much broader conceptualization of entrepreneurship, there 
remains the implication of a focal entrepreneur – or at most a three-person 
founding team with equity stakes. Coming from a sociological perspective, 
Ruef strives to explain the majority of all business foundings (in the US). In 
fact, one of the criticisms sociologists level at the “business management 
perspective” on entrepreneurship is that its scholars focus too much on a very 
small subset of organizational types or founding processes (i.e. high 
capitalization industries or high-growth firms) and that they often suffer from 
survivorship bias since they tend to study only successful startup processes 
(Aldrich & Martinez, 2001; Ruef 2010). 
The present study was not designed to elucidate the “average” start-up 
process, but neither does it look at the same subset of industries and firm 
types that business management scholars typically study. It does not suffer 
from survivorship bias, “sampling in the dependent variable”, or “unobserved 
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heterogeneity” since it analyses cases from their very inception. It purposefully 
examines a particular kind of start-up process, one in which organizations – 
rather than individuals – decide to launch new ventures, and do so in new 
market space. 
These conditions have serious implications for the start-up process. First of all, 
we see that the entrepreneurial group does not form and evolve the same way 
Ruef‟s archetypal entrepreneurial groups do. In the Ruefian start-up process, 
the focal entrepreneur may partner with his wife or an old friend, borrow some 
money from an uncle, hire his neighbor‟s kid, and get advice from his old boss. 
The proto-organization then consists of himself, his partner and their 
employee. 
In this study‟s cases, most of the actors involved do not hold an explicit equity 
stake in the business at the outset. In fact, what the ownership structure will 
eventually look like is extremely uncertain at the start. Given the mandate to 
create a novel business, the immersion or field team not only has to create a 
new organization, it also has to simultaneously build the social and cognitive 
legitimacy the new offering will require in order to be adopted. Thus, the field 
team also has to develop the necessary supporting social structures and 
institutional arrangements; this process is more like nurturing the emergence 
of an ecosystem, rather than midwifing the birth of a single organism. In this 
process, it becomes unclear who is the focal “entrepreneur” and who belongs 
to the “start-up assistance network”. A successful effort will likely result in the 
formation of several organizations, and their ownership structure may be 
complicated and in great flux. 
In the SCJ case, the field team‟s efforts – the team itself did not have a single 
leader throughout – initially led to the creation of two quasi-organizations: CYE 
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and CCS. The resulting core of this ecosystem had individuals with different 
organizational origins and identities – from SCJ, the different youth groups, 
CFK – all contributing significantly to the business, yet none of them with any 
formal equity rights. No one was the clear owner of the business, but all 
participated significantly and certainly felt some degree of ownership of the 
venture. This emergent ecosystem evolved further, ending with the 
SCJ>master franchisee>franchises system. Yet even in this final configuration, 
it was not entirely clear who the “owner-manager” was and who belonged to 
the “start-up assistance network”. Most of the central actors were in some way 
entrepreneurs: the SCJ manager was in charge of nurturing a whole new 
business for SCJ, the master franchisee now formally owned the CCS brand, 
and the franchisees owned their own individual yet affiliated businesses. 
To conclude, in these conditions – when firms attempt to build new-to-the-
world businesses – it is not clear who the “entrepreneur” is and who belongs to 
the start-up assistance network. The entrepreneurial function – to construct or 
to discover and exploit opportunities – is distributed across a diverse array of 
individuals and organizations. If there is a “master entrepreneur” it may not be 
the individual or individuals with residual ownership rights, or even the people 
contributing the most time to organizational activities, but the person or 
persons who ensure that the emergent collection of disparate entrepreneurs 
does not disband; the gardener who tends this entrepreneurial garden; the 
actor who nurtures and guides the evolution of the entire ecosystem. Yet even 
this “master” or “facilitating” entrepreneurial function can be distributed across 
people. In the SCJ case, at least the following actors played this role to some 
degree: Erik, Duncan, Justin, Joseph. 
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Framework for examining opportunity construction 
The synthetic framework for opportunity construction processes is a 
substantive contribution to the entrepreneurship literature in its own right, as 
Alvarez and Barney (2007) state: “(opportunity) creation theory has yet to be 
articulated as a single coherent theory in the literature”. 
By bringing together elements from improvisation, bricolage, effectuation, 
reflective practice, interpretive processes, and organizational knowledge 
creation, the synthetic framework provides a single composite tool for 
examining any opportunity construction process. As discussed previously, 
each of the parent theories has been developed to explain a particular 
phenomenon – for example improvisation looks at instances in which planning 
and execution converge in time. The synthetic framework can be used to 
examine the unique structure and sequence of any opportunity construction 
process; it is not constrained to the particular kinds of phenomena for which 
each of its ancestral theories was formulated. 
Furthermore, the synthetic framework goes beyond simply integrating the 
elements that the underlying theories have in common, it expands on them in 
order to become applicable to a broader universe of processes while still 
capturing the essentials that distinguish opportunity creation from discovery. 
Two features of the framework stand out. Firstly, it allows for the examination 
of processes in which agency is distributed across actors. Theories such as 
bricolage, effectuation and reflective practice imply or require a focal 
opportunity constructor to drive the process. On the other hand, the theories 
on interpretive process and organization knowledge creation presuppose and 
necessitate the existence of collectives. The synthetic framework can be 
applied to a single driver of the process or to multiple drivers; it can even be 
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applied to multiple drivers of the same process as if each were its single 
motivator. 
Secondly, the framework is agnostic regarding the open-endedness of the 
process and does not place upper bounds on its potential for creating novelty. 
Some of the precursor theories, such as disjointed incrementalism severely 
curtail the novelty of the outcome while others such as bricolage imply upper 
limits on the novelty and value of the effects. 
 
Conditions that promote opportunity construction 
As mentioned in the previous section, there doesn‟t exist a coherent theory of 
opportunity construction in the management literature, it is dispersed across 
different sub-streams. Thus, it is not well understood when entrepreneurial 
action is likely to adopt this outlook and when it is prone to rely on an 
opportunity discovery one. Most of the theories I draw upon implicitly assume 
that the capacity to construct opportunities belongs to the entrepreneur; 
Sarasvathy‟s “seasoned entrepreneurs” (Sarasvathy, Simon, & Lave, 1998; 
Sarasvathy, 2005) have developed a rationality for “effectual reasoning”; 
Baker and Nelson‟s (2005) bricoleur accumulates “odds and ends” on the 
principle that “they may always come in handy”. These theories implicitly 
assume that opportunity construction occurs because the focal actor 
consciously decides to engage in it or is habituated to do so because she has 
already done it before and developed the requisite skills (Alvarez & Barney, 
2007). The bricoleur cannot help being a pack rat, and the expert entrepreneur 
cannot easily disencumber himself of his experience. 
 This study shows that environmental and situational factors can and do drive 
opportunity construction behavior, even if the focal actor or entrepreneurial 
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team has not previously developed the talent or outlook for doing so. The main 
factors introduced in the Discussion Chapter that induce this mindset are: 
unclear organizational boundaries, multiple goals, and shared decision 
making. Deploying a field team to immerse itself in a community to develop a 
novel business engenders all three factors, and consequently activates the 
enactment of an opportunity construction mentality. 
These conclusions can be readily tested and refined by surveying other 
entrepreneurial efforts where these conditions hold. Lester and Piore‟s (2004) 
examples of the interpretive process flourishing when different firms or 
organizational units work together to mesh technologies clearly demonstrates 
instances in which organizational boundaries dissolve and decision making 
becomes a shared activity. Such joint ventures are prime settings to confirm to 
what degree these factors engender opportunity construction behaviors. 
 
Strategy process 
In the Discussion Chapter I touch upon the distinction between intended and 
realized strategies (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985). The tension between these 
closely mirrors that between strategy formulation and implementation, and the 
debate about whether structure follows strategy or strategy follows structure 
(Chandler, 1962; Bower, 1974; Galbraith & Nathanson, 1978). 
The more conventional strategy-implementation conceptual division in 
strategic management scholarship steers most attention towards a top-down 
approach to strategy formation. In Hart‟s (1992) strategy making typology 
presented in the Discussion Chapter, this approach fits the command or 
rational style of strategy making. Hambrick and Mason‟s (1984) “upper 
echelons” or top management teams are the “inner circle of executives who 
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collectively formulate, articulate, and execute the strategic and tactical moves 
of the organization” (Raes et al., 2011). Consequently, if middle managers‟ 
role is to sell issues to top managers (Dutton & Ashford, 1993), serve as 
“linking pins” (Raes et al., 2011), and generally ensure that top managements‟ 
wishes get executed, then lowly field teams are usually thought of as simple 
instruments with little effect on the strategy making process – at best, they 
play a role in the organization‟s environmental scanning (Hambrick, 1982). 
The “strategy process” stream of scholarship that emerged from the seminal 
field research conducted by Mintzberg, Bower, and others calls into question 
the assertion that strategy formulation comes first, followed by implementation 
or structure. This stream of research tends to emphasize the chaotic, bottom-
up emergence of strategy, more a result of insights gained at the operational 
level (Campbell & Alexander, 1997) and autonomous strategic activities 
carried out by front-line managers and subordinates (Burgelman, 1983b) that 
subsequently get baked in to the realized strategy. This view of strategy 
making often leads to attempts to resolve the distinction between the strategy 
itself (where to go) and the process of developing it (how to get there) and is 
captured by aphorisms such as “strategy is the organization” (Eisenhardt, 
2003) and “strategy is destiny” (Burgelman, 2001). 
There are different models of bottom-up strategy formation; two of the most 
notable ones were developed by Bower (1970) and Burgelman (1983c). In 
these models, it is primarily the sponsoring activities of divisional level 
managers that determine which strategic projects proposed by their 
subordinates are pursued. The success or failure of these projects then 
determines the firms‟ resulting strategies. Corporate or top level managers can 
affect the general direction and nature of the emerging strategies by 
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establishing the culture and constraints under which the divisional level 
managers make choices about which projects to endorse (Burgelman, 1983c; 
Burgelman, 2001). 
These models emerge from field studies of internal corporate ventures of 
“diversified major firms”, agglomerations of widely diversified but partially 
related businesses grouped into major divisions. In these firms, most 
corporate ventures are spawned from within, relying on the firm‟s existing 
capabilities and resources; the subordinates propose strategic projects based 
on available physical plant capacity, opportunities or discontinuities they 
perceive in their immediate markets, or new technologies they are developing 
(Burgelman, 1983a; Burgelman & Sayles, 1986). 
Nonaka (1988) provides an alternate model of strategy development he calls 
compressive or middle-up-down management. In this model, abstracted from 
Japanese corporations, it is middle managers who take the lead in strategy 
development. They are tasked with creating and implementing concrete 
concepts to solve or transcend the contradictions that arise from the gap 
between top management‟s context-free vision and what firm members on the 
“shop floor” experience, which is context-specific. In Nonaka‟s Honda 
example, this management style is deliberately chosen by senior management 
to create ambiguity and foster innovation. Top managers are intentionally 
vague, couch visions in equivocal terms, and provide virtually no task 
direction. Middle managers then have to transform top management‟s general 
vision into directions for the team‟s activities and manage the ensuing chaos – 
or at least keep it within tolerable limits. Ultimately, in compressive 
management it is middle managers who are in charge of unifying individual 
visions into a single larger vision; strategy does not bubble up from the bottom, 
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it emanates from the middle. 
Entrepreneurial sensemaking extends theorizing on the strategy process by 
presenting a fourth model of strategy process which is not top-down, bottom-
up, or middle-up-down, but is instead bottom-up meets top-down. In Hart‟s 
(1992) framework of strategy-making processes, this would equate to a 
command or rational mode of strategy making encountering an emergent 
mode. In entrepreneurial sensemaking we have a deliberate top-down effort 
by senior managers to set objectives, a plan, and a set of constraints around 
which a new venture is to be launched. At the same time, senior managers 
empower a hierarchically low-level field team to ideate a new business in a far-
off location that is difficult to monitor, thus deliberately or inadvertently seeding 
a bottom-up strategy development process. The crux of entrepreneurial 
sensemaking is the creative clash that then results between the opportunity 
construction mindset developed by the field team and the opportunity 
discovery approach enacted by top managers. Strategy emerges from the 
intense negotiation that ensues. 
As in compressive management, strategy in entrepreneurial sensemaking 
could be said to come from the middle. But contrary to Nonaka‟s model, 
strategy is not generated by middle managers who are simply provided a 
context-free vision, no task direction, and a multidisciplinary team. In 
entrepreneurial sensemaking, strategy emerges from the dialectic interaction 
between top and bottom; from the efforts to make two worldviews and logics of 
action compatible. Middle managers do play a crucial role in entrepreneurial 
sensemaking, but rather than being the torch-bearers, they become the 
fulcrum that determines whether the process can emerge despite the natural 
pressures to revert to a top-down strategy development process. 
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As the entrepreneurial sensemaking process evolved in SCJ and ACB, it 
became apparent that the “middle managers” – or actors who had one foot in 
the field team and another in upper management (e.g. Erik, Justin, and Daniel) 
– played a crucial role in facilitating, driving, or obstructing the process. When 
they acted as mere conduits for top managements‟ decisions, or on the 
contrary, just focused on selling field team issues to their superiors, the overall 
sensemaking and learning process faltered. When top managers bypassed 
them and dealt directly with the field team members, the field teams inevitably 
devolved to an order-following mode and abdicated ownership of the process; 
they did as they were instructed. When the middle managers managed to 
balance the pressures or resolve the differences emerging from the 
opportunity construction logic prevalent in the field and the opportunity 
discovery logic in the upper echelons, they hastened the development of the 
synthetic logic. 
The dynamics of entrepreneurial sensemaking are not necessarily the result of 
a choice of managerial philosophy – as in compressive management, where 
top managers consciously decide to let middle managers take the lead – but 
can emerge due to the conditions of the situation. When teams are 
sequestered in the field and tasked with developing a novel business while top 
management remains at home, in a “developed” environment, the two distinct 
logics of action are likely to arise and set up the bottom-up meets top-down 
encounter – entrepreneurial sensemaking‟s engine. When entrepreneurial 
sensemaking does occur, it is not painless or perforce lead to a successful 
outcome. As Campbell and Alexander (1997) remind us, strategy development 
is hard; it is a “puzzle that frequently doesn‟t get solved”. 
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Innovation 
The academic field of innovation is enormous and multivariate, this 
dissertation sheds light on a small but important corner of it. To start, a critical 
distinction to make is between invention – the creation of something new with 
potential for generating significant benefits – and innovation, defined here as 
the widespread adoption of an invention. In Hargadon‟s (2003) words, 
“Successful innovations are just those deviations that survived adolescence.” 
To use an example, Apple‟s development and marketing of its first IPod –
revolutionary as it was with its fresh design and novel Click Wheel interface – 
would be considered an invention. The IPod became a major innovation a few 
years later, once it was a top-selling MP3 player. 
Under this definition, innovations cannot really be determined ex ante, only ex 
post; and significant ones usually take several years, if not decades, to reach 
fruition. It took decades for foundational technologies such as the light bulb, 
the electric motor, the gas-powered car, and the steam engine to move from 
invention to widespread adoption (Mokyr, 1992). The same goes for social or 
organizational innovations such as microfinance, micro brewing, and specialty 
coffee (Yunus, 1999; Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000; Rindova & Fombrun, 
2001). 
This distinction between invention and innovation serves to highlight the 
different elements that underlie the innovation process. Firstly, most invention 
and innovation is usually centered on technology. And technology, even 
though it is sometimes assumed to be a practice, is often centered on an 
object or a method that harnesses a natural phenomenon for some purpose 
(see Arthur, 2009 for a detailed discussion of the nature of technology). Thus, 
most innovation literature revolves around the evolutionary discontinuities (or 
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disruptions) of distinct product lines, such as minicomputers and airplanes 
(Tushman & Anderson, 1986). Gort and Klepper (1982), for example, 
document innovations in 46 different product categories in a single study. 
As Hargadon (2003) and many others points out, a focus on the objects of a 
technology – the hardware and software, or the nuts and bolts – can draw 
attention away from the broader system that enables an invention to diffuse 
and be adopted, and instead tends to exalt the “lone genius” or promote the 
“cult of the great inventor”. This perspective on innovation is captured by the 
misquotation attributed to Ralph Waldo Emerson, “build a better mousetrap, 
and the world will beat a path to your door.” In this view, Thomas Edison 
singlehandedly invented the light bulb and Henry Ford was solely responsible 
for creating and implementing the assembly line. 
A broader perspective on technology – such as Hargadon‟s (2003) networked 
one in which technology is defined as the relationship between people, ideas, 
and objects –allows us to better examine the processes that underlie 
innovation rather than only invention. In the IPod example, key elements of the 
innovation process occurred years after the original device had been designed 
and put on the market; its success as an innovation was in no small measure 
due to the subsequent development of the ITunes store and the porting over 
of the IPod/ITunes software to the PC environment. 
Again, Hargadon‟s (2003) network-centric perspective on innovation helps us 
better understand the pre and post-invention processes that help drive 
adoption. In his view, it is the networks and communities that crystallize 
around an invention, and change the way people think about what they are 
doing, that over time lead to a major innovation. Hargadon argues that 
successful innovators are those that are able to form bridges to the old 
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networks of distant worlds and gain access to their established resources for 
use in a new arena; he calls this “technology brokering” (Hargadon & Sutton, 
1997). 
In technology brokering, invention takes a backseat to effective networking. It 
is not simply about designing a better mousetrap; it is about convincing others 
to join in the new venture – as investors, suppliers, employees, retailers, 
customers, and even competitors – especially those whose mature knowledge 
from a totally different industry may prove useful and quickly applicable in the 
new setting. 
Technology brokering is very sympathetic to entrepreneurial sensemaking, but 
is at odds with another major perspective on innovation – Christensen‟s (2000) 
theory of disruptive innovation, popularized in the book “The Innovator‟s 
Dilemma”. According to Christensen, established networks – mainly one‟s 
current set of customers – are actually an impediment to disruptive innovation 
because they trap firms in their current “technology trajectories”. Established 
networks penalize firms for exploring options outside these trajectories 
because the alternatives‟ initially offer dismal price-performance ratios for the 
currently prized attributes. 
The main point here is that in Christensen‟s view, old networks hinder 
innovation, while in Hargadon‟s view, bridging to old networks is necessary in 
order to incorporate ready-made technologies into the invention and thus 
facilitate adoption. 
Entrepreneurial sensemaking bridges these two perspectives on innovation. 
First of all, innovation in sensemaking is even more agnostic towards objects 
than it is in disruptive innovation or technology brokering. Since the focus is on 
creating a new-to-the-world business, there may or may not be a need to 
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invent a new product. Many innovative businesses are simply the 
recombination of already existing elements; the emergence of microfinance as 
an institution did not require the design of any physical object. 
In entrepreneurial sensemaking, as discussed in the Theory Development 
Chapter‟s section on opportunity construction, we do see the creation of new 
networks densely populated with strong ties, especially at the sites where the 
field teams operate. These new networks serve Hargadon‟s conditions for 
innovation, namely: “a small group of individuals committed to a common goal” 
that provides “the collective support necessary to risk going against the 
established ways of doing things” (Hargadon, 2003). These new networks also 
serve to broker technology on a local scale. But in contrast to Hargadon‟s 
view, where the technological elements these networks provide are mostly 
around objects and knowhow, in entrepreneurial sensemaking they can be 
about business model components or market-related behaviors. 
To illustrate, Hargadon (2003) uses the example of how the firm Design 
Continuum created the Reebok Pump sneaker by importing concepts and 
expertise it had developed while working for hospital and diagnostic equipment 
manufacturers. Not only did the ideas for using little pumps, tubing, and valves 
emerge from this previous experience, Design Continuum was able to 
convince an IV bag manufacturer to become Reebok‟s supplier of air bladders 
for the new shoe. In the ACB case, the field team was able to borrow and 
adapt elements from a wide range of businesses that already operated 
successfully in the Madeiran BOP. ACB‟s proprietary peer-based distribution 
channel drew inspiration from localized direct sales businesses; its payment 
system piggybacked on the network of existing corner stores. 
The new networks formed at the BOP by ACB and SCJ also served as 
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Christensen‟s (2000) “small markets” and “fringe clients” – those that find 
value in attributes that mainstream clients do not currently care about. Thus, 
SCJ found that its general purpose cleaner and other products could be sold in 
bulk format – without their container-integrated specialized dispensation 
mechanisms. 
But in entrepreneurial sensemaking, the firms weren‟t tied to only using 
Christensen‟s small and isolated networks for innovating or to only bridging 
Hargadon‟s distant worlds, the process allowed them to engage in both 
processes simultaneously. The upper echelons of ACB and SCJ did not 
abandon their existing networks in order to innovate only with the “BOP fringe 
clients”; they continued their normal activities and maintained their “old” 
relationships. They brokered technologies from their existing networks to the 
nascent communities of practice their field teams were cultivating at the BOP. 
In ACB‟s case, for example, core technology development was initiated in 
Chicago and Boston in conjunction with “old network” partners and later 
shifted for refinement and localization to the Madeira site; ready-set Chinese 
suppliers were used initially for ACB‟s technology platform, but production 
slowly shifted to Tierra Santa as the local network there grew and adapted to 
ACB‟s requirements. 
In conclusion, entrepreneurial sensemaking serves as a bridge between two 
apparently contradictory perspectives on innovation – that new worlds are built 
from the pieces of old ones; and that innovators have to start fresh in order to 
free themselves from the constraints of established ways of doing things. 
Opportunity construction and opportunity discovery – the mindsets that 
entrepreneurial sensemaking transforms into a single synthetic logic – are 
each naturally inclined towards one of the aforementioned perspectives on 
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innovation. Field teams naturally create networks centered on the new 
performance attributes of the emergent venture, Christensen‟s “small 
markets”; senior management relies on its existing “old” networks to bring 
relevant resources and knowhow to bear on the issue, Hargadon‟s “technology 
brokering”. As the field teams and senior managers jointly make 
entrepreneurial sense of their effort, they also merge these two innovation 
processes. 
 
Implications for research 
This dissertation shines a light on promising areas for future research, as well 
as some gaps in the management literature. I discuss some of these avenues 
and literature gaps below. 
 
Ethnographical research of the entrepreneurial process 
As others have noted (Gartner, 1989), ethnographical studies based on direct 
observation of the entrepreneurial process are scarce. The reasons for this 
scarcity include: (1) ethnographical research is a high-risk proposition for 
management scholars; (2) first-hand observation and participation requires an 
outsize commitment on the part of the researcher, as well as a supple support 
system; (3) opportunities for observing and participating at the right moment 
are difficult to discern beforehand – once a researcher identifies an 
entrepreneur or organization to work with, many of the entrepreneurial 
processes of interest have already occurred; and (4) it‟s hard to gain intimate 
access to these processes, entrepreneurs in action don‟t usually have the 
time, energy, and willingness to drag an observer around for months on end 
and provide access to every meeting, e-mail, phone call, and conversation. 
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Furthermore, most organizational ethnographers study stable organizational 
environments – their search for patterns and deep structure draws them to 
these kinds of settings. But observing open-ended processes requires an even 
greater level of immersion and appreciation of the emic perspective. This 
dissertation is one attempt in this vein, but it clearly shows that there is room 
for many more similar studies. 
 
Research on field teams 
Despite the huge literature on multidisciplinary and product development 
teams, a review of the management literature shows surprisingly little of 
research on field teams; and almost nothing on field teams specifically tasked 
with creating new businesses. This is not about a “much-needed gap in the 
literature.” As this study demonstrates, the processes that business-creating 
field teams and their managers undergo are of theoretical and practical 
interest. 
One of the reasons that field teams have not received much attention from 
management scholars is because of how we think of them and what purposes 
they usually serve. What literature there is on field teams generally treats them 
as organizational tools used to carry out very specific and delimited tasks. 
Thus, multilateral institutions deploy field teams to developing countries to 
apply pre-designed surveys and collect baseline economic data, medical 
organizations send field teams to treat patients at their homes or villages, and 
firms send field teams out to deal with specific technical issues their customers 
have which need to be dealt with onsite. The mental image many of us have of 
a field team member is the technician sent to fix our cable or internet 
connection. We often view field team members as people of low organizational 
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rank, provided with specific instructions, clear targets, and severely limited in 
their scope of activity. 
This dissertation shows that – in the case of field teams deployed to create 
new businesses – this conceptualization may be faulty, and at times has lead 
us to overlook significant processes that influence strategy formation. 
There are many unanswered questions around field teams, especially those 
tasked with activities that can have strategic impact. How common are these 
teams? How often do firms deploy field teams to develop new businesses in 
far off locations? The Cemex and Honda examples presented in the 
introduction suggest that the phenomenon is not too rare, nor necessarily 
constrained to firms who are looking to “do well and do good”. Immelt et al. 
(2009) describe how GE evolved its “local growth team” (LGT) model. LGTs 
mirror the kind of field teams described in this study in important ways, not 
least because they develop new offerings for local markets and directly affect 
GE‟s strategic scope. LGTs are based on the following principles: 
 Shift power to where the growth is. 
 Build new offerings from the ground up. 
 Build LGTs from the ground up, like new companies. 
 Customize objectives, targets, and metrics. 
 Have the LGT report to someone high in the organization. 
 
Despite these examples, we do not know how widespread these kinds of 
teams are; how they vary among firms, industries, and contexts; nor how they 
are usually put together, trained, or managed. 
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Boundary conditions for the opportunity construction framework 
The main deficiency of the theories I used to build the opportunity construction 
framework (e.g. improvisation, bricolage, etc.) is that most of them cannot be 
used on their own as a lens for examining opportunity construction; they do 
not provide a wide enough view of the process of business creation. For 
example, examining to what extent planning and execution converge in time – 
improvisation – is not sufficient for convincingly explaining how an 
entrepreneurial process unfolded or why it did so in a particular manner. 
The synthetic framework does prove sufficient for examining the SCJ and ACB 
cases, but it could still use more development to better determine when it is 
applicable and when it is not. Does it help to explain and understand other 
open-ended processes? Would the addition of another element greatly 
improve its explanatory and sensemaking powers? Under what conditions 
does it not provide any value? 
 
Entrepreneurial sensemaking 
The main contribution of this dissertation – entrepreneurial sensemaking – is a 
new theory, one that emerged from grounded theory building and a particular 
set of circumstances. As such, it begs to be tested, refined, and expanded. For 
example, how important was each of the factors that were seen to promote 
opportunity construction (unclear organizational boundaries, shared decision 
making, and conflicting goals)? Is one factor more important than the others? 
Are they fungible? Do all have to obtain in order to promote opportunity 
construction? May there be other factors, in different contexts, that also 
promote opportunity construction? 
Entrepreneurial sensemaking emerged from a pretty extreme context. Teams 
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living at the BOP are about as far away culturally, psychologically, and 
emotionally as it is possible to get from the executive suite. To what extent 
does the process occur when there isn‟t such a drastic difference between the 
contexts of senior management and the field teams? In other words, how 
distinct to the top and bottom environments have to be in order to drive each 
of the logics? 
Other key issues that could affect the process include the nature of the field 
team‟s task – in this case to create a novel business that also provides social 
or environmental benefits – and the team‟s level of autonomy or isolation. How 
ambiguous and difficult must the field team‟s task be? How much leeway and 
decision-making responsibility has to reside in the field team in order for it to 
not simply fall back on simply following orders and abdicating its own 
initiative? 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE 
A substantial body of evidence suggests that managers and executives do not 
use academic research as a basis for their strategy making (Abrahamson, 
1996) and that there is a wide gap between organizational research and 
managerial practice (Rynes, Bartunek, & Daft, 2001). Academics blame this 
research-practice gap on profound differences between academics‟ and 
practitioners‟ basic assumptions, beliefs, frames of reference, and ways of 
understanding what is “true” (Shrivastava & Mitroff, 1984). The gap is also 
blamed on a knowledge transfer problem – the inability to translate research 
findings into ideas and practices that are meaningful to managers (Van de Ven 
& Johnson, 2006b) and that are also sufficiently timely and specific. Some 
academics even argue that academic research findings should not be 
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“dumbed down” for managers (McKelvey, 2006). 
Contrary to this feeling and to the much discussed research-practice gap – 
due to the combination of its driving research question, research methods, and 
sample – this dissertation does provide actionable insights for managers. 
While the study generates learnings for general entrepreneurship, innovation, 
and strategy-making processes, I will focus on the takeaways related to BOP-
focused ventures. These fall into two main buckets: (1) implications and 
suggestions for corporate actors who are interested in the BOP or using 
“business thinking to solve the world‟s problems” and wanting to learn more 
about the field before making a decision whether to pursue a BOP strategy, 
and (2) learnings and advice for professionals already committed to building 
businesses with the BOP or perhaps already engaged in such ventures. 
 
Should we innovate with the BOP? 
For the reader that is learning about the BOP movement and evaluating it as 
an option for action, the first takeaway from this study is that one should 
carefully consider what kind of approach to the BOP – business for, by or with 
– best fits the firm‟s intent, capabilities, resource base, and most importantly, 
it‟s outlook and philosophy. This section charts some of the main 
considerations, challenges, and pitfalls to consider when pondering a 
“business with the BOP” course of action. 
The first conclusion of this dissertation in this regard is that in order to 
effectively work with the BOP, a firm or an entrepreneurial team has to 
undergo a period of immersion and relationship-building in the target 
community. In most cases, this involves deploying a field team, or possibly 
creating a local subsidiary. A series of trips to recruit already established 
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businesses or NGOs to serve as local partners does not really fall into the 
“business with the BOP” category. The deployment of a field team with the 
express goal of creating a business with the BOP sets up the conditions for an 
entrepreneurial sensemaking process. 
The main question for the would-be corporate innovator is whether the firm is 
sufficiently prepared to house and nurture this kind of open-ended process. 
Entrepreneurial sensemaking will lead to the questioning of the firm‟s strategic 
nature and sense of “who we are” and “what we do” (Navis & Glynn, 2011) 
and attempts to modify, amplify and expand it. In ACB‟s case, the 
entrepreneurial sensemaking process encouraged firm members to change 
their view of the company as a designer and provider of point-of-use 
technological solutions to the Vitamin/Virus/Parasite problems at the BOP to 
one of being an “enabler of healthy living habits”. In SCJ‟s case, the process 
challenged participants‟ perception of the firm as a producer and marketer of 
fast-moving packaged consumer goods driven by the strength of its individual 
brands. To succeed at the BOP, SCJ switched to offering bundled services, 
developed an entirely separate value chain, and reached out to customers in 
different, much more direct ways – SCJ became a franchiser of service 
providers. 
These experiments in rethinking a firm‟s purpose and strategic nature may not 
necessarily lead to a successful synthetic logic or a strategic renewal. In 
Cemex‟s case, Patrimonio Hoy was eventually disbanded – despite the fact 
that it was profitable and growing – because Cemex‟s senior managers were 
ultimately unable to expand the firm‟s strategic scope to include a business 
that was so different (Segel, Chu & Herrero, 2006). The same ultimate 
conundrum still holds for ACB and SCJ; as of the writing of this, neither firm 
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has concluded the entrepreneurial sensemaking process or reached a stable, 
new strategic direction in their BOP efforts. 
So, to reiterate, the main question for would-be entrepreneurial sensemakers 
is whether they and their firms have the sufficient initial flexibility, patience, 
resources, and maturity to manage such a process. To achieve a new and 
stable synthetic logic, there will have to be organizational and personal 
transformation. 
 
Time frame 
Field team immersions that have a reasonable chance of spawning a 
successful business – such as CEMEX‟s, Honda‟s, ACB‟s, and SCJ‟s – rarely 
take less than eighteen months to generate a business concept, initial market 
demand, and some compelling proof of viability . As I described in the 
Introduction, it took Yunus several years to arrive at the general idea of 
providing credit to the poor, and then many more to develop and refine the 
business that would come to be known as peer-based lending or microfinance. 
In a more contemporary case, it took Dr. Tralance Addy, the founder of 
WaterHealth more than six years of experimentation, six million dollars in 
investment, and a bankruptcy to generate a convincing BOP business model 
centered on the village-scale, UV-based water purification technology he had 
licensed. The revamped business model enabled WaterHealth to raise 
additional capital. It then took the firm seven more years to reach an installed 
base of six hundred WaterHealthCenters (Faheem & Purkayastha, 2010). 
Overall, examples of innovative BOP business models that take years or 
decades to gestate vastly outnumber the cases of quick success – and the 
number of failures exceeds the number of successes by orders of magnitude. 
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But despite the knowledge that in real life businesses usually take more than 
five years to develop, most firms cannot commit to five-year open-ended 
venture launch plans. Fortunately, an understanding of the entrepreneurial 
sensemaking process may enable firms to reasonably expect to develop the 
core of a viable BOP business with proof of demand in eighteen to twenty-four 
months. The main reason this period cannot be shortened is the rate at which 
trust-building and social legitimation occur, but a preparation for effective 
sensemaking can help reduce the amount of additional time misspent on 
experiments, tests, product development, and abortive business launches that 
will definitely not encounter demand. A well-managed sensemaking process 
can help avoid the blind stabs in the dark resulting from pure opportunity 
discovery and the aimless meandering that can result from unadulterated 
opportunity construction. 
 
Resources 
An immersive sensemaking process does not need to be hugely expensive. In 
fact, the direct costs of sustaining a 4-8 person field team for two years might 
be negligible in terms of a corporation‟s R&D budget, but for smaller firms, 
individuals, or mid-size corporate units with more modest budgets, committing 
to a two-year open-ended project with nebulously defined deliverables might 
be hard. It may also inadvertently lead to an oppressive, top-down approach 
that short-circuits the entrepreneurial process from the start. If a manager 
applies fifty percent of his discretionary R&D budget to a single project, he‟ll 
likely get evaluated on it and feel the need to show clear goals and consistent 
progress towards them. A very strong opportunity discovery mindset at the top 
right at the start of the effort may set the stage in a way that hinders the field 
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team from developing an opportunity construction logic of action; the project 
then becomes a simple top-down implementation exercise with a high 
likelihood of failing once the “product” is launched, sales fail to materialize, and 
it‟s determined that there is “no demand there.” 
Entrepreneurial sensemaking improves when the adequate physical, 
organizational, human capital, and political resources are set aside for the 
process from the start and are made available upon demonstrated progress 
along learning and development dimensions rather than traditional business 
evaluation metrics. 
 
Pitfalls 
It should be noted that most BOP-focused ventures are usually not provided 
the full suite of required support: patience, resources, and flexibility. As 
mentioned, even though we know that most start-up and corporate ventures 
fail, and that those corporate ventures that do succeed take on average eight 
to ten years to reach maturity, BOP-focused ventures – which arguably have 
even worse odds of survival given their additional constraints – are often 
expected to produce fundamental innovations that: 
 Are perfectly compatible with the firm‟s existing strategic stance and 
resource base 
 Scale quickly and virally 
 Quickly become self-sustaining 
 Clearly and measurably address the social ill they were originally 
targeted at 
 
These high expectations – rather than serve as stretch-goals – often help 
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derail incipient projects and provide ammunition for early critics to take pot 
shots and eventually shoot them down. 
In addition to unreasonable expectations regarding the effort‟s outcome and 
duration, a common assumption is that these ventures should be 
“entrepreneurial” – meaning opportunities are to be pursued without regard to 
the resources currently controlled (Stevenson & Jarillo, 1990). Starting such 
an effort without the bare minimum of resources, and with the expectation that 
the necessary resources will be acquired effectually through the process itself 
– for example, by bringing other partners on board as needed – may have two 
important consequences: (1) loss of direction, and (2) overreliance on a single 
project “champion”. 
Procuring resources from others naturally injects their preferences and 
priorities into the entrepreneurial process. While fluidly integrating external 
parties into the process as needs arise is part and parcel of opportunity 
construction, it is antithetical to opportunity discovery. If the constant pressure 
for acquiring the venture‟s essential resources implants an opportunity 
construction mindset in senior management, half the ingredients necessary for 
entrepreneurial sensemaking are removed. In these cases, the venture may 
become prone to simply “following the money”, and become the kind of entity 
its sponsors at the time would like to see. This can lead it astray from building 
opportunities that really create demand because future BOP customers are 
rarely the sponsors injecting the cash at the start. This is akin to the mission 
drift that occurs among many NGOs that “serve” the BOP but that really 
opportunistically hop between projects, catering to donors‟ wishes rather than 
to their BOP communities‟ expressed needs. Organizations tend to respond to 
the wishes of those who control the resources the organization needs (Pfeffer 
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& Salancik, 1978). 
The second potential consequence of relying on a more “effectual” approach 
to resource acquisition is that the venture may come to rely primarily on the 
fund-raising abilities of a single actor – the project‟s “champion”. This 
champion many times is able to attract investment and support not necessarily 
because of the ideas or process underlying the venture, but because of her 
perceived enthusiasm, charisma, tenacity, or drive. While this view of 
entrepreneurial action is valid, it is a different model and logic of business 
development – more akin to Ashoka‟s version of social entrepreneurship 
(Drayton, 2000) – than it is about entrepreneurial sensemaking. If the process 
revolves around a single focal actor, then it is difficult to get a dialogue 
between opportunity construction and opportunity discovery logics. 
 
Innovating with the BOP 
For more experienced practitioners, or people already involved in a business 
with the BOP or fully committed to pursuing one, this study provides a 
multitude of insights and suggestions. I touch here briefly on only a few of 
them: field team composition, field team development, and senior 
management preparedness. 
 
Field team formation 
As much as we all like to think we are good judges of character, it is really very 
difficult to predict how a particular person will behave or perform under 
circumstances she has never been under before, nor how she will function in a 
brand new team. In other words, it‟s very difficult to form an effective and well-
functioning field team before the actual immersion. Most of us are trained and 
 224 
live in a predominantly opportunity-discovery world that prizes rationality, logic, 
planning, goals, foresight and clear-headedness, yet the conditions a field 
team will live and work in push towards an opportunity construction logic – or 
to a failed immersion. The ideal field team will enact an opportunity 
construction logic but will also be able to maintain meaningful interaction with 
an opportunity-discovery-enacting senior management team. 
When things seem to be stuck and no progress is being made, there may be 
the temptation to give the team leadership position to a “natural” entrepreneur. 
The danger with this is the possibility of a breakdown of communications 
between the two logics. On the other hand, keeping a “trusted lieutenant” as 
team leader – someone known as a can-do person, who does what needs to 
be done – may simply transfer the opportunity discovery logic to the field team 
and thwart the development of an appreciation for opportunity construction. 
Finding the right team leader or combination of team members that can enact 
an opportunity construction logic while retaining the ability to meaningfully 
interact with their superiors will like require some trial and error. It is almost 
axiomatic that not all the initial selections for team members will work out, one 
must be willing to quickly change members and roles as needed. Retaining 
members for too long who can‟t effectively manage the process has been one 
of the main mistakes documented in the studied cases. 
Also, as mentioned in the Theory Development and Discussion Chapters, the 
entrepreneurial function tends to be distributed in these processes. So the 
team needs to be formed with the best possible candidates, not solely 
focusing on the team leader. Team members should be selected primarily for 
their tolerance of ambiguity, their ability to motivate others to engage in an 
open-ended process, their capacity for practicing humility and developing 
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genuine relationships, and most importantly, their deep and true desire to live 
at the BOP and serve it. Other skills traditionally held in high regard for project 
managers or team leaders – such as technical knowledge, leadership skills, 
decisiveness, political power, etc. – may not be the best indicators of the 
ability to manage and participate in an entrepreneurial sensemaking process. 
Another issue to consider when forming an immersion team is the length of the 
process. Ideally, members should be selected for the long haul, at least a two-
year commitment – with the possibility of early departure if they prove 
unsatisfactory, as per the earlier point. In order to minimize long term 
commitments, many corporate immersion efforts are launched relying heavily 
on external consultants, student interns, independent contractors, or 
outsourced part-time employees. While this model is adequate for exploratory 
and information gathering activities, it does not support an entrepreneurial 
sensemaking process. These kinds of actors will simply not have the time to 
build the necessary relationships on the ground to effectively construct 
opportunities, nor will their organizational identity be strong enough to maintain 
intense negotiation with senior management and constructively manage the 
attendant conflict. 
Other important issues to consider when forming an immersion team for 
entrepreneurial sensemaking include: language capabilities, cultural adaptivity, 
and organizational familiarity. It is important that team members speak the 
local language fluently; an inability to do so does not kill the process – 
interpreters can be used – but it does slow it down considerably and embeds 
additional sources of misunderstanding and conflict. In relation to this, it is very 
convenient if most of the team members are to some extent local or native. 
Deploying foreigners to far-off countries for extended periods of time is very 
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stressful to them, more so when they are asked to live and work in BOP 
conditions and sacrifice almost all the “comforts of home”. In the studied 
cases, there were numerous examples of burnout resulting from cultural shock 
coupled to the intensity of the process. On the other hand, the field team does 
require members who are familiar with the parent organization, understand 
how it works, and can communicate effectively with their superiors. 
 
Field team development 
When asked to develop a novel business in close partnership with potential 
BOP stakeholders, few people really know what to do. At best, some team 
members may have experience in western style business startups (i.e. 
opportunity discovery based approaches based on market research, pitching 
business plans, etc.) or some industrial product design experience. Very rarely 
is someone on a field team formally trained in co-creation, co-invention, co-
venturing, collaborative business development, or community immersion. 
Sometimes an anthropologist, social worker, or participatory development 
practitioner is added to the team to plug this skills gap, but this rarely works in 
terms of business development. These disciplines are usually focused on 
understanding, helping, or empowering communities, but they do not integrate 
their community mobilization skills with the demands of constructing a 
commercial opportunity for a firm. 
Firms are exhorted to practice embedded innovation, and to develop the 
capabilities for innovating with the BOP, but there is no manual for this. This 
dissertation suggests that, given the open-ended nature of the process, there 
cannot be a detailed manual. It would be akin to a manual for entrepreneurs, 
something which has been tried countless times, yet not consensus has been 
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achieved on what its essentials are. Entrepreneurship is still considered more 
“art than science”. 
Since it is difficult, if not impossible, to adequately train a field team for 
opportunity construction in a classroom or off-site, the immersion itself can be 
used as a process for testing and training the team. Learning by doing, and 
experience living the process are what breed expertise in opportunity 
construction, tolerance for ambiguity, and the ability to negotiate the logic-
dichotomous command structure. 
In light of this, firms trying to innovate with the BOP would be wise to structure 
the immersion process in a way that enables the team members to develop 
the requisite skills and outlooks as they participate in it. This means starting 
slow, focusing initially on relationship building with the community and 
potential local partners, and supporting the team in its efforts to “become 
native”, rather than pressing for the immediate start of information gathering or 
outright ideation and product development activities. 
Team members should be initially evaluated on their ability to set the stage for 
opportunity construction: 
 How well can they establish relationships of trust within the community? 
(Not only with its purported leaders or most westernized and educated 
members). 
 How good are they at generating enthusiasm and commitment in the 
community? 
 How good are they at maintaining open-endedness? At dealing with 
ambiguity and uncertainty on a sustained basis, without trying to 
prematurely reach closure? 
 How good are they at keeping the growing network of potential 
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stakeholders committed to the venture while managing an action-
learning process that doesn‟t foreclose options? 
 
After a few months of relationship building and the creation of a core business 
concept, the emphasis of the effort on the ground shifts from the courting of 
ambiguity to more concrete business activities such as developing prototypes, 
generating sales leads, creating organizational identities, evolving governance 
systems, and fostering customer relationships. The main challenge at this 
point is moving towards these more commercial and operational activities 
without sacrificing the social embeddedness that has been achieved. The field 
team should not be replaced – at least in its entirety – at this point in order to 
inject these more operational skills; maintaining and evolving the incipient 
relationships with stakeholders still is the most delicate and crucial activity. 
As needed functions crystallize – and senior management develops a clearer 
understanding of current team members‟ capabilities – the field team can be 
gradually morphed and strengthened by adding or substituting one member at 
a time. An effective way of ensuring this process goes smoothly is to let the 
field team itself take the lead in searching for, vetting, selecting and inducting 
new members. 
To conclude, the main challenge in field team development is managing the 
tension between the stability required for local stakeholder relationship-
building and the changes that result from bringing new skillsets to bear in 
response to evolving business demands. 
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Senior management preparedness 
Senior managers need to understand the stresses and requirements that the 
deployment of an immersion field team may have on a firm and prepare 
accordingly. The field team members themselves cannot really foresee what it 
is they are getting into, and it‟s unreasonable to expect the team to 
singlehandedly develop a new business and a new market. Senior managers 
have to be involved from the outset and highly committed to the process in 
order to not only provide the needed space and support – such as protection 
from traditional operational performance metrics – but most importantly, to 
serve as an anchor for the field team. In other words, senior managers need to 
understand how to enact an opportunity discovery logic that ensures that the 
field team‟s opportunity construction activities remain broadly aligned with 
what the firm can ultimately commit to. At the same time, they need to provide 
the field team enough autonomy so that it is able to develop its opportunity 
discovery mode of action and not revert to simply following orders. Most firms 
that deploy field teams to interactively construct a business with a community 
end up with businesses that are much more complex, broad in scope, and 
multi-layered than what was initially envisioned; senior management has to 
consider this from the outset to provide effective guidance and feedback to the 
team. 
In both cases analyzed, senior managers were as unprepared and 
inexperienced in entrepreneurial sensemaking as the field team members. 
This ensured that the process in each case was more conflictive, drawn-out, 
resource-intensive, time-consuming, and energy draining than it needed to be. 
If conflict becomes pervasive, it can easily shift from beneficial task conflict to 
destructive personal conflict. It is senior management‟s responsibility to help 
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avoid or manage conflict; senior managers are the “older brothers” in this 
relationship, responsible regardless. 
An important issue that senior managers should realize is that the firm‟s ability 
to engage in entrepreneurial sensemaking is akin to a dynamic capability – it is 
dissipative, unstable, and produces unpredictable outcomes (Eisenhardt & 
Martin, 2000). Dynamic capabilities are semi-structured and based more on 
individuals‟ or inter-group skills than on organizational routines or systems. 
The implication is that this capability – which has to be “learnt by doing” – is 
tacitly held by the participants in the process and is also embedded in the 
pattern and nature of relationships held within the group (including senior 
managers). It takes time, perseverance, and patience to develop the 
capability, so senior managers must be careful not to lose or degrade it 
through deficient human resource practices. A corollary to this is that some 
initial ventures may be economic failures but may serve as great opportunities 
for developing an entrepreneurial sensemaking capability. The challenge for 
firms is to take the long view and persevere after the first, second, or third 
apparent failure, and not fire or exhaust the crucial employees before they 
have fully matured. Creating a market is tough business, is senior 
management truly committed? 
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